The Interaction Between Conscientiousness and General Mental Ability: Support for a Compensatory Interaction in Task Performance

Journal of Business and Psychology - We propose a compensatory interactive influence of conscientiousness and GMA in task performance such that conscientiousness is most beneficial to performance...     

Justice at the Margins: The Social Contract and the Challenge of Marginal Cases

Attempts to justify the special moral status of human beings over other animals face a well‐known objection: the challenge of marginal cases. If we attempt to ground this special status in the unique rationality of humans, then it becomes difficult to see why nonrational humans (infants, the severely cognitively disabled, and so on) should be treated any differently than other, nonhuman animals. We respond to this challenge by turning to the social contract tradition. In particular, we identify an important role for the concept of recognition in attempts to secure rights through a social contract. Recognition, which involves identifying with or seeing ourselves as others, is the key to establishing the scope of justice, and we argue that this scope extends to all humans—even the so‐called marginal cases—but not to other animals. If this is correct, then we have a principled reason for why all humans have certain rights that other animals lack.     

Salience,Imagination, and Moral Luck

One key desideratum of a theory of blame is that it be able to explain why we typically have differing blaming responses in cases involving significant degrees of luck. T.M. Scanlon has proposed a relational account of blame, and he has argued that his account succeeds in this regard and that this success makes his view preferable to reactive attitude accounts of blame. In this paper, I aim to show that Scanlon's view is open to a different kind of luck-based objection. I then offer a way of understanding moral luck cases which allows for a plausible explanation of our differential blaming responses by appealing to the salience of certain relevant features of the action in question.     

Benefits from retrieval practice are greater for students with lower working memory capacity

We examined the effects of retrieval practice for students who varied in working memory capacity as a function of the lag between study of material and its initial test, whether or not feedback was given after the test, and the retention interval of the final test. We sought to determine whether a blend of these conditions exists that maximises benefits from retrieval practice for lower and higher working memory capacity students. College students learned general knowledge facts and then restudied the facts or were tested on them (with or without feedback) at lags of 0–9 intervening items. Final cued recall performance was better for tested items than for restudied items after both 10 minutes and 2 days, particularly for longer study–test lags. Furthermore, on the 2-day delayed test the benefits from retrieval practice with feedback were significantly greater for students with lower working memory capacity than for students with higher working memory capacity (r?=??.42). Retrieval practice may be an especially effective learning strategy for lower ability students.     

A cross-cultural study of family functioning

The Family Assessment Device (FAD) was used to compare patterns of family functioning in two cultural settings, North America and Hungary. The sample size consisted of 95 nonclinical North American families and 58 nonclinical Hungarian families. No cross-cultural differences were found in the families' general functioning nor in their affective involvement or affective responsiveness as measured by the FAD. Hungarian families, however, perceived their functioning as significantly better than the North American families in problem-solving and in communication. North American families rated themselves significantly better than the Hungarians in setting family rules and boundaries and in meeting their family responsibilities. Results from this study suggest that cultural values can affect a family's functioning and that differences in areas of family functioning can be captured using the FAD. A discussion of broad societal values of the two cultures was used to interpret the contrasting patterns of family functioning.Cross-cultural studies serve many purposes. In general they provide knowledge about the different cultures under investigation. As such, they broaden and enrich our perspectives of ourselves and the world around us. More specifically they highlight similarities and differences across cultures, information that can be helpful in further refining our understanding of the impact of diverse and varying socio-political forces.A topic of particular interest to family therapists and researchers is family functioning in different cultural settings. In spite of continuing research in this area, few studies examine cross-cultural patterns of family interactions and even fewer do so with instruments specifically designed to assess family functioning.From a family perspective, particularly looking at pathology in family functioning, cross-cultural comparisons can be used to highlight areas of dysfunction common to families irrespective of the cultural context. From a cross-cultural perspective, family comparisons can be used to point out the cultural effects and emphases given to different dimensions of functioning within a common system (i.e., the family unit).Both conceptual and methodological problems have contributed to shortcomings in previous cross-cultural studies (Fabrega, 1974; Kleinman, 1987; Flaherty et al., 1988; Rogler, 1989). A basic criticism of such studies has been the assumption that meanings and values in one culture are equivalent to those in another.Another issue, which is particularly pertinent to our study, is the use of an instrument which is developed in one culture and administered in another cultural setting. A potential problem this raises is inferring cultural differences between groups when the translated and the original instruments are not actually comparable in meaning. In fact, one objective of the study was to see whether our own self-report measure of family functioning, the Family Assessment Device (FAD, Epstein et al., 1978, 1983), could be successfully used in another cultural setting.The following report is part of a larger research project, conducted in 1986–87, that compared depressed and nonclinical families across two cultures. The findings presented here are comparisons between nonclinical Hungarian and nonclinical North American families. In our earlier study differences in family interactions between clinically depressed and nonclinical families were evident in both cultural settings (Keitner et al., in press). It was not clear, however, if significant cross-cultural differences in family functioning would be found for the normal group of families and, if so, how these would differ from their ill counterparts. Inclusion of the normal families thus served two purposes, as controls in the larger study to test within cultural differences and as comparison groups in a separate analysis to test between cultural differences.A specific objective of this study was to contrast patterns of perceived family functioning in nonclinical Hungarian families and North American families. Another objective was to determine if the Family Assessment Device (FAD), a self-report measure of family functioning, could be successfully used in different cultural contexts. Hungary was chosen as an appropriate country of study for several reasons. It is at the crossroads of East and West, sharing enough similarities with western culture to validate comparisons, yet different enough in both its cultural and sociopolitical system that some differences could be expected to emerge. Because it is likely that the Hungarian social system is less familiar to readers than that of North American, the results are discussed with particular reference to Hungary.We would like to thank Drs. J. Furedi and T. Kurimay for help in translating the Family Assessment Device and Professors J. Szilard and Muszong-Kovacs for their support of this study. This work was supported in part by the Firan Foundation.     

Brain potentials related to seeing one''s own name

Subjects were assigned an assumed name and then shown a series of statements of the form, "My name / is / X", where X was the assumed name, their own first name, or one of a set of other false names. Their task was to respond positively to the "assumed" name and reject as false all other names, including their own. An N380 feature of the averaged task-related brain potentials, considered to be inversely related to the degree of contextual priming, was greatly enhanced for the false names compared to the assumed name. The N380 to one's own name was more similar to that of the false than the assumed name, indicating that the sentence context's priming of various names was under the subjects' attentional control, and that the late negativity could be modulated by this attention. In contrast, a large P510 feature distinguished one's own name from the false name, and this difference was unaffected by practice. Even in cases, then, where the context allows anticipation of one verbal event (here, the assumed name), a highly overlearned and salient stimulus such as one's own name continues to produce a distinctive neural response.     

Does imagery contribute to metaphoric quality?

With metaphoric quality divided into an appropriateness and novelty component, college-student subjects rated 75 metaphoric sentences on those components and on imageability. Different subjects were assigned to each of the three rating conditions (n=45 in each). Correlations based on mean ratings of the metaphors indicated that imageability was negatively related to novelty and positively related to appropriateness. A composite of the novelty and appropriateness ratings (deemed to reflect metaphoric quality) proved to be independent of imageability. Examination of metaphors with the highest and lowest imagery ratings suggested that imagery was facilitated by perceptual-configural linkages and inhibited by remote conceptual linkages between topic and vehicle. This configural-conceptual distinction appears to be of greater importance than quality in influencing the extent to which a metaphor is imaged.An earlier version of this paper was presented by the first author at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, New York City, April 1981. This research was funded in part by a doctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada to the first author, who is now affiliated with the University of Illinois.