The Dance: Essence of Embodiment

An analysis of movement, and particularly of dance,helps us to see in an extraordinarily effective way the meaningof embodiment. This paper then looks through the eyes ofdance theorists and at philosophers who consider dance andmovement and their meaning of embodiment. A study of movementand dance encompasses the fullest meaning of embodiment: that theembodied way of being-in-the-world is also an embedded way ofbeing in a world of others. Dance has critically importantsocial ramifications. In our own and other cultures, dance playsan important role in healing and in health enhancement.     

The drawing effect: Evidence for reliable and robust memory benefits in free recall

In 7 free-recall experiments, the benefit of creating drawings of to-be-remembered information relative to writing was examined as a mnemonic strategy. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were presented with a list of words and were asked to either draw or write out each. Drawn words were better recalled than written. Experiments 3–5 showed that the memory boost provided by drawing could not be explained by elaborative encoding (deep level of processing, LoP), visual imagery, or picture superiority, respectively. In Experiment 6, we explored potential limitations of the drawing effect, by reducing encoding time and increasing list length. Drawing, relative to writing, still benefited memory despite these constraints. In Experiment 7, the drawing effect was significant even when encoding trial types were compared in pure lists between participants, inconsistent with a distinctiveness account. Together these experiments indicate that drawing enhances memory relative to writing, across settings, instructions, and alternate encoding strategies, both within- and between-participants, and that a deep LoP, visual imagery, or picture superiority, alone or collectively, are not sufficient to explain the observed effect. We propose that drawing improves memory by encouraging a seamless integration of semantic, visual, and motor aspects of a memory trace.     

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.     

"Show me" bioethics and politics

Missouri, the "Show Me State," has become the epicenter of several important national public policy debates, including abortion rights, the right to choose and refuse medical treatment, and, most recently, early stem cell research. In this environment, the Center for Practical Bioethics (formerly, Midwest Bioethics Center) emerged and grew. The Center's role in these "cultural wars" is not to advocate for a particular position but to provide well researched and objective information, perspective, and advocacy for the ethical justification of policy positions; and to serve as a neutral convener and provider of a public forum for discussion. In this article, the Center's work on early stem cell research is a case study through which to argue that not only the Center, but also the field of bioethics has a critical role in the politics of public health policy.     

Dynamic perceptual completion and the dynamic snapshot view to help solve the ‘two times’ problem

Perceptual completion fills the gap for discrete perception to become continuous. Similarly, dynamic perceptual completion (DPC) provides an experience of dynamic continuity. Our recent discovery of the ‘happening’ (H) element of DPC completes the total experience for dynamism in the flow of time (FOT). However, a phenomenological explanation for these experiences is essential. The Snapshot Hypotheses especially the Dynamic Snapshot View provides the most comprehensive explanation. From that understanding the ‘two times’ problem (TTP) can be addressed. The static time of spacetime cosmologies has been irreconcilable with the dynamic FOT. Dismissing the FOT as an illusion is unsatisfactory. Therefore, we provide four hypotheses for the TTP.

1) Since cosmological static time demands that all events (cerebral included) are discrete, DPC elements for dynamism should likewise be expected to be discrete and accounted for by a snapshot phenomenology such as the DSV. 2) If temporality can be demonstrated to be similar to apparent motion by being a snapshot phenomenon and not demanding temporal extension it would confirm the DSV and permit reconciliation with static time. 3) If the ‘present moment’ (of the FOT) is subjective as static time theories suggest, it should be possible experimentally for an observer to choose his own ‘present’ by moving (perceptually) to various points in the past with the aid of virtual reality. 4) If dynamism e.g. motion can be precluded without significant information loss or violating physics principles it is a cognitive add-on, thereby contradicting non-static time theories which suggest that time is ‘real.’ We confirm those hypotheses.

     

The use of multitreatment modalities in early intervention: A quantitative case study

A quantitative single case study is presented to illustrate how an early intervention program used two therapeutic modalities to treat a depressed mother and her 2-month-old son. Drawing upon an ecological, transactional model of development, the case study utilized a multimethod, longitudinal approach to assess the infant's developmental competence and attachment status, the mother's history and current psychosocial functioning, patterns of mother-infant interaction, and components of the family's social ecology. Measures were administered during a baseline period to assess pre-intervention functioning and were systematically repeated throughout the 2-year period of intervention. The treatment modalities included psychodynamically oriented individual therapy and Parent-Infant Relationship Treatment (PIRT) in which the dyad was also seen by a second therapist to foster more adaptive mother-infant transactional patterns. The findings indicated increased infant developmental competence and a shift from an insecure to a secure attachment classification, improved maternal psychosocial functioning, and a decline in the dyadic interactional pattern of maternal intrusiveness and infant withdrawal. The advantages of using two treatment modalities and a single case approach to evaluation are discussed.