Learning words: children disregard some pragmatic information that conflicts with mutual exclusivity

Children tend to infer that when a speaker uses a new label, the label refers to an unlabeled object rather than one they already know the label for. Does this inference reflect a default assumption that words are mutually exclusive? Or does it instead reflect the result of a pragmatic reasoning process about what the speaker intended? In two studies, we distinguish between these possibilities. Preschoolers watched as a speaker pointed toward (Study 1) or looked at (Study 2) a familiar object while requesting the referent for a new word (e.g. ‘Can you give me the blicket?’). In both studies, despite the speaker's unambiguous behavioral cue indicating an intent to refer to a familiar object, children inferred that the novel label referred to an unfamiliar object. These results suggest that children expect words to be mutually exclusive even when a speaker provides some kinds of pragmatic evidence to the contrary.     

The hoarding dimension of OCD: psychological comorbidity and the five-factor personality model

Although hoarding has been associated with several psychological disorders, it is most frequently linked to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The present study assessed hoarding obsessions and compulsions in 204 individuals with OCD, and evaluated how hoarding was related to obsessive-compulsive symptom severity, psychological comorbidity, and personality as measured by the five-factor model. Results indicated that hoarding in OCD is a dimensional variable that is positively associated with dysphoria, total number of lifetime Axis I disorders, and lifetime histories of bipolar I, PTSD, and body dysmorphic disorder. Hoarding was negatively correlated with the NEO-Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R) factor of Conscientiousness and positively associated with the NEO-PI-R factor of Neuroticism. When all personality and psychopathology variables were entered into a regression equation, dysphoria, bipolar II disorder, Conscientiousness, age, and Extraversion emerged as significant predictors of hoarding severity. Recommendations are made for clinicians and for future research.     

Differing profiles of developmental experiences across types of organized youth activities

This study inventoried the types of developmental and negative experiences that youth encounter in different categories of extracurricular and community-based organized activities. A representative sample of 2,280 11th graders from 19 diverse high schools responded to a computer-administered protocol. Youth in faith-based activities reported higher rates of experiences related to identity, emotional regulation, and interpersonal development in comparison with other activities. Sports and arts programs stood out as providing more experiences related to development of initiative, although sports were also related to high stress. Service activities were associated with experiences related to development of teamwork, positive relationships, and social capital. Youth reported all of these positive developmental experiences to occur significantly more often in youth programs than during school classes.     

Belief in supernatural agents in the face of death

Four studies examined whether awareness of mortality intensifies belief in supernatural agents among North Americans. In Studies 1 and 2, mortality salience led to more religiosity, stronger belief in God, and in divine intervention. In Studies 3 and 4, mortality salience increased supernatural agent beliefs even when supernatural agency was presented in a culturally alien context (divine Buddha in Study 3, Shamanic spirits in Study 4). The latter effects occurred primarily among the religiously affiliated, who were predominantly Christian. Implications for the role of supernatural agent beliefs in assuaging mortality concerns are discussed.     

A comparison of statistical selection strategies for univariate and bivariate log‐linear models

In this study, eight statistical selection strategies were evaluated for selecting the parameterizations of log‐linear models used to model the distributions of psychometric tests. The selection strategies included significance tests based on four chi‐squared statistics (likelihood ratio, Pearson, Freeman–Tukey, and Cressie–Read) and four additional strategies (Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), consistent Akaike information criterion (CAIC), and a measure attributed to Goodman). The strategies were evaluated in simulations for different log‐linear models of univariate and bivariate test‐score distributions and two sample sizes. Results showed that all eight selection strategies were most accurate for the largest sample size considered. For univariate distributions, the AIC selection strategy was especially accurate for selecting the correct parameterization of a complex log‐linear model and the likelihood ratio chi‐squared selection strategy was the most accurate strategy for selecting the correct parameterization of a relatively simple log‐linear model. For bivariate distributions, the likelihood ratio chi‐squared, Freeman–Tukey chi‐squared, BIC, and CAIC selection strategies had similarly high selection accuracies.     

The social face of emotion recognition: Evaluations versus stereotypes

The goal of the present paper was to demonstrate the influence of general evaluations and stereotype associations on emotion recognition. Earlier research has shown that evaluative connotations between social category members and emotional expression predict whether recognition of positive or negative emotional expressions will be facilitated (e.g. Hugenberg, 2005). In the current paper we tested the hypothesis that stereotype associations influence emotion recognition processes, especially when the difference between valences of emotional expressions does not come into play. In line with this notion, when participants in the present two studies were asked to classify positive versus negative emotional expressions (i.e. happy versus anger, or happy versus sadness), valence congruency effects were found. Importantly, however, in a comparative context without differences in valence in which participants were asked to classify two distinct negative emotions (i.e. anger versus sadness) we found that recognition facilitation occurred for stereotypically associated discrete emotional expressions. With this, the current results indicate that a distinction between general evaluative and cognitive routes can be made in emotion recognition processes.     

Luther's Radical Conception of Faith: God,Christ, and Personhood in a Post‐Metaphysical Age

Luther's exposition of Paul's letter to the Galatians offers a premier window into a deconstruction of the tandem God, ego and symbolic order of the law by proposing a radical “technology of the self,” a new understanding of what it means to be a person in light of God's own becoming in the flesh—a new subjective perspective. This places the event of belief as a displacement of a socially and ecclesiastically constructed ego‐consciousness and the emergence of a new (social) center of subjectivity—Christ consciousness, that is, faith. For Luther the “person” emerges as a radical break with the self‐referentiality of the ego and through the perspectival assimilation of God's own subjective experience in the flesh.     

Psychological distance and judgments of causal impact

When assessing causal impact, individuals have to consider two pieces of information: the magnitude of the cause that resulted in an effect, and the magnitude of the resulting effect. In the present research, participants judged the causal impact of cause–effect relationships in which the magnitude of causes and effects varied independently. Participants mainly relied on effect magnitude, rating causal impact to be much higher when strong (vs. weak) effects emerged. When participants took cause magnitude into account (which they did, but to a lesser extent), their judgments reflected a covariation rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for strong causes generating strong effects) rather than a ratio rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for weak causes generating strong effects). These distinct views on causal impact were moderated by psychological distance: Effect magnitude dominated judgments of proximal events, whereas cause magnitude had relatively more impact on causal judgments of distal events.     

Lateralisation of diffuse positive and negative affect: Ascribing valence to ambiguous stimuli

The available evidence regarding the lateralisation of affect is rather divergent. Interestingly, the common procedure in previous research on affective lateralisation has been to measure hemispheric dominance following exposure to concrete affective stimuli. Therefore, prior research seems to tap primarily into the lateralisation of specific approach–avoidance motivations rather than diffuse affective states. The present research adopted an alternative methodological approach that excluded approach–avoidance motivations and merely studied the lateralised nature of diffuse affect. Participants evaluated ambiguous stimuli presented in either the right or left visual field. Results showed that stimuli presented in the left visual field were significantly more often ascribed a positive meaning compared to information in the right visual field. The present findings are compatible with related lateralised processes and underscore the necessity of distinguishing between specific motivations and diffuse affect.     

Devaluation of distracting stimuli

Previous research has shown that distracting stimuli are evaluated more negatively than new stimuli in a dual task paradigm (Raymond, Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003). The present research aimed to extend this research by showing that repeatedly selecting targets in a perceptual identification task leads to lower evaluations of distracting stimuli embedded in this task, even when participants are unaware that they will be asked to evaluate the stimuli in a subsequent (separate) task. Results indeed show that repeatedly selecting target stimuli in the presence of distracting stimuli leads to devaluation of these distracting stimuli compared to both target stimuli and new stimuli in a subsequent task. The findings of the present research indicate that devaluation of repeatedly ignored stimuli arises even when stimulus evaluation is not salient during target selection.