Yours or mine? Ownership and memory

An important function of the self is to identify external objects that are potentially personally relevant. We suggest that such objects may be identified through mere ownership. Extant research suggests that encoding information in a self-relevant context enhances memory (the so-called 'self-reference effect'), thus an experiment was designed to test the impact of ownership on memory performance. Participants either moved or observed the movement of picture cards into two baskets; one of which belonged to self and one which belonged to another participant. A subsequent recognition test revealed that there was a significant memory advantage for objects that were owned by self. Acting on items (i.e., moving them) had no impact on memory. Results are discussed with reference to the importance of self-object associations in cognition.     

Evaluating models of remember-know judgments: Complexity, mimicry, and discriminability

Remember-know judgments provide additional information in recognition memory tests, but the nature of this information and the attendant decision process are in dispute. Competing models have proposed that remember judgments reflect a sum of familiarity and recollective information (the one-dimensional model), are based on a difference between these strengths (STREAK), or are purely recollective (the dual-process model). A choice among these accounts is sometimes made by comparing the precision of their fits to data, but this strategy may be muddied by differences in model complexity: Some models that appear to provide good fits may simply be better able to mimic the data produced by other models. To evaluate this possibility, we simulated data with each of the models in each of three popular remember-know paradigms, then fit those data to each of the models. We found that the one-dimensional model is generally less complex than the others, but despite this handicap, it dominates the others as the best-fitting model. For both reasons, the one-dimensional model should be preferred. In addition, we found that some empirical paradigms are ill-suited for distinguishing among models. For example, data collected by soliciting remember/know/new judgments--that is, the trinary task--provide a particularly weak ground for distinguishing models. Additional tables and figures may be downloaded from the Psychonomic Society's Archive of Norms, Stimuli, and Data, at www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Learning from experience: Examining the impact of client work upon two trainee therapists

This qualitative research study, focusing on the learning and change of two trainee therapists over a nine‐month period, was conducted by the trainees themselves. In collecting and analysing their data, the researchers made use of the heuristic methodology, to which some of the principles of the co‐operative inquiry methodology were added. The findings shed light on some of the ways in which trainee counsellors and psychotherapists might learn through their work with clients, the forms and contexts in which this learning may arise, and how the learning might affect the trainees. The findings additionally highlight some of the possible benefits of engaging in research for trainee counsellors and psychotherapists, in terms of their roles as practitioners. These include positive changes in the ways in which they work with clients, and changes in the ways they think about their practice.     

Using Adobe Flash Lite on mobile phones for psychological research: Reaction time measurement reliability and interdevice variability

Mobile telephones have significant potential for use in psychological research, possessing unique characteristics— not least their ubiquity—that may make them useful tools for psychologists. We examined whether it is possible to measure reaction times (RTs) accurately using Adobe Flash Lite on mobile phones. We ran simple and choice RT experiments on two widely available mobile phones, a Nokia 6110 Navigator and a Sony Ericsson W810i, using a wireless application protocol (WAP) connection to access the Internet from the devices. RTs were compared within subjects with those obtained using a Linux-based millisecond-accurate measurement system. Results show that measured RTs were significantly longer on mobile devices, and that overall RTs and distribution of RTs varied across devices.     

New Foundations for a Relational Theory of Theory-revision

AGM-theory, named after its founders Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson, is the leading contemporary paradigm in the theory of belief-revision. The theory is reformulated here so as to deal with the central relational notions ‘J is a contraction of K with respect to A’ and ‘J is a revision of K with respect to A’. The new theory is based on a principal-case analysis of the domains of definition of the three main kinds of theory-change (expansion, contraction and revision). The new theory is stated by means of introduction and elimination rules for the relational notions. In this new setting one can re-examine the relationship between contraction and revision, using the appropriate versions of the so-called Levi and Harper identities. Among the positive results are the following. One can derive the extensionality of contraction and revision, rather than merely postulating it. Moreover, one can demonstrate the existence of revision-functions satisfying a principle of monotonicity. The full set of AGM-postulates for revision-functions allow for completely bizarre revisions. This motivates a Principle of Minimal Bloating, which needs to be stated as a separate postulate for revision. Moreover, contractions obtained in the usual way from the bizarre revisions, by using the Harper identity, satisfy Recovery. This provides a new reason (in addition to several others already adduced in the literature) for thinking that the contraction postulate of Recovery fails to capture the Principle of Minimal Mutilation. So the search is still on for a proper explication of the notion of minimal mutilation, to do service in both the theory of contraction and the theory of revision. The new relational formulation of AGM-theory, based on principal-case analysis, shares with the original, functional form of AGM-theory the idealizing assumption that the belief-sets of rational agents are to be modelled as consistent, logically closed sets of sentences. The upshot of the results presented here is that the new relational theory does a better job of making important matters clear than does the original functional theory. A new setting has been provided within which one can profitably address two pressing questions for AGM-theory: (1) how is the notion of minimal mutilation (by both contractions and revisions) best analyzed? and (2) how is one to rule out unnecessary bloating by revisions?     

A new secretary problem with rank-based selection and cardinal payoffs

We present an extension of the secretary problem in which the decision maker (DM) sequentially observes up to n applicants whose values are random variables X₁,X₂,…,X_n drawn i.i.d. from a uniform distribution on [0,1]. The DM must select exactly one applicant, cannot recall released applicants, and receives a payoff of x_t, the realization of X_t, for selecting the tth applicant. For each encountered applicant, the DM only learns whether the applicant is the best so far. We prove that the optimal policy dictates skipping the first sqrt(n)-1 applicants, and then selecting the next encountered applicant whose value is a maximum.     

The Product of Self-Deception

I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii) have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for the product of self-deception.