On the heritability of inspection time and its covariance with IQ: a twin study

Using the classical twin design, this study investigates the influence of genetic factors on the large phenotypic variance in inspection time (IT), and whether the well established IT–IQ association can be explained by a common genetic factor. Three hundred ninety pairs of twins (184 monozygotic, MZ; 206 dizygotic, DZ) with a mean age of 16 years participated, and 49 pairs returned approximately 3 months later for retesting. As in many IT studies, the pi figure stimulus was used and IT was estimated from the cumulative normal ogive. IT ranged from 39.4 to 774.1 ms (159±110.1 ms) with faster ITs (by an average of 26.9 ms) found in the retest session from which a reliability of .69 was estimated. Full-scale IQ (FIQ) was assessed by the Multidimensional Aptitude Battery (MAB) and ranged from 79 to 145 (111±13). The phenotypic association between IT and FIQ was confirmed (−.35) and bivariate results showed that a common genetic factor accounted for 36% of the variance in IT and 32% of the variance in FIQ. The maximum likelihood estimate of the genetic correlation was −.63. When performance and verbal IQ (PIQ & VIQ) were analysed with IT, a stronger phenotypic and genetic relationship was found between PIQ and IT than with VIQ. A large part of the IT variance (64%) was accounted for by a unique environmental factor. Further genetic factors were needed to explain the remaining variance in IQ with a small component of unique environmental variance present. The separability of a shared genetic factor influencing IT and IQ from the total genetic variance in IQ suggests that IT affects a specific subcomponent of intelligence rather than a generalised efficiency.     

On the Strategic Weighting of Spectral Information in Consonant Identification

When identifying speech sounds, do listeners direct attention specifically to those frequency regions in which distinctive phonetic information is located? Scharf, Dai, and Miller (1988) concluded that they do, based on an experiment that involved listeners identifying the members of a pair of voiced stop consonants differing primarily in their third-formant transitions. Adding extra contrastive acoustic energy to the third-formant region of one of the consonants enhanced performance more than did adding energy to a region where the consonants were otherwise identical. The present experiments extended this paradigm to reveal evidence of an interaction between the frequency region in which extra distinctive energy was added and the class of consonant to which it was added. The results were more consistent with an account in terms of the effects of added energy on phonetic identity than one based on spectral selective attention.     

Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover from Kant?

Kant marks a watershed in the history of theology, after which the anxious questions, “Can we speak of God? How can we?” have continually haunted modern theologians, insisting on being addressed before any others. Feeling compelled not to say about God what they want to say without first establishing that they are justified or entitled in saying those things, theologians have experienced both frustration and anxiety. However, the widespread assumption that one must experience the Kantian agony in order to be a modern theologian is challenged. Wolterstorff contends that one can move beyond Kant by rejecting the mental representationalist picture required by the latter’s account of intuitions and concepts. Conceiving of our intuitions as ’inputs’ which are then mentally represented according to concepts, is not only unnecessary but misleading. Theologians are better off rejecting the assumption that awareness always represents input and adopting instead the view that perceptual awareness, for example, is not so much an input but an action – the actualization of one of our human powers. Such an alternate pathway (opened up by Thomas Reid) would allow modern theologians to appropriate Kant without being appropriated by Kant.     

Cognitive models of stereotype change: (1). Generalization and subtyping in young people's views of the police

We report investigations of change in, and cognitive representation of young people's stereotypes of the police, in response to a police-schools liaison programme. This programme provides a real-life application of the ‘conversion’ model of stereotype change (in which stereotypes change radically in response to salient instances of disconfirming information). Study 1 revealed that school police officers were rated significantly more positively than the police in general, but that this view did not generalize to perceptions of the police in general. Stereotypes of the police became less positive over one year, although females were more positive than males, and school police officers were not judged typical of the category. Study 2 revealed that subjects categorized their school police officer separately from the police in general, and perceived him to share features with ‘caring and welfare’ professions, rather than other police officers and authority figures. Both studies converge on the limitations of the conversion model and tend to support the subtyping model (in which extremely disconfirming individuals are isolated from other group members).     

Measuring the stop point of rapid smoking

A method and an apparatus are described for measuring the point at which subjects elect to stop smoking when cigarette smoke is delivered more rapidly than in typical smoking. The device allows either the subject or the experimenter to control the volume of smoke and the interval between puffs. The device delivers reliable quantities of particulate matter from cigarette smoke. Subjects retested a week apart exhibited consistent stopping points.     

Socrates and the Unity of the Virtues

In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that each of the virtue-terms refers to “one thing” (εν: 333b4). But in the Laches (190c8–d5, 199e6–7), Socrates claims that courage is a proper part of virtue as a whole, and at Euthyphro 11e7–12e2, Socrates says that piety is a proper part of justice. But A cannot be both identical to B and also a proper part of B – piety cannot be both identical to justice and also a proper part of justice. In this paper we argue that coherent sense can be made of Socrates' apparently conflicting claims. The key to understanding Socrates' position, we will argue, is the central role of wisdom among the virtues. It is through the relationship of each virtue to wisdom that each may be said to be the same as all of the others, on the one hand, and also that some virtues may be regarded as proper parts of some other virtues, or as proper parts of virtue in general, on the other.