Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies and Witness Group Identity on Mock‐Juror Judgments1

We examined the interaction of testimonial consistency and witness group identity on mock jurors' judgments of witness effectiveness, probability that the defendant committed the crime, and verdict. In a 3 × 2 (Witness Group Identity × Testimonial Consistency) between‐groups design, 180 mock jurors heard a trial of a person charged with assault. Although both variables affected judgments, group‐identity effects were weak when testimony was characterized by inconsistencies, and they were stronger when testimony was internally consistent but ambiguous. The judgment patterns were consistent with predictions from Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly's (1989) heuristic‐systematic processing theory, suggesting that heuristic processing would bias systematic processing when the evidence was not decisive.     

Using confidence ratings to identify a target among foils

Sauer, Brewer, and Weber (2008) advanced a novel procedure for testing eyewitness recognition memory. Rather than providing a single decision (i.e., identifying a lineup member or rejecting the lineup as a whole), participants rated their confidence that each lineup member was the culprit. Classification algorithms determined when patterns of confidence ratings indicated suspect guilt or innocence. Across varied test stimuli, confidence-based classifications equalled or out-performed single decisions. However, Sauer et al.’s classification criteria were designed to optimize performance for the data to which they were applied. If effective classification using confidence ratings requires such idiosyncratic criteria, the applied utility of the confidence procedure is nil. We re-analysed the data from Sauer et al.’s two identification experiments and demonstrated that confidence-based classification performance exceeding that of a traditional lineup task did not depend on uniquely developed classification criteria. Confidence-rating lineups offer a potentially promising alternative to procedures requiring single decisions from witnesses.     

An Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Affective Control Scale in an Undergraduate Sample

A considerable amount of clinical research interest has recently developed regarding emotion dysregulation and psychopathology. Many have suggested that distinct affective management deficits may characterize anxiety and mood pathology. Despite increased research attention, efforts to validate and sufficiently investigate the psychometric properties of many self-report measures of affect regulation have been lacking. The current study examined the response behavior of 1566 undergraduate participants who completed the Affective Control Scale (ACS). The ACS assesses fear of intense emotion, and it is frequently used in empirical research. The present investigation examined the structural qualities of the measure using exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic techniques. Findings suggest the original four rationally-derived subscales do not adequately fit the observed response patterns. Rather, results indicated that a five-factor solution that included a subscale measuring emotion mismanagement better represented response behavior. Additional normative data and bivariate correlations with other measures of emotion regulation and affect are presented.     

Self-reflection and the temporal focus of the wandering mind

Current accounts suggest that self-referential thought serves a pivotal function in the human ability to simulate the future during mind-wandering. Using experience sampling, this hypothesis was tested in two studies that explored the extent to which self-reflection impacts both retrospection and prospection during mind-wandering. Study 1 demonstrated that a brief period of self-reflection yielded a prospective bias during mind-wandering such that participants’ engaged more frequently in spontaneous future than past thought. In Study 2, individual differences in the strength of self-referential thought — as indexed by the memorial advantage for self rather than other-encoded items — was shown to vary with future thinking during mind-wandering. Together these results confirm that self-reflection is a core component of future thinking during mind-wandering and provide novel evidence that a key function of the autobiographical memory system may be to mentally simulate events in the future.     

Effects of pre-experimental knowledge on recognition memory

The influence of pre-experimental autobiographical knowledge on recognition memory was investigated using as memoranda faces that were either personally known or unknown to the participant. Under a dual process theory, such knowledge boosted both recollection- and familiarity-based recognition judgements. Under an unequal variance signal detection model, pre-experimental knowledge increased both the variance and the separation of the target and foil memory strength distributions, boosting hits and correct rejections. Thus, pre-experimental knowledge has profound effects on the multiple, interacting processes that subserve recognition memory, and likely in the neural systems that underpin them.     

Donation after circulatory death: burying the dead donor rule

Despite continuing controversies regarding the vital status of both brain-dead donors and individuals who undergo donation after circulatory death (DCD), respecting the dead donor rule (DDR) remains the standard moral framework for organ procurement. The DDR increases organ supply without jeopardizing trust in transplantation systems, reassuring society that donors will not experience harm during organ procurement. While the assumption that individuals cannot be harmed once they are dead is reasonable in the case of brain-dead protocols, we argue that the DDR is not an acceptable strategy to protect donors from harm in DCD protocols. We propose a threefold alternative to justify organ procurement practices: (1) ensuring that donors are sufficiently protected from harm; (2) ensuring that they are respected through informed consent; and (3) ensuring that society is fully informed of the inherently debatable nature of any criterion to declare death.     

Feeling bad about screwing up: emotion regulation and action monitoring in the anterior cingulate cortex

This study examined neural features of emotional responses to errors. We specifically examined whether directed emotion regulation of negative emotion associated with error modulates action-monitoring functions of anterior cingulate cortex, including conflict monitoring, error processing, and error prevention. Seventeen healthy adults performed a continuous performance task during assessment by fMRI. In each block, participants were asked either to increase or decrease their negative emotional responses or to react naturally after error commission. Emotion regulation instructions were associated with modulation of rostral and dorsal anterior activity and of their effective connectivity following errors and conflict. Cingulate activity and connectivity predicted subsequent errors. These data may suggest that responses to errors are affected by emotion and that aspects of emotion and cognition are inextricably linked, even during a nominally cognitive task.     

Path analytic examination of a cognitive model of PTSD

Ehlers and Clark (2000) developed a cognitive model of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptom maintenance which implicated the role of posttraumatic cognitions and aspects of the trauma memory in maintaining symptoms via an increased sense of current threat. The aim of the current study was to empirically test a variant of this model using path analysis. Participants in the current study were 514 undergraduates at a midwestern university who reported experiencing at least one traumatic event. Path analyses examined various models of the possible relationships between one’s posttraumatic cognitions and the centrality of the traumatic event to the sense of self (considered an aspect of memory integration) in predicting current level of PTSD symptoms. Results indicate that both event centrality and posttraumatic cognitions are unique and independent predictors of current symptom level. Overall, the results of this study support aspects of Ehlers and Clark’s cognitive model of PTSD; cognitive appraisals of the self and centrality of the event were highly related to levels of distress. However, the current study suggests that overly integrated trauma memories may lead to greater distress and not poorly integrated ones as suggested by Ehlers and Clark.