WHEN DOES FALSEHOOD PRECLUDE KNOWLEDGE?

Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem and arrive at a relatively simple theory with virtues linked to several issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology.     

DESIRE AND THE ORIGINS OF CULTURE: LONERGAN AND GIRARD IN CONVERSATION

This paper explores differing accounts of the nature of desire, found in the works of Bernard Lonergan and René Girard, and their implications for our understanding of the origins or socio‐cultural order. Using Lonergan's distinction between natural and elicited desires it argues that Girard's account of desire as mimetic may account for elicited desire, but may not account for natural desire, in Lonergan's account, as desire for meaning, truth and goodness. It then considers the implications for this distinction in our understanding of our socio‐cultural origins.     

Personality and Attitude Toward Christianity Among Undergraduates

Four samples of 454, 333, 292, and 224 undergraduates completed the Francis Scale of attitude toward Christianity together with the short form Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. The data demonstrate that a positive attitude toward Christianity is unrelated to either extraversion or neuroticism but is negatively correlated with scores on the psychoticism scale.     

On Evading Responsibility

ABSTRACT The paper examines J. Glover's 1970 account of the evasion of responsibility. Attention is focused on the Eichmann case and Glover's contention that moral condemnation of Eichmann depends on the view that there is a duty to submit one's actions to moral criticism. Two uses of the word 'moral' are distinguished (one use for moral commitment, the other for logical diagnosis) and it is argued that Glover's thesis is accordingly ambiguous. It is contended that Glover must either abandon his stipulative account of the concept of morality or accept the objectivity of moral judgements or modify his unqualified thesis that everybody ought to submit his conduct to moral criticism. An account of problems of evading responsibility involves us, it is maintained, in an area of moral philosophy, the Dialectic of Morals, where knock-down arguments are sparse.     

A Study on Maintaining Workshop Impact for Employment Counselors

It is the authors' belief that the skills or knowledge acquired in short-term educational experiences are often rapidly washed-out after returning to a work environment. This article describes an attempt to maintain the skills of employment counselors after they return from a workshop setting to their work environment.     

Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief: (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism.     

PERSONALITY TESTS AT THE CROSSROADS: A RESPONSE TO MORGESON, CAMPION, DIPBOYE, HOLLENBECK, MURPHY, AND SCHMITT (2007)

Despite widespread and growing acceptance that published personality tests are valid predictors of job performance, Morgeson et al. (2007) propose they be abandoned in personnel selection because average validity estimates are low. Our review of the literature shows that Morgeson et al.'s skepticism is unfounded. Meta-analyses have demonstrated that published personality tests, in fact, yield useful validity estimates when validation is based on confirmatory research using job analysis and taking into account the bidirectionality of trait–performance linkages. Further gains are likely by use of narrow over broad measures, multivariate prediction, and theory attuned to the complexities of trait expression and evaluation at work. Morgeson et al. also suggest that faking has little, if any, impact on personality test validity and that it may even contribute positively to job performance. Job applicant research suggests that faking under true hiring conditions attenuates personality test validity but that validity is still sufficiently strong to warrant personality test use in hiring. Contrary to Morgeson et al., we argue that the full value of published personality tests in organizations has yet to be realized, calling for programmatic theory-driven research.