Consciousness Raising: From Revolution to Re-Evaluation

Consciousness raising was developed in the radical feminist wing of the women's liberation movement. It was originally envisioned as a means of creating revolution. The reform wing of the movement took up consciousness raising after 1970 partially in response to grassroots pressure and partially to attract members. As consciousness raising spread, the political content began to disappear. Ultimately, consciousness raising moved into the orbit of the group therapy movement. The transformation of consciousness raising from its revolutionary origins to convergence with group therapies is tied to the history of radical feminism and to a change in its practitioners. The history of consciousness raising reflects not only the power of the therapeutic view, but more significantly, brings into question the value of the process both for the movement and for individuals, as long as political content is left out.     

Editorial Introduction to the Special Issue: Using Story Completion Methods in Qualitative Research

ABSTRACT

What is story completion? How come I’ve never heard of it? Can it be useful for me as a qualitative researcher? A relatively unknown method for qualitative data collection, story completion has a long history of use in psychotherapy practice and (quantitative) developmental psychology research. We believe it has untapped, exciting potential as a qualitative technique in and beyond psychology, offering something quite different to many of the popular methods (e.g., interviews, focus groups). In this article, an introduction to an exciting Special Issue that discusses and demonstrates the potential of story completion, we provide a brief history of the development of story completion as a qualitative technique and an overview of design, sampling, and data analysis in story completion research. We finish by highlighting potential pitfalls of story completion, alongside a discussion of the possibilities it offers, and briefly introduce the empirical papers in the Special Issue.     

Hidden gifts of love: A clinical application of object relations theory

Using an extended clinical example, the author applies aspects of Kleinian, Fairbairnian, and Bionian theory to demonstrate how individuals may come to hide away feelings of both love and aggression. In the clinical material presented, a version of a schizoid retreat was understood as a pervasive response to trauma. The author attempts to explore more specifically the nature of a ‘traumatizing outer world’ ( Guntrip, 1969 ) and how these experiences cause an individual to retreat and undermine movement toward healthy adult dependency. An understanding of these dynamics helps inform the psychoanalytic treatment process and can serve as a type of roadmap in navigating through challenging transference–countertransference enactments.     

The A Priori and the Empirical in Theories of Emotion: Smedslund's “Conceptual Analysis” of Emotion

Abstract

This paper examines the suggestion made by Smedslund that the empirical laws of emotion proposed by Frijda are a priori necessities, derivable from a definition of emotion Smedslund proposes. First, a distinction is drawn between a causal and non-causal reading of Smedslund's own definition of emotion. The suggestion is made that although on the causal reading the definition might provide sufficient conditions for being in an emotional state, causal regularities are empirical, so this reading would not meet his own criteria for an a priori definition. Moreover, showing that Frijda's laws are derivable from the definition thus understood would not undermine their empirical status. The non-causal reading is then examined and questions are raised about whether it can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a state to be a state of emotion. Finally, the suggestion is made that the central issue in the question of whether or not a theory of emotion is wholly empirical turns not on whether it can be derived from a definition of emotion, but, rather, on the extent to which the explanations proposed of the regularities governing emotions must appeal to a priori rationality constraints.