Making a religious diagnosis: The use of religious assessment in pastoral care and counseling

This essay discusses the importance of assessing the religious condition of persons in pastoral care and counseling. Undertaking such assessments via the use of explicit theological terms assures a unique role for pastoral counselors in the helping process and provides a model that avoids overdependence on psychology or psychiatry. Utilizing a method proposed by Paul Pruyser, the development of a psychometrically sound interview and inventory is described. These measures, based on eight dimensions of the Christian tradition, have been found to relate positively to mental health and personality strength. The importance of using such assessments of functional theology in helping persons grow in spiritual living and effective functioning is described.Paper delivered at the 4th International Congress on Pastoral Care and Counseling, Noordwijkerhout, The Netherlands, August 3–10, 1991.     

Derrida's language-games

Conclusion In previous essays (1973, 1975, 1977) I have praised Derrida's contributions to philosophical dialogue and also insisted on their limitations. The considerations raised in this present essay do not lead me to a position that is less ambivalent.Philosophy is a particular language-game. Like any other, it has its constitutive rules; or, perhaps better: its practice has certain distinctive features by means of which we recognize philosophizing and distinguish it from other linguistic activities. None of this can be set down in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions, and there always will be large areas of controversy about the paradigms themselves. Nonetheless there are philosophers, and they generally acknowledge Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Hume, and even some of their colleagues as also being philosophers. This acknowledgement holds even where there is philosophical disagreement - as must inevitably be the case, in view of the dialogical character of philosophical discourse.Derrida occasionally enters into the dialogue, as do many others - poets, novelists, critics, diplomats, attorneys, cooks, barbers, and babysitters. These occasional contributions to philosophical dialogue differ in focus, in style, and in lack of self-referentiality from the works which constitute the main corpus of philosophy. Some might wish to say, as if the matter were paradoxical, that such contributions are both philosophical and not philosophical, or that they are neither philosophy nor not-philosophy. That might be as good a thing to say as anything. The practice of philosophy is complex and has many levels. Those who are acknowledged as its finest practitioners have a focus, a style, and a respect for where questions begin and end. Derrida does not share these qualities, and does not care to share them. That is no reason to ignore his work, but it is sufficient to explain why philosophers do not recognize it as a contribution to the central corpus of philosophy.     

Ministerial effectiveness: A review of recent research

Effectiveness of ministers is difficult to measure. Ideally, the goal would be to find out if they have been helpful in reconciling people to God and to each other. However, these criteria can only be assessed indirectly. This essay proposes a model of effectiveness and reviews several studies designed to assess one or more of its facets. Although results are only somewhat conclusive, the methods are promising and future research on this foundation is indicated.     

Quasi-truth,paraconsistency, and the foundations of science

In order to develop an account of scientific rationality, two problems need to be addressed: (i) how to make sense of episodes of theory change in science where the lack of a cumulative development is found, and (ii) how to accommodate cases of scientific change where lack of consistency is involved. In this paper, we sketch a model of scientific rationality that accommodates both problems. We first provide a framework within which it is possible to make sense of scientific revolutions, but which still preserves some (partial) relations between old and new theories. The existence of these relations help to explain why the break between different theories is never too radical as to make it impossible for one to interpret the process in perfectly rational terms. We then defend the view that if scientific theories are taken to be quasi-true, and if the underlying logic is paraconsistent, it’s perfectly rational for scientists and mathematicians to entertain inconsistent theories without triviality. As a result, as opposed to what is demanded by traditional approaches to rationality, it’s not irrational to entertain inconsistent theories. Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that the view advanced here provides a new way of thinking about the foundations of science. In particular, it extends in important respects both coherentist and foundationalist approaches to knowledge, without the troubles that plague traditional views of scientific rationality.     

Memory search following valid and invalid abrupt-onset cues

The impact of abrupt-onset cues on memory search was investigated, where the abrupt-onset cue was a valid (Experiment 1), random (Experiment 2), or irrelevant (Experiment 3) predictor of the location containing the test probe. In Experiment 4, the abrupt-onset cue either preceded or followed the test probe. Sternberg-like functions were obtained in Experiments 1 and 2, with the effects of the abrupt-onset cue localized primarily in the intercept rather than the slope. Experiment 3 demonstrated that a spatially separated and irrelevant abrupt-onset cue increased latency even when all memory probes occurred at the fixation point. In Experiment 4, the robust impact of an abrupt-onset cue vanished, regardless of stimulus onset asynchrony, when it followed the target. We concluded that abrupt-onset cues captured attention regardless of their predictability, manifested as a delaying of search. However, once attention was captured by the target, a subsequent abrupt-onset stimulus had no effect. These results were discussed in terms of diffuse attention and contingent capture models of attention.     

Assessment of family functioning in Caucasian and Hispanic Americans: reliability, validity, and factor structure of the Family Assessment Device

The purpose of this study was to examine the factor structure, reliability, and validity of the Family Assessment Device (FAD) among a national sample of Caucasian and Hispanic American families receiving public sector mental health services. A confirmatory factor analysis conducted to test model fit yielded equivocal findings. With few exceptions, indices of model fit, reliability, and validity were poorer for Hispanic Americans compared with Caucasian Americans. Contrary to our expectation, an exploratory factor analysis did not result in a better fitting model of family functioning. Without stronger evidence supporting a reformulation of the FAD, we recommend against such a course of action. Findings highlight the need for additional research on the role of culture in measurement of family functioning.     

Kant on the Logical Origin of Concepts

In his lectures on general logic Kant maintains that the generality of a representation (the form of a concept) arises from the logical acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction. These acts are commonly understood to be identical with the acts that generate reflected schemata. I argue that this is mistaken, and that the generality of concepts, as products of the understanding, should be distinguished from the classificatory generality of schemata, which are products of the imagination. A Kantian concept does not provide mere criteria for noting sameness and difference in things, but instead reflects the inner nature of things. Its form consists in the self‐consciousness of a capacity to judge (i.e. the Concept is the ‘I think’).     

Women’s Regrets About Their Lives: Cohort Differences in Correlates and Contents

In this paper we test hypotheses about the importance of life stage in moderating the relationship between acknowledging regrets and concurrent well-being, as well as how changes in women’s social roles during the post-war period affected the content of the regrets they develop. We examine the relationship between women’s life regrets and life satisfaction, and the content of life regrets, using data from 313 predominately white, college-educated women who graduated from the same university in the United States in 1951/2 (age 66), 1972 (age 46) and 1992 (age 26). Analyses revealed that the more types of regrets middle-aged and older women reported (the 1972 and 1951/2 cohorts respectively), the lower their life satisfaction; this pattern did not hold for the youngest women. In terms of the specific content of regrets, exact logistic regressions showed that women in the oldest cohort reported more regrets about prioritizing family over career compared with the later cohorts. Overall, few women reported regrets about prioritizing their careers over families; however, women in the middle cohort were most likely to report these regrets. Results are discussed in terms of both developmental and socio-historical frameworks.