SENSIBILITY THEORY AND CONSERVATIVE COMPLANCENCY

Abstract:  In Ruling Passions , Simon Blackburn contends that we should reject sensibility theory because it serves to support a conservative complacency. Blackburn's strategy is attractive in that it seeks to win this metaethical dispute – which ultimately stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism – on the basis of an uncontroversial normative consideration. Therefore, Blackburn seems to offer an easy solution to an apparently intractable debate. We will show, however, that Blackburn's argument against sensibility theory does not succeed; it is no more supportive of conservative complacency than Blackburn's noncognitivism. A victory for noncognitivism cannot be so easily won.     

AN EPISTEMICALLY DISTANT GOD? A CRITIQUE OF JOHN HICK'S RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE HIDDENNESS*

God is thought of as hidden in at least two ways. Firstly, God's reasons for permitting evil, particularly instances of horrendous evil, are often thought to be inscrutable or beyond our ken. Secondly, and perhaps more problematically, God's very existence and love or concern for us is often thought to be hidden from us (or, at least, from many of us on many occasions). But if we assume, as seems most plausible, that God's reasons for permitting evil will (in many, if not most, instances) be impossible for us to comprehend, would we not expect a loving God to at least make his existence or love sufficiently clear to us so that we would know that there is some good, albeit inscrutable, reason why we (or others) are permitted to suffer? In this paper I examine John Hick's influential response to this question, a response predicated on the notion of ‘epistemic distance’: God must remain epistemically distant and hence hidden from us so as to preserve our free will. Commentators of Hick's work, however, disagree as to whether the kind of free will that is thought to be made possible by epistemic distance is the freedom to believe that God exists, or the freedom to choose between good and evil, or the freedom to enter into a personal relationship with God. I argue that it is only the last of these three varieties of free will that Hick has in mind. But this kind of freedom, I go on to argue, does not necessitate an epistemically distant God, and so the problem of divine hiddenness remains unsolved.     

Pseudo‐Transformational Leadership: Model Specification and Outcomes1

A model of pseudo‐transformational leadership was tested in 4 experiments. Pseudo‐transformational leadership is defined by self‐serving, yet highly inspirational leadership behaviors, unwillingness to encourage independent thought in subordinates, and little caring for one's subordinates more generally. Study 1 (N = 167) used vignettes to differentiate among transformational, pseudo‐transformational, and laissez‐faire leadership styles. Study 2 (N = 179) replicated this model using ratings of characters in the film 12 Angry Men ( Fonda, Rose, & Lumet, 1957 ). Study 3 (N = 120) tested the model, controlling for participant perceptions of leader affect and prototypical leadership behaviors. Study 4 (N = 127) extended the ecological validity of the model and range of outcomes. Across the studies, support was obtained for the model.