Training in Timing Improves Accuracy in Golf

In this experiment, the authors investigated the influence of training in timing on performance accuracy in golf. During pre- and posttesting, 40 participants hit golf balls with 4 different clubs in a golf course simulator. The dependent measure was the distance in feet that the ball ended from the target. Between the pre- and posttest, participants in the experimental condition received 10 hr of timing training with an instrument that was designed to train participants to tap their hands and feet in synchrony with target sounds. The participants in the control condition read literature about how to improve their golf swing. The results indicated that the participants in the experimental condition significantly improved their accuracy relative to the participants in the control condition, who did not show any improvement. We concluded that training in timing leads to improvement in accuracy, and that our results have implications for training in golf as well as other complex motor activities.     

Planning of Reach-and-Grasp Movements: Effects of Validity and Type of Object Information

Individuals are assumed to plan reach-and-grasp movements by using two separate processes. In 1 of the processes, extrinsic (direction, distance) object information is used in planning the movement of the arm that transports the hand to the target location (transport planning); whereas in the other, intrinsic (shape) object information is used in planning the preshaping of the hand and the grasping of the target object (manipulation planning) In 2 experiments, the authors used primes to provide information to participants (N = 5, Experiment 1; N = 6, Experiment 2) about extrinsic and intrinsic object properties. The validity of the prime information was systematically varied. The primes were succeeded by a cue, which always correctly identified the location and shape of the target object. Reaction times were recorded. Four models of transport and manipulation planning were tested. The only model that was consistent with the data was 1 in which arm transport and object manipulation planning were postulated to be independent processes that operate partially in parallel. The authors suggest that the processes involved in motor planning before execution are primarily concerned with the geometric aspects of the upcoming movement but not with the temporal details of its execution.     

An Analysis of Motor Coordination Components for Various Localization Tasks

Localization abilities of subjects in three perceptual-motor tasks were considered before and after an exposure to a visual distortion. During this distortion the subject observed his hand ballistically point to an invisible but audible target while either receiving or not receiving knowledge of results (KR) concerning pointing accuracy. Also, subjects either received a 1-or a 4-sec rest period between each of 30 exposure ballistic pointing actions. The pre-and postexposure tasks involved the ability of a subject to accurately point to an occluded and stationary auditory target, to point to the straight-ahead position in space, and to indicate when a moving, auditory target was perceived as being in the straight-ahead position. For these tasks, the pre-vs. postexposure localization difference scores are referred to as the negative aftereffect, the proprioceptive shift, and the auditory shift, respectively. Wilkinson’s (1971) two-component additive model (negative aftereffect= proprioceptive shift plus auditory shift) held when KR was given regardless of amount of rest between exposure pointing responses. With a 4-sec rest and no KR, the relationship between coordination components was nonadditive (negative aftereffect greater than proprioceptive shift plus auditory shift).     

Revision from the Margins: Fromm's Contributions to Psychoanalysis

Fromm's important contributions to the modern development of psychoanalytic thought are often ignored and frequently misunderstood. An early proponent of revisions of psychoanalytic theory and therapy similar to recent trends in object relations, self-psychology and interpersonal psychoanalysis, Fromm was a visionary for a Freudian theory built upon orthodoxies of the past but going beyond them. It is argued here that Fromm's unique role in helping create a new version of psychoanalysis for the 21st century was as sociological as it was intellectual. Fromm's contributions were intimately linked to his institutional positioning close to the center but on the relative margins of the discipline. This paper will outline how sociological dynamics shaped Fromm's revision of psychoanalysis. We will conclude by discussing how Fromm was able to have a more dramatic influence than other Freudian revisionists who were less favourably positioned.     

Do MacDonald and MacDonald Solve the Problem of Mental Causal Relevance?

Ever since Davidson first articulated and defended anomalous monism, nonreductive physicalists have struggled with the problem of mental causation. Considerations about the causal closure of the physical domain and related principles about exclusion make it very difficult to maintain the distinctness of mental and physical properties while securing a causal role for the former. Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the underlying metaphysics and ontology of the mental causation debate to gain traction on this issue. Cynthia MacDonald and Graham MacDonald have followed suit and argue that the solution to the nonreductivist’s troubles lies in a particular metaphysical view of events. They claim that an appropriately formulated property exemplification account of events resolves the problem and secures the causal relevance of mental properties. I argue that while this approach might get us the causal efficacy of mental events, it does not provide the sought-after causal relevance of mental properties. I show that the reason MacDonald and MacDonald stumble on the problem of causal relevance is—ironically—due to features of their view of events.     

The effects of list composition and perceptual fluency on judgments of learning (JOLs)

The perceptual fluency hypothesis proposes that items that are easier to perceive at study will be given higher memorability ratings, as compared with less fluent items. However, prior research has examined this metamemorial cue primarily using mixed-list designs. Furthermore, certain memory effects are moderated by the design (mixed list vs. pure list) used to present stimuli. The present study utilized mixed as well as pure lists to assess whether judgments of learning based on perceptual fluency are relative or absolute and whether people are sensitive to differences in recall produced by variation in list composition. Using font size and generation manipulations, Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the effect of perceptual fluency on metamemory is relative in nature, occurring only in mixed lists. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that metamemory is insensitive to the effect of list composition on recall. These findings are consistent with the assumptions of Koriat’s (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 126: 349-370, 1997) cue-utilization framework, that JOLs reflect a comparative process and are insensitive to cues pertaining to conditions of learning.     

Aristotle's Syllogistic and Core Logic

I use the Corcoran–Smiley interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic as my starting point for an examination of the syllogistic from the vantage point of modern proof theory. I aim to show that fresh logical insights are afforded by a proof-theoretically more systematic account of all four figures. First I regiment the syllogisms in the Gentzen–Prawitz system of natural deduction, using the universal and existential quantifiers of standard first-order logic, and the usual formalizations of Aristotle's sentence-forms. I explain how the syllogistic is a fragment of my (constructive and relevant) system of Core Logic. Then I introduce my main innovation: the use of binary quantifiers, governed by introduction and elimination rules. The syllogisms in all four figures are re-proved in the binary system, and are thereby revealed as all on a par with each other. I conclude with some comments and results about grammatical generativity, ecthesis, perfect validity, skeletal validity and Aristotle's chain principle.     

Type D personality predicts poor medication adherence in myocardial infarction patients

Type D personality, the combination of negative affectivity (NA) and social inhibition (SI), is an emerging risk factor in cardiovascular disease. This study aimed to examine one possible behavioural mechanism to explain the link between Type D and ill-health. It was hypothesised that Type D personality would predict medication adherence in myocardial infarction (MI) patients. In a prospective study, 192 MI patients (54 females and 138 males) completed measures of Type D personality and provided demographic and medical information 1 week post-MI, and then 131 patients went on to complete a self-report measure of medication adherence 3 months post-MI. It was found that Type D personality predicts adherence to medication, after controlling for demographic and clinical risk factors. Critically, the constituent components of Type D, NA and SI, interact to predict medication adherence, after controlling for the effects of each component separately. Poor adherence to medication may represent one mechanism to explain why Type D cardiac patients experience poor clinical outcome, in comparison to non-Type D patients. Interventions, which target the self-management of medication, may be useful in these high-risk patients.     

What,and Where,Luck is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey

In ‘What Luck Is Not’, Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of fortune. Fortune is luck-involving, and therefore easily confused with luck, but it is not itself lucky.