The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.     

Right visual-field advantage in the attentional blink: Asymmetry in attentional gating across time and space

When two targets are presented in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), recognition of the second target (T2) is usually reduced when presented 150–500 ms after the first target, demonstrating an attentional blink (AB). Previous studies have shown a left visual-field (LVF) advantage in T2 recognition, when T2 was embedded in one of two streams, demanding top-down attention for its recognition. Here, we explored the impact of bottom-up saliency on spatial asymmetry in the AB. When T2 was spatially shifted outside from the RSVP, creating an abrupt onset of T2, right T2s showed a right visual-field (RVF) advantage. In lag-1 trials, right T2s were not only better recognized, but also showed a low T1-T2 order error rate. In contrast, recognized left T2s exhibited high order error rate. Without abrupt onset, symmetrical AB was found and order error rate was similarly low in both sides. Follow-up experiments showed that, while RVF advantage was related