Subliminal anchoring: Judgmental consequences and underlying mechanisms

Judgmental anchoring—the assimilation of a numeric estimate towards a previously considered standard—is an exceptionally ubiquitous effect that influences human judgment in a variety of domains and paradigms. Three studies examined whether anchoring effects even occur, if anchor values are presented subliminally, outside of judges’ awareness. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate such subliminal anchoring effects: judges assimilated target estimates towards the subliminally presented anchor values. Study 3 further demonstrates that subliminal anchors produced a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent target knowledge. The implications of these findings for the ubiquity of judgmental anchoring, its different underlying mechanisms, and comparative information processing are discussed.     

I know you are, but what am I? Self-evaluative consequences of judging in-group and out-group members.

When judging another person, people often spontaneously compare this person with themselves. Six studies examined the self-evaluative consequences of such spontaneous comparisons with in-group versus out-group members. They demonstrate that spontaneous comparisons with in-group members primarily involved the activation of specific individuating knowledge about the self. In particular, knowledge indicating that the self is similar to the judged target was rendered accessible. As a consequence, subsequent self-evaluations that were based on the implications of accessible self-knowledge were assimilated toward in-group targets. Spontaneous comparisons with out-group members, however, primarily involved the activation of more general category knowledge about the self. Specifically, knowledge about judges' membership in a group that distinguished them from the target was rendered accessible. Consequently, self-evaluations were contrasted away from out-group targets.     

The malleability of anchoring effects

Anchoring effects--the assimilation of a numeric estimate to a previously considered standard--are typically described as very robust and persistent. Based on the assumption that judgmental anchoring involves a hypothesis-testing process in which judges actively seek and generate judgment-relevant target knowledge, it was assumed that anchoring effects might at the same time be fairly malleable. Specifically, subtle influences that change the nature of the tested hypothesis are likely to affect the magnitude of anchoring. Using a procedural priming task, judges were induced to focus on similarities versus differences during a series of anchoring tasks. The results demonstrate that the magnitude of the obtained effect critically depended on this manipulation. In particular, a more pronounced anchoring assimilation effect resulted for judges with a similarity rather than a difference focus. Implications of these findings for models of anchoring as well as for the nature of the anchoring phenomenon are discussed.     

What friends are for! The use of routine standards in social comparison

Social comparisons are frequently used for self-evaluation. As a consequence, judges have to be efficient in each comparison step. Standard selection, however, is traditionally seen as an elaborate process in which judges deliberately select similar standards. We propose that often judges do not engage in such deliberate selection processes. Instead, they use routine standards--standards that have frequently been used for self-evaluation. Consistent with this assumption, Studies 1-3 demonstrate that student participants activate knowledge about their best friend--a likely routine standard--during self-evaluation. In Study 1, lexical decisions for the best friend's name are facilitated after self-evaluation. In Study 2, participants judge their best friend faster after evaluating themselves on the same dimension. In Study 3, this is even the case if the best friend is dissimilar and consequently undiagnostic. Finally, in Study 4, self-evaluations are primarily influenced by comparison information about an experimentally created routine standard.     

Comparison processes in social judgment: mechanisms and consequences

This article proposes an informational perspective on comparison consequences in social judgment. It is argued that to understand the variable consequences of comparison, one has to examine what target knowledge is activated during the comparison process. These informational underpinnings are conceptualized in a selective accessibility model that distinguishes 2 fundamental comparison processes. Similarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard similarity, whereas dissimilarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard dissimilarity. These respective subsets of target knowledge build the basis for subsequent target evaluations, so that similarity testing typically leads to assimilation whereas dissimilarity testing typically leads to contrast. The model is proposed as a unifying conceptual framework that integrates diverse findings on comparison consequences in social judgment.     

Do monkeys compare themselves to others?

