Electrophysiological indices of memory for temporal order in early childhood: implications for the development of recollection

The ability to recall contextual details associated with an event begins to develop in the first year of life, yet adult levels of recall are not reached until early adolescence. Dual‐process models of memory suggest that the distinct retrieval process that supports the recall of such contextual information is recollection. In the present investigation, we used both behavioral and electrophysiological measures to assess the development of memory for contextual details, as indexed by memory for temporal order, in early childhood. Results revealed age‐related improvements in memory for temporal order despite similar levels of memory for the individual items themselves. Furthermore, this pattern of recall was associated with specific components in the electrophysiological response. Consistent with electrophysiological research in adults, distributed, positive‐going activity late in the waveform was associated with increases in recall of contextual details and the development of recollective processes.     

The role of interference produced by conflicting associations in contextual control

In 2 experiments, participants completed a computer task in which they judged the probability of outcomes occurring (e.g., flowers growing, a bug infestation) given cues (e.g., treatment of soil with a fictitious garden product). In each 2-phase experiment, cue X was associated with 1 outcome in Phase 1 and with a 2nd outcome in Phase 2. When the outcome in Phase 1 (e.g., X led to a bug infestation) was replaced in Phase 2 (e.g., X led to flowers growing), contextual control was observed (Experiments 1 and 2). Information learned in each phase was less likely to be retrieved when the cue was tested in a context different from the 1 where training occurred. When the 2nd outcome did not conflict with information acquired in the 1st phase (e.g., X led to flowers and bugs), no contextual control was observed (Experiment 2). Acquiring a 2nd association to X resulted in contextual control only when it conflicted with an association learned earlier. The authors discuss the role of interference produced when conflicting information is acquired in establishing contextual control.     

A central capacity limit to the simultaneous storage of visual and auditory arrays in working memory

If working memory is limited by central capacity (e.g., the focus of attention; N. Cowan, 2001), then storage limits for information in a single modality should apply also to the simultaneous storage of information from different modalities. The authors investigated this by combining a visual-array comparison task with a novel auditory-array comparison task in 5 experiments. Participants were to remember only the visual, only the auditory (unimodal memory conditions), or both arrays (bimodal memory conditions). Experiments 1 and 2 showed significant dual-task tradeoffs for visual but not for auditory capacity. In Experiments 3-5, the authors eliminated modality-specific memory by using postperceptual masks. Dual-task costs occurred for both modalities, and the number of auditory and visual items remembered together was no more than the higher of the unimodal capacities (visual: 3-4 items). The findings suggest a central capacity supplemented by modality- or code-specific storage and point to avenues for further research on the role of processing in central storage.     

Religious Fundamentalism and Gender Differences

The role of religious fundamentalism and its relationship to shame and guilt was evaluated in 107 students who attend a church-sponsored university. A number of personality measures were given and gender differences were analyzed. The role of externalization was similar for males in this sample to that of earlier studies. However, it was found that females showed positive correlations between externalization and both shame and guilt. For females, more fundamentalistic religious training may help to contribute to an external orientation at the expense of identifying with a personal religion, and appropriate guilt.     

Effects of early institutionalization on the development of emotion processing: a case for relative sparing?

We tested the capacity to perceive visual expressions of emotion, and to use those expressions as guides to social decisions, in three groups of 8‐ to 10‐year‐old Romanian children: children abandoned to institutions then randomly assigned to remain in ‘care as usual’ (institutional care); children abandoned to institutions then randomly assigned to a foster care intervention; and community children who had never been institutionalized. Experiment 1 examined children's recognition of happy, sad, fearful, and angry facial expressions that varied in intensity. Children assigned to institutional care had higher thresholds for identifying happy expressions than foster care or community children, but did not differ in their thresholds for identifying the other facial expressions. Moreover, the error rates of the three groups of children were the same for all of the facial expressions. Experiment 2 examined children's ability to use facial expressions of emotion to guide social decisions about whom to befriend and whom to help. Children assigned to institutional care were less accurate than foster care or community children at deciding whom to befriend; however, the groups did not differ in their ability to decide whom to help. Overall, although there were group differences in some abilities, all three groups of children performed well across tasks. The results are discussed in the context of theoretical accounts of the development of emotion processing.     

On some worldly worries

Israel Scheffler and others have had trouble accepting such drastic theses in my work as that worlds, even old ones, are made by right versions, even new ones, and that two conflicting versions may both be right. But further explication shows how such theses have advantages over the more usual common-sense alternatives.Published by the author at Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138, U.S.A., on 1 September 1988.NOTICE: This paper may be copied and circulated with due credit but without charge. (It was accepted by theJournal of Philosophy, but withdrawn by that journal on the eve of publication because of a dispute over rights.)     

Utilization of base-rate information during feeling-of-knowing judgments.

We examined whether subjects use base-rate information about item difficulty when making feeling-of-knowing judgments for items they failed to recall. First, the subjects attempted to recall the answers to general-information questions. Then, for those items they recalled incorrectly, half of the subjects received information about the normative probability of recall of each item while judging their feeling of knowing. The other subjects made their feeling-of-knowing judgments without receiving any base-rate information. Finally, all subjects had a forced-choice recognition test on those items to validate the accuracy of their feeling-of-knowing judgments. Relative to the no-base-rate information group, the base-rate group had lower feelings of knowing for normatively difficult items and higher feelings of knowing for normatively easier items. Subjects who had received base-rate information during the judgment state had greater feeling-of-knowing accuracy than subjects who did not receive base-rate information. However, even the predictions from subjects who received base-rate information were not significantly more accurate for predicting subsequent recognition than were the predictions derived from normative information alone.