A longitudinal investigation of the relationship between maternal mind‐mindedness and theory of mind

Data are presented from a longitudinal investigation examining the relationship between maternal mind‐mindedness (MM) in infancy and socio‐cognitive development in childhood. We revisited children (n = 18) who had taken part in a longitudinal study as infants. MM had been assessed at 10, 12, 16, and 20 months of age. We followed up these children at 5–6 years of age to test their higher order theory of mind (ToM) (using the strange stories task). The convergent validity, temporal stability, and predictive validity of the construct of MM were examined in a longitudinal data set. The five measures of MM were not significantly correlated. Mother's production of appropriate mind‐related comments (but no other measures) showed evidence of temporal stability throughout infancy. Thus, MM (as measured by appropriate mind‐related comments) was confirmed as a stable construct. Children's ToM at 5–6 years of age was significantly predicted by their mother's MM up to 4 years earlier, with MM accounting for 40% of the variance of the strange stories task scores. These findings identify a relationship between MM across a protracted period of infancy and socio‐cognitive development at 5–6 years of age.     

Exploring early self‐referential memory effects through ownership

The self‐reference effect (SRE) is the reliable memory advantage for information encoded about self over material encoded about other people. The developmental pathway of the SRE has proved difficult to chart, because the standard SRE task is unsuitable for young children. The current inquiry was designed to address this issue using an ownership paradigm, as encoding objects in the context of self‐ownership have been shown to elicit self‐referential memory advantages in adults. Pairs of 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children (n = 64) sorted toy pictures into self‐ and other‐owned sets. A surprise recognition memory test revealed a significant advantage for toys owned by self, which decreased with age. Neither verbal ability nor theory of mind attainment predicted the size of the memory advantage for self‐owned items. This finding suggests that contrary to some previous reports, memory in early childhood can be shaped by the same self‐referential biases that pervade adult cognition.     

Exploring Subjective Representationalism

Representationalism is, roughly, the view that experiencing is to be analyzed wholly in terms of representing. But what sorts of properties are represented in experience? According to a prominent form of representationalism, objective representationalism, experiences represent only objective (i.e. suitably mind‐independent) properties. I explore subjective representationalism, the view that experiences represent at least some subjective (i.e. suitably mind‐dependent) properties. Subjective representationalists, but not objective representationalists, can accommodate cases of illusion‐free phenomenal inversion. Moreover, subjective representationalism captures the so‐called transparency of experience, as it is standardly articulated, just as well as objective representationalism.