Perspective taking in children's narratives about jealousy

This study explored relationships between perspective‐taking, emotion understanding, and children's narrative abilities. Younger (23 5‐/6‐year‐olds) and older (24 7‐/8‐year‐olds) children generated fictional narratives, using a wordless picture book, about a frog experiencing jealousy. Children's emotion understanding was assessed through a standardized test of emotion comprehension and their ability to convey the jealousy theme of the story. Perspective‐taking ability was assessed with respect to children's use of narrative evaluation (i.e., narrative coherence, mental state language, supplementary evaluative speech, use of subjective language, and placement of emotion expression). Older children scored higher than younger children on emotion comprehension and on understanding the story's complex emotional theme, including the ability to identify a rival. They were more advanced in perspective‐taking abilities, and selectively used emotion expressions to highlight story episodes. Subjective perspective taking and narrative coherence were predictive of children's elaboration of the jealousy theme. Use of supplementary evaluative speech, in turn, was predictive of both subjective perspective taking and narrative coherence.     

The role of prevention focus under stereotype threat: Initial cognitive mobilization is followed by depletion

Previous research has demonstrated that stereotype threat induces a prevention focus and impairs central executive functions. The present research examines how these 2 consequences of stereotype threat are related. The authors argue that the prevention focus is responsible for the effects of stereotype threat on executive functions and cognitive performance. However, because the prevention focus is adapted to deal with threatening situations, the authors propose that it also leads to some beneficial responses to stereotype threat. Specifically, because stereotype threat signals a high risk of failure, a prevention focus initiates immediate recruitment of cognitive control resources. The authors further argue that this response initially facilitates cognitive performance but that the additional cognitive demands associated with working under threat lead to cognitive depletion over time. Study 1 demonstrates that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates immediate cognitive control capacity during a stereotype-relevant task. Study 2 experimentally demonstrates the process by showing that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates cognitive control as a default, as well as when a prevention focus has been experimentally induced, but not when a promotion focus has been induced. Study 3 shows that stereotype threat facilitates initial math performance under a prevention focus, whereas no effect is found under a promotion focus. Consistent with previous research, however, stereotype threat impaired math performance over time under a prevention focus, but not under a promotion focus.     

The implications of value conflict: how disagreement on values affects self-involvement and perceived common ground

This article presents two studies demonstrating the implications of having different values (vs. interests) in a situation where people take opposite positions. Study 1 examined how people respond to a range of conflict issues that were framed either as referring to conflicting values or as referring to conflicting interests. Study 2 used a more immersive methodology, in which participants were led to consider either their values or interests in taking up a particular position, after which they were presented with a confederate who took up the opposite position. Results of both studies converge to demonstrate that framing a particular conflict issue in terms of values causes people to experience more self-involvement and to perceive less common ground. This result can be seen as a potential explanation of why value conflicts tend to escalate more easily than conflicts of interests and also offers scope for interventions directed at value conflict resolution.     

Do socially anxious individuals fear embarrassment by close others? Development of the Fear of Embarrassment by Others Scale

Social anxiety disorder is characterized by an intense fear of social or performance situations, and a fear of acting in a way that will be humiliating or embarrassing. However, the extent to which socially anxious individuals fear embarrassment due to the behavior of close others remains unknown. The Fear of Embarrassment by Others Scale (FEOS) was developed to assess the extent to which individuals with social anxiety fear being embarrassed by others. To assess the psychometric properties of this measure, 162 undergraduate students low or high in social anxiety completed the FEOS, along with additional questionnaires. An exploratory factor analysis suggested a single factor. The measure demonstrates high internal consistency, and is correlated with measures of social anxiety, fear of negative evaluation, and anxiety sensitivity. Fear of embarrassment by others was not found to be a significant predictor of social anxiety, as compared to anxiety sensitivity and fear of negative evaluation. The FEOS discriminated among participants high and low in social anxiety, as those high in social anxiety scored significantly higher on the measure than did participants low in social anxiety. The utility of this scale for research and clinical practice is discussed.     

Self-compassion and social anxiety disorder

Self-compassion refers to having an accepting and caring orientation towards oneself. Although self-compassion has been studied primarily in healthy populations, one particularly compelling clinical context in which to examine self-compassion is social anxiety disorder (SAD). SAD is characterized by high levels of negative self-criticism as well as an abiding concern about others' evaluation of one's performance. In the present study, we tested the hypotheses that: (1) people with SAD would demonstrate less self-compassion than healthy controls (HCs), (2) self-compassion would relate to severity of social anxiety and fear of evaluation among people with SAD, and (3) age would be negatively correlated with self-compassion for people with SAD, but not for HC. As expected, people with SAD reported less self-compassion than HCs on the Self-Compassion Scale and its subscales. Within the SAD group, lesser self-compassion was not generally associated with severity of social anxiety, but it was associated with greater fear of both negative and positive evaluation. Age was negatively correlated with self-compassion for people with SAD, whereas age was positively correlated with self-compassion for HC. These findings suggest that self-compassion may be a particularly important target for assessment and treatment in persons with SAD.     

The role of anger in generalized anxiety disorder

Little is known about the role of anger in the context of anxiety disorders, particularly with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). The aim of study was to examine the relationship between specific dimensions of anger and GAD. Participants (N?=?381) completed a series of questionnaires, including the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002, Behavior Therapy, 33, 215-233), the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI-2; Spielberger 1999, State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2: STAXI-2 professional manual, Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources) and the Aggression Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & Perry 1992, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 452-459). The GAD-Q-IV identifies individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for GAD (i.e. GAD analogues) and those who do not (non-GAD). The STAXI-2 includes subscales for trait anger, externalized anger expression, internalized anger expression, externalized anger control and internalized anger control. The AQ includes subscales for physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger and hostility. The GAD-Q-IV significantly correlated with all STAXI-2 and AQ subscales (r's ranging from .10 to .46). Multivariate analyses of variance revealed that GAD analogues significantly differed from non-GAD participants on the combined STAXI-2 subscales (η(2)?=?.098); high levels of trait anger and internalized anger expression contributed the most to GAD group membership. GAD analogue participants also significantly differed from non-GAD participants on the combined AQ subscales (η(2)?=?.156); high levels of anger (affective component of aggression) and hostility contributed the most to GAD group membership. Within the GAD analogue group, the STAXI-2 and AQ subscales significantly predicted GAD symptom severity (R (2)?=?.124 and .198, respectively). Elevated levels of multiple dimensions of anger characterize individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for GAD.     

Visual complexity attenuates emotional processing in psychopathy: Implications for fear-potentiated startle deficits

A long-standing debate is the extent to which psychopathy is characterized by fundamental deficits in attention or emotion. We tested the hypothesis that the interplay of emotional and attentional systems is critical for understanding processing deficits in psychopathy. A group of 63 offenders were assessed using the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) and fear-potentiated startle (FPS) reflexes were collected while participants viewed pictures selected to disentangle an existing confound between perceptual complexity and emotional content in the pictures typically used to study fear deficits in psychopathy. As predicted, picture complexity moderated the emotional processing deficits. Specifically, the affective–interpersonal features of psychopathy were associated with greater allocation of attentional resources to processing emotional stimuli at initial perception (visual N1), but only when the picture stimuli were visually complex. Despite this, results for the late positive potential indicated that emotional pictures were less attentionally engaging and held less motivational significance for individuals high in affective–interpersonal traits. This deficient negative emotional processing was observed later in their reduced defensive fear reactivity (FPS) to high-complexity unpleasant pictures. In contrast, the impulsive–antisocial features of psychopathy were associated with decreased sensitivity to picture complexity (visual N1) and were unrelated to emotional processing, as assessed by both ERPs and FPS. These findings are the first to demonstrate that picture complexity moderates FPS deficits, and they implicate the interplay of attention and emotional systems as deficient in psychopathy.     

A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Stress and Health

Psychological stress is a major risk factor for the development and progression of a number of diseases, including cardiovascular disease, cancer, arthritis, and major depression. A growing body of research suggests that long term, stress‐induced activation of the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and the hypothalamic‐pituitary‐adrenal (HPA) axis may lead to increases in inflammation, which is known to play a key role in the pathophysiology of a variety of diseases. Furthermore, the burgeoning fields of social neuroscience and health neuroscience have begun to identify the neurocognitive mechanisms by which stress may lead to these physiological changes. Here we review the literature examining the neurocognitive correlates of stress‐induced SNS, HPA, and inflammatory responses. Specifically, we summarize the results of neuroimaging studies that have examined the neural correlates of stress‐related increases in SNS, HPA, and inflammatory activity. A set of neural systems involved in threat processing, safety processing, and social cognition are suggested as key contributors to stress‐related changes in physiology. We conclude by offering suggestions for future research in the exciting new field of health neuroscience.     

Morality in Groups: On the Social‐Regulatory Functions of Right and Wrong

Applying what we know about group‐based identities and concerns allows us to improve our understanding of the ways in which morality is relevant to social judgments of right and wrong. We distinguish between three different social functions of moral standards and moral judgments. The identity defining function of morality indicates where people want to belong, and how they are regarded by others. The group dynamic function indicates consensual definitions of what is right and wrong that guide individual behavioral choices. The intergroup relations function of group morality, speaks to the way people tend to communicate with and behave towards members of other groups that have different moral standards.     

Social Aspects of Sexual Boundary Trouble in Psychoanalysis: Responses to the Work of Muriel Dimen,edited by Charles Levin,Routledge, Abingdon and New York, 2021, 244 pp.

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -