Green Keynesianism: Bringing the Entrepreneurial State Back in(to Question)?

Since the global financial crisis of 2007/8, proliferating calls for a Keynesian Green New Deal have cast the publicly (and environmentally) minded state as a necessary driver of technological innovation and social transformation, while, vice versa, innovation has moved to political centre-stage. The history and genesis of this particular Green Keynesian paradigm illustrate that some of its most high-profile proponents selectively and problematically frame twentieth-century Keynesianism and the ‘public good’. It is important to examine critically the calls for an ‘entrepreneurial state’ in which Green Keynesian ideas are mobilized in support of an agenda for continued and accelerated development of commercially focused, privately developed green technologies. The entrepreneurial state represents a neoliberal re-appropriation of Green Keynesianism, where dominant financial actors (in Silicon Valley, as opposed to on Wall Street) are tapped as the visionaries who can and should set our collective innovation agenda. Although there is a need for large-scale, coordinated techno-social efforts to address climate change, supporting ‘green’ innovation cannot simply be framed as maximizing ‘innovation’ while taking the ‘state’ for granted. Instead, it must entail a careful assessment of the specific trajectories of innovation being enabled and the underlying socio-natures that they maintain and promote. Science and technology studies (STS)-informed analysis allows, and compels, asking how socio-technological innovation and their constitutive power relations are crucially interrelated, making the reshaping of the state—still the primary institution and system of social relations of collective governance—a core but neglected political, technological and ecological project of our time, with a key role for STS.     

The Nature and Organization of Individual Differences in Executive Functions: Four General Conclusions

Executive functions (EFs)-a set of general-purpose control processes that regulate one's thoughts and behaviors-have become a popular research topic lately and have been studied in many subdisciplines of psychological science. This article summarizes the EF research that our group has conducted to understand the nature of individual differences in EFs and their cognitive and biological underpinnings. In the context of a new theoretical framework that we have been developing (the unity/diversity framework), we describe four general conclusions that have emerged from our research. Specifically, we argue that individual differences in EFs, as measured with simple laboratory tasks, (1) show both unity and diversity (different EFs are correlated yet separable); (2) reflect substantial genetic contributions; (3) are related to various clinically and societally important phenomena; and (4) show some developmental stability.     

Predictors of Deliberate Self-Harm Behavior Among Emerging Adolescents: An Initial Test of a Self-Punitiveness Model

The current study examined the extent to which an expanded self-punitiveness model could be applied to deliberate self-harm (DSH) among students making the transition to university. Specific components of the self-punitiveness model included perfectionism, overgeneralization, self-criticism, and shame. A sample of 319 university students completed a measure of deliberate self-harm as well as two multidimensional perfectionism measures and measures of self-criticism, overgeneralization, and shame. Correlational analyses found few significant associations among deliberate self-harm and the self-punitiveness factors among men. In contrast, among women, deliberate self-harm was associated with dimensions of trait perfectionism such as parental criticism and socially prescribed perfectionism, as well as with overgeneralization, self-criticism, and both characterological shame and bodily shame with the strongest associations found with shame. Supplementary analyses found a strong link between overgeneralization and shame and an association between self-criticism and shame among women. The results support the contention that particularly among young women making the transition to university, deliberate self-harm behavior is a reflection of a self-punitive personality orientation with multiple facets and a sense of shame associated with an overgeneralized sense of failing to meet social expectations.     

Inhibitory control and negative emotional processing in psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder

The field of personality disorders has had a long-standing interest in understanding interactions between emotion and inhibitory control, as well as neurophysiological indices of these processes. More work in particular is needed to clarify differential deficits in offenders with antisocial personality disorder (APD) who differ on psychopathic traits, as APD and psychopathy are considered separate, albeit related, syndromes. Evidence of distinct neurobiological processing in these disorders would have implications for etiology-based personality disorder taxonomies in future psychiatric classification systems. To inform this area of research, we recorded event-related brain potentials during an emotional-linguistic Go/No-Go task to examine modulation of negative emotional processing by inhibitory control in three groups: psychopathy (n = 14), APD (n = 16), and control (n = 15). In control offenders, inhibitory control demands (No-Go vs. Go) modulated frontal-P3 amplitude to negative emotional words, indicating appropriate prioritization of inhibition over emotional processing. In contrast, the psychopathic group showed blunted processing of negative emotional words regardless of inhibitory control demands, consistent with research on emotional deficits in psychopathy. Finally, the APD group demonstrated enhanced processing of negative emotion words in both Go and No-Go trials, suggesting a failure to modulate negative emotional processing when inhibitory control is required. Implications for emotion-cognition interactions and putative etiological processes in these personality disorders are discussed.     

The compensation and capitalization models: A test of two approaches to individualizing the treatment of depression

Despite long-standing calls for the individualization of treatments for depression, modest progress has been made in this effort. The primary objective of this study was to test two competing approaches to personalizing cognitive-behavioral treatment of depression (viz., capitalization and compensation). Thirty-four adults meeting criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (59% female, 85% Caucasian) were randomized to 16-weeks of cognitive-behavioral treatment in which strategies used were selected based on either the capitalization approach (treatment matched to relative strengths) or the compensation approach (treatment matched to relative deficits). Outcome was assessed with a composite measure of both self-report (i.e., Beck Depression Inventory) and observer-rated (i.e., Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression) depressive symptoms. Hierarchical linear modeling revealed a significant treatment approach by time interaction indicating a faster rate of symptom change for the capitalization approach compared to the compensation approach (d = .69, p = .03). Personalizing treatment to patients' relative strengths led to better outcome than treatment personalized to patients' relative deficits. If replicated, these findings would suggest a significant change in thinking about how therapists might best adapt cognitive-behavioral interventions for depression for particular patients.     

Emotion Dysregulation and Eating Disorder Symptoms: Examining Distinct Associations and Interactions in Adolescents

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - Emotion dysregulation has been posited as a key transdiagnostic factor of mental health difficulties, including eating disorders. However, how...     

Feeling happy enhances early spatial encoding of peripheral information automatically: electrophysiological time-course and neural sources

Previous research has shown that positive mood may broaden attention, although it remains unclear whether this effect has a perceptual or a postperceptual locus. In this study, we addressed this question using high-density event-related potential methods. We randomly assigned participants to a positive or a neutral mood condition. Then they performed a demanding oddball task at fixation (primary task ensuring fixation) and a localization task of peripheral stimuli shown at three positions in the upper visual field (secondary task) concurrently. While positive mood did not influence behavioral performance for the primary task, it did facilitate stimulus localization on the secondary task. At the electrophysiological level, we found that the amplitude of the C1 component (reflecting an early retinotopic encoding of the stimulus in V1) was enhanced in the positive, as compared with the neutral, mood group. Importantly, this effect appeared to be largely automatic, because it occurred regardless of the task relevance of the peripheral stimulus and prior to top-down gain control effects seen at the level of the subsequent P1 component. This early effect was also observed irrespective of a change of the target-related P300 component (primary task) by positive mood. These results suggest that positive mood can automatically boost the spatial encoding of peripheral stimuli early on following stimulus onset. This effect can eventually underlie the broadening of spatial attention, which has been associated with this specific mood state.     

Autonomic and subjective responsivity to emotional images in people with dissociative seizures

People with dissociative seizures (DS) report a range of difficulties in emotional functioning and exhibit altered responding to emotional facial expressions in experimental tasks. We extended this research by investigating subjective and autonomic reactivity (ratings of emotional valence, arousal and skin conductance responses [SCRs]) to general emotional images in 39 people with DS relative to 42 healthy control participants, whilst controlling for anxiety, depression, cognitive functioning and, where relevant, medication use. It was predicted that greater subjective negativity and arousal and increased SCRs in response to the affective pictures would be observed in the DS group. The DS group as a whole did not differ from controls in their subjective responses of valence and arousal. However, SCR amplitudes were greater in ‘autonomic responders’ with DS relative to ‘autonomic responders’ in the control group. A positive correlation was also observed between SCRs for highly arousing negative pictures and self‐reported ictal autonomic arousal, in DS ‘autonomic responders’. In the DS subgroup of autonomic ‘non‐responders’, differences in subjective responses were observed for some conditions, compared to control ‘non‐responders’. The findings indicate unaffected subjective responses to emotional images in people with DS overall. However, within the group of people with DS, there may be subgroups characterized by differences in emotional responding. One subgroup (i.e., ‘autonomic responders’) exhibit heightened autonomic responses but intact subjective emotional experience, whilst another subgroup (i.e., ‘autonomic non‐responders’) seem to experience greater subjective negativity and arousal for some emotional stimuli, despite less frequent autonomic reactions. The current results suggest that therapeutic interventions targeting awareness and regulation of physiological arousal and subjective emotional experience could be of value in some people with this disorder.