Rate of processing and judgment of response speed: comparing the effects of alcohol and practice

Both alcohol and practice affect choice reaction time. The present study was conducted to investigate the possibility that impairment from alcohol and improvement with practice could be attributed to changes in the efficiency of control mechanisms (Rabbitt, 1979a), some of which depend upon the ability to judge response speed accurately. Twenty subjects participated in a four-choice reaction time experiment in which they received no alcohol (NA) in Session 1 and either no alcohol (10 subjects) or 0.8 ml alcohol (A) per kilogram of body weight (10 subjects) in Session 2. The task was to respond as fast and as accurately as possible to each stimulus. In addition, subjects were required to press a fifth key after any response that they considered to be both fast and accurate. Subjects had no difficulty in performing this task: (1) there was a significant difference of 122 msec between the mean response time for correct responses indicated as fast and that for correct responses not indicated as fast, and (2) subjects indicated 1 in 4 correct responses but only 1 in 64 errors. Alcohol increased all response times by approximately 40 msec. In contrast, practice decreased response times less for correct responses not indicated as fast than for correct responses indicated as fast. The ability to distinguish between fast and slow responses was thus unaffected by alcohol, but was improved by practice. Responses indicated as "fast" were significantly faster than errors, and appeared to occur without warning (unlike errors, which tended to end a sequence of increasingly fast correct responses). The results suggest that alcohol and practice influence choice reaction time in qualitatively different ways: Alcohol impairs overall response speed but has no effect on the ability to judge response speed, whereas practice improves both.     

Predecisional information acquisition: Effects of task variables on suboptimal search strategies

Effective overall performance in judgment tasks generally involves both acquisition of information and integration of the information acquired. When information is costly the decision maker must balance acquisition costs against improved decisional accuracy, a complex balancing problem in which, laboratory evidence suggests, humans often do poorly. The three experiments reported here extend this earlier evidence to different task structures, subject pools, incentive systems, information volumes, decision aids, and kind of data sources. Though each of these factors was found to affect performance, the general finding was of persistent underpurchase (buying less information overall than is optimal) and mispurchase (buying poor sources when better sources are available at the same cost), with significant inflation of overall costs. It is proposed that unaided human judgment is unequal to the complexity of the cost/benefit trade-offs involved in acquiring costly information, and that formal decision analysis should be preferred whenever the stakes justify.