Is emotion regulation associated with cancer-related psychological symptoms?

Objectives: This study examined the cross-sectional and prospective relationships between subjective (cognitive reappraisal, expressive suppression and experiential avoidance) and objective (high-frequency heart rate variability [HF-HRV]) measures of emotion regulation (ER) and a set of psychological symptoms (anxiety, depression, fear of cancer recurrence [FCR], insomnia, fatigue, pain, and cognitive impairments) among women receiving radiation therapy for non-metastatic breast cancer.

Design: Eighty-one participants completed a battery of self-report scales within 10 days before the start of radiotherapy (T1) and within 10 days after its end (T2; approximately 6 weeks after T1). HF-HRV at rest was measured at T1.

Results: Canonical correlation analyses revealed that higher levels of experiential avoidance and expressive suppression were cross-sectionally associated with higher levels of all symptoms, except pain, at T1 and at T2 (both p’s?<?0.0001). Higher levels of suppression and reappraisal at T1 were marginally associated with reduced FCR and with increased depression and fatigue between T1 and T2 (p?=?0.07). HF-HRV was not associated with symptoms cross-sectionally or prospectively.

Conclusions: Although preliminary, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that maladaptive ER strategies, assessed subjectively, may cross-sectionally act as a transdiagnostic mechanism underlying several cancer-related psychological symptoms.     

Reasons Wrong and Right

The fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrong’ kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons wherever it appears. In this article I argue that two recent proposals for solving the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem do not work. I then offer an alternative solution that provides a unified, systematic explanation of the difference between the two kinds of reasons.