Against Branching Identity

Philosophia - Would you survive if your consciousness branched into two or more streams? Commonly discussed within the context of split-brain scenarios, this possibility might soon become...     

ADHD Symptoms in Post-Institutionalized Children Are Partially Mediated by Altered Frontal EEG Asymmetry

Individual differences in the propensity for left versus right frontal electroencephalogram (EEG) asymmetry may underlie differences in approach/withdrawal tendencies and mental health deficits. Growing evidence suggests that early life adversity may shape brain development and contribute to the emergence of mental health problems. The present study examined frontal EEG asymmetry (FEA) following the transition to family care in children adopted internationally from institutional care settings between 15 and 36 months of age (N = 82; 46 female, 36 male). Two comparison groups were included: an international adoption control consisting of children adopted from foster care with little to no institutional deprivation (N = 45; 17 female, 28 male) and a post-adoption condition control consisting of children reared in birth families of the same education and income as the adoptive families (N = 48; 23 female, 25 male). Consistent with evidence of greater approach and impulsivity-related behavior problems in post-institutionalized (PI) children, PI status was associated with greater left FEA than found in the other two groups. In addition, left FEA served as a mediator between institutionalization and age 5 ADHD symptoms for girls. Age at adoption and other preadoption factors were examined with results suggesting that earlier adoption into a supportive family resulted in a more typical pattern of brain functioning. Findings support the idea that the capacity of brain activity to evidence typical functioning following perturbation may differ in relation to the timing of intervention and suggest that the earlier the intervention of adoption, the better.     

Object files across eye movements: Previous fixations affect the latencies of corrective saccades

One of the factors contributing to a seamless visual experience is object correspondence—that is, the integration of pre- and postsaccadic visual object information into one representation. Previous research had suggested that before the execution of a saccade, a target object is loaded into visual working memory and subsequently is used to locate the target object after the saccade. Until now, studies on object correspondence have not taken previous fixations into account. In the present study, we investigated the influence of previously fixated information on object correspondence. To this end, we adapted a gaze correction paradigm in which a saccade was executed toward either a previously fixated or a novel target. During the saccade, the stimuli were displaced such that the participant’s gaze landed between the target stimulus and a distractor. Participants then executed a corrective saccade to the target. The results indicated that these corrective saccades had lower latencies toward previously fixated than toward nonfixated targets, indicating object-specific facilitation. In two follow-up experiments, we showed that presaccadic spatial and object (surface feature) information can contribute separately to the execution of a corrective saccade, as well as in conjunction. Whereas the execution of a corrective saccade to a previously fixated target object at a previously fixated location is slowed down (i.e., inhibition of return), corrective saccades toward either a previously fixated target object or a previously fixated location are facilitated. We concluded that corrective saccades are executed on the basis of object files rather than of unintegrated feature information.     

On universals: an extensionalist alternative to Quine’s resemblance theory

The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine’s theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine’s theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and realism: Universals and Scientific realism (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In the present paper, I propose an alternative framework that accounts for the phenomena that Quine intends to explain with his resemblance theory. The framework agrees with Quine’s austere ontology; in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and of possible worlds. (I will mention below Quine’s reason for rejecting properties and possible worlds. For a theory of Universals that assumes possible worlds, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Moreover, the framework is extensionalist since the abstract entities it assumes are classes and these can be individuated extensionally, for classes are identical if their members are identical. Finally, I will refute some of the objections to Quine’s approach that have been raised by Armstrong and Oliver [(1996). The metaphysics of properties. Mind, 105, 1–80.] and I will argue that, contrary to what has been claimed by Oliver in a comment on Lewis [(1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.], Quine is able to specify an important set of sparse properties. Editor’s Note: Nathan Stemmer died on 6 April 2007. Due to this, the proofreading was only done by the editors. All colleagues being acquainted with Nathan Stemmers work are deeply concerned about the loss.     

Inhibiting your native language: the role of retrieval-induced forgetting during second-language acquisition

After immersion in a foreign language, speakers often have difficulty retrieving native-language words--a phenomenon known as first-language attrition. We propose that first-language attrition arises in part from the suppression of native-language phonology during second-language use, and thus is a case of phonological retrieval-induced forgetting. In two experiments, we investigated this hypothesis by having native English speakers name visual objects in a language they were learning (Spanish). Repeatedly naming the objects in Spanish reduced the accessibility of the corresponding English words, as measured by an independent-probe test of inhibition. The results establish that the phonology of the words was inhibited, as access to the concepts underlying the presented objects was facilitated, not impaired. More asymmetry between English and Spanish fluency was associated with more inhibition for native-language words. This result supports the idea that inhibition plays a functional role in overcoming interference during the early stages of second-language acquisition.     

Recall in Infancy: A Neurodevelopmental Account

ABSTRACT— Relations between developments in neural structures and changes in memory in infancy are a relatively recent focus of research. Greater knowledge about brain development, as well as methodological advances such as combined use of behavioral and electrophysiological techniques, have led to the generation and testing of specific hypotheses regarding sources of age-related change. Theory and data converge to suggest that the early-stage processes of encoding and consolidation are a significant source of age-related variability in memory early in life. Additional research is needed to determine how these processes change and interact with myriad other determinants of recall.     

Toward a New Method of Detecting Deliberately Faked Personality Tests: The use of idiosyncratic item responses

This study presents a new method for developing faking detection scales based on idiosyncratic item‐response patterns. Two scoring schemes based on this approach strongly differentiated between scores obtained under honest vs directed faking conditions in cross‐validation samples (r_pb=.45 and .67). This approach is shown to successfully classify between 20% and 37% of faked personality measures with only a 1% false positive rate in a sample comprised of 56% honest responses. Of equal importance, this method does not result in a scale that meaningfully correlates with personality or cognitive ability tests. This study raises many questions about both the source and generalizabiltiy of the effect. Key directions for future research and improved scale development that may limit or enhance the utility of the idiosyncratic item‐response method are discussed.     

Socrates and Superiority

I propose an alternative interpretation of the Crito. The arguments that are typically taken to be Socrates' primary arguments against escape are actually supplementary arguments that rely on what I call the Superiority Thesis, the thesis that the state and its citizens are members of a moral hierarchy where those below are tied by bonds of obligation to those above. I provide evidence that Socrates holds this thesis, demonstrate how it resolves a number of apparent difficulties, and show why my interpretation is preferable to competing interpretations.     

Effects of antecedent variables on disruptive behavior and accurate responding in young children in outpatient settings

The effects of manipulations of task variables on inaccurate responding and disruption were investigated with 3 children who engaged in noncompliance. With 2 children in an outpatient clinic, task directives were first manipulated to identify directives that guided accurate responding; then, additional dimensions of the task were manipulated to evaluate their influence on disruptive behavior. With a 3rd child, similar procedures were employed at school. Results showed one-step directives set the occasion for accurate responding and that other dimensions of the task (e.g., preference) functioned as motivating operations for negative reinforcement.     

Hume’s Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill’s problem)

Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume’s account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman’s opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the account even includes a correct answer to Mill’s question of why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for a complete induction, since Hume gives a well-supported explanation of this reliability phenomenon. The discussion also suggests that Bayesian theory by itself cannot explain this phenomenon. Finally, we will see that Hume’s explanation of the reliability phenomenon is surprisingly similar to the explanation given lately by a number of naturalistic philosophers in their discussion of the Goodman paradox.