Social comparisons are a fundamental characteristic of human behaviour, yet relatively little is known about their evolutionary foundations. Adapting the co-acting paradigm from human research (Seta in J Pers Soc Psychol 42:281–291, 1982. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.42.2.281), we examined how the performance of a partner influenced subjects’ performance in long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis). Using parallel testing in touch screen setups in which subjects had to discriminate familiar and novel photographs of men and women, we investigated whether accuracy and reaction time were influenced by partner performance and relationship quality (affiliate vs. non-affiliate). Auditory feedback about the alleged performance of the co-actor was provided via playback; partner performance was either moderately or extremely better or worse than subject performance. We predicted that subjects would assimilate to moderately different comparison standards as well as to affiliates and contrast away from extreme standards and non-affiliates. Subjects instantly generalized to novel pictures. While accuracy was not affected by any of the factors, long reaction times occurred more frequently when subjects were tested with a non-affiliate who was performing worse, compared to one who was doing better than them (80 % quantile worse: 5.1, better: 4.3 s). For affiliate co-actors, there was no marked effect (worse: 4.4, better: 4.6 s). In a control condition with no auditory feedback, subjects performed somewhat better in the presence of affiliates (M = 77.8 % correct) compared to non-affiliates (M = 71.1 %), while reaction time was not affected. Apparently, subjects were sensitive to partner identity and performance, yet variation in motivation rather than assimilation and contrast effects may account for the observed effects.     

A tool for thought! When comparative thinking reduces stereotyping effects

Stereotypes have pervasive, robust, and often unwanted effects on how people see and behave towards others. Undoing these effects has proven to be a daunting task. Two studies demonstrate that procedurally priming participants to engage in comparative thinking with a generalized focus on differences reduces behavioral and judgmental stereotyping effects. In Study 1, participants who were procedurally primed to focus on differences sat closer to a skinhead - a member of a negatively stereotyped group. In Study 2, participants primed on differences ascribed less gender stereotypic characteristics to a male and female target person. This suggests that comparative thinking with a focus on differences may be a simple cognitive tool to reduce the behavioral and judgmental effects of stereotyping.     

Suspicious spirits, flexible minds: when distrust enhances creativity

Intuitively, as well as in light of prior research, distrust and creativity appear incompatible. The social consequences of distrust include reluctance to share information, a quality detrimental to creativity in social settings. At the same time, the cognitive concomitants of distrust bear resemblance to creative cognition: Distrust seems to foster thinking about nonobvious alternatives to potentially deceptive appearances. These cognitive underpinnings of distrust hold the provocative implication that distrust may foster creativity. Mirroring these contradictory findings, we suggest that the social versus cognitive consequences of distrust have diverging implications for creativity. We address this question in Study 1 by introducing private/public as a moderating variable for effects of distrust on creativity. Consistent with distrust's social consequences, subliminal distrust (vs. trust) priming had detrimental effects on creative generation presumed to be public. Consistent with distrust's cognitive consequences, though, an opposite tendency emerged in private. Study 2 confirmed a beneficial effect of distrust on private creative generation with a different priming method and pointed to cognitive flexibility as the mediating process. Studies 3 and 4 showed increased category inclusiveness versus increased remote semantic spread after distrust priming, consistent with enhanced cognitive flexibility as a consequence of distrust. Taken together, these results provide evidence for the creativity-enhancing potential of distrust and suggest cognitive flexibility as its underlying mechanism.     

Fast similarities: efficiency advantages of similarity-focused comparisons

People constantly have to make efficient use of their limited cognitive resources. Recently, T. Mussweiler and K. Epstude (2009) demonstrated that comparative thinking simplifies information processing and increases the efficiency of judgment. However, there are different types of comparative thinking. While comparing 2 entities, people may focus on either similarities or dissimilarities between target and standard. The authors propose that these 2 comparative thinking styles differ in their efficiency. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that comparisons with a focus on similarities lead to more focused information processing and faster judgments than comparisons with a dissimilarity focus. In line with these hypotheses, the authors demonstrate that participants are indeed faster at judging the similarity of 2 stimuli (Study 1) and that they search for less target information in a comparative judgment task (Study 2) if they focus on similarities rather than dissimilarities. Focusing on similarities thus appears to be the more efficient comparative thinking style.     

First offers as anchors: the role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus

Three experiments explored the role of first offers, perspective-taking, and negotiator self-focus in determining distributive outcomes in a negotiation. Across 3 experiments, whichever party, the buyer or seller, made the 1st offer obtained a better outcome. In addition, 1st offers were a strong predictor of final settlement prices. However, when the negotiator who did not make a 1st offer focused on information that was inconsistent with the implications of the opponent's 1st offer, the advantageous effect of making the 1st offer was eliminated: Thinking about one's opponent's alternatives to the negotiation (Experiment 1), one's opponent's reservation price (Experiment 2), or one's own target (Experiment 3) all negated the effect of 1st offers on outcomes. These effects occurred for both face-to-face negotiations and E-mail negotiations. Implications for negotiations and perspective-taking are discussed.