Defending the Possibility of Knowledge

In this paper, I propose a solution to Fitch’s paradox that draws on ideas from Edgington (Mind 94:557–568, 1985), Rabinowicz and Segerberg (1994) and Kvanvig (Noûs 29:481–500, 1995). After examining the solution strategies of these authors, I will defend the view, initially proposed by Kvanvig, according to which the derivation of the paradox violates a crucial constraint on quantifier instantiation. The constraint states that non-rigid expressions cannot be substituted into modal positions. We will introduce a slightly modified syntax and semantics that will help underline this point. Furthermore, we will prove results about the consistency of verificationism and the principle of non-omniscience by model-theoretical means. Namely, we prove there exists a model of these principles, and delineate certain constraints they pose on a structure in which they are true.     

Recognition by association: Within‐ and cross‐modality associative priming with faces and voices

Recent literature has raised the suggestion that voice recognition runs in parallel to face recognition. As a result, a prediction can be made that voices should prime faces and faces should prime voices. A traditional associative priming paradigm was used in two studies to explore within‐modality priming and cross‐modality priming. In the within‐modality condition where both prime and target were faces, analysis indicated the expected associative priming effect: The familiarity decision to the second target celebrity was made more quickly if preceded by a semantically related prime celebrity, than if preceded by an unrelated prime celebrity. In the cross‐modality condition, where a voice prime preceded a face target, analysis indicated no associative priming when a 3‐s stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was used. However, when a relatively longer SOA was used, providing time for robust recognition of the prime, significant cross‐modality priming emerged. These data are explored within the context of a unified account of face and voice recognition, which recognizes weaker voice processing than face processing.     

Online Advertisements and Conceptual Implicit Memory: Advances in Theory and Methodology

We conducted three experiments to further our understanding, both theoretically and methodologically, of conceptual implicit memory within the advertising context. Results from the first experiment confirmed what previous research had suggested: using a brand generation task is a conceptual implicit memory measure. The first experiment also demonstrated that conceptual priming can be found using realistic‐looking advertisements embedded within a news website. Results from Experiments 2 and 3 suggest that not only is providing specific encoding instructions not necessary to induce conceptual or semantic processing but also that there were no differences based on whether the experimental procedure was conducted in a laboratory or online. Together, these results have implications for increasing the ecological validity of this type of research. By allowing participants to view realistic advertisements outside of a laboratory without specific encoding instructions, the procedure much more closely mimics how individuals actually interact with advertisements in real life. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

Nation,Narration, and Health in Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Guantánamo Diary</Emphasis>

Scholars have mostly analyzed information from mental health practitioners, attorneys, and institutions to critique mental health practices in the War on Terror. These sources offer limited insights into the suffering of detainees. Detainee accounts provide novel information based on their experiences at Guantánamo. Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s Guantánamo Diary is the only text from a current detainee that provides a first-person account of his interrogations and interactions with health professionals. Despite being advertised as a diary, however, it has undergone redaction from American government officials. This article examines Slahi’s account of his interrogations and representations of mental health at Guantánamo and considers its role within the narrative function of the nation. At stake is the right of detainees to narrate, scholars to critique medical practices in the War on Terror, and the nation’s attempts to control its narration.     

Ecological Networks and Community Attachment and Support Among Recently Resettled Refugees

Interventions aimed at enhancing mental health are increasingly centered around promoting community attachment and support. However, few have examined and tested the specific ecological factors that give rise to these key community processes. Drawing from insights from the ecological network perspective, we tested whether spatial and social overlap in routine activity settings (e.g., work, school, childcare) with fellow ethnic community members is associated with individuals’ attachment to their ethnic communities and access to social resources embedded in their communities. Data on routine activity locations drawn from the Refugee Well‐Being Project (based in a city in the Southwestern United States) were used to reconstruct the ecological networks of recently resettled refugee communities, which were two‐mode networks that comprise individuals and their routine activity locations. Results indicated that respondents’ community attachment and support increased with their ecological network extensity—which taps the extent to which respondents share routine activity locations with other community members. Our study highlights a key ecological process that potentially enhances individuals’ ethnic community attachment that extends beyond residential neighborhoods.     

Handedness and Reach-to-Place Kinematics in Adults: Left-Handers Are Not Reversed Right-Handers

The primary goal of this study was to examine the relations between limb control and handedness in adults. Participants were categorized as left or right handed for analyses using the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. Three-dimensional recordings were made of each arm on two reach-to-place tasks: adults reached to a ball and placed it into the opening of a toy (fitting task), or reached to a Cheerio inside a cup, which they placed on a designated mark after each trial (cup task). We hypothesized that limb control and handedness were related, and we predicted that we would observe side differences favoring the dominant limb based on the dynamic dominance hypothesis of motor lateralization. Specifically, we predicted that the dominant limb would be straighter and smoother on both tasks compared with the nondominant limb (i.e., right arm in right-handers and left arm in left-handers). Our results only partially supported these predictions for right-handers, but not for left-handers. When differences between hands were observed, the right hand was favored regardless of handedness group. Our findings suggest that left-handers are not reversed right-handers when compared on interlimb kinematics for reach-to-place tasks, and reaffirm that task selection is critical when evaluating manual asymmetries.     

A sound effect: Exploration of the distinctiveness advantage in voice recognition

Two experiments are presented, which explore the presence of a distinctiveness advantage when recognising unfamiliar voices. In Experiment 1, distinctive voices were recognised significantly better, and with greater confidence, in a sequential same/different matching task compared with typical voices. These effects were replicated and extended in Experiment 2, as distinctive voices were recognised better even under challenging listening conditions imposed by nonsense sentences and temporal reversal. Taken together, the results aligned well with similar results when processing faces, and provided a useful point of comparison between voice and face processing.     

Associative false consumer memory: effects of need for cognition and encoding task

Two experiments investigated the effects of product–attribute associations on false consumer memory. In both experiments, subjects were presented with sets of related product attributes under incidental encoding conditions. Later, recognition memory was tested with studied attributes, non-studied but associated attributes (critical lures) and non-studied unrelated attributes. In Experiment 1, the effect of Need for Cognition (NFC) was assessed. It was found that individuals high in NFC recognised more presented attributes and falsely recognised more associative critical lures. The increase in both true and associative false memory was accompanied by a greater number of responses that index the retrieval of detailed episodic-like information. Experiment 2, replicated the main findings through an experimental manipulation of the encoding task that required subjects to consider purchase likelihood. Explanations for these findings are considered from the perspective of activation processes and knowledge structures in the form of gist-based representations.     

You meta believe it

Because of the privileged place of beliefs in explaining behaviour, mismatch cases—in which agents sincerely claim to believe that p, but act in a way that is inconsistent with that belief—have attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, I argue that some of these cases, at least, are at least partially explained by agents believing that they believe that p, while failing to believe that p. Agents in these cases do not believe that ~p; rather, they have an indistinct first‐order, beliefy, representation that p. The indistinctness of this first‐order representation provides the leeway for the inconsistency seen in their behaviour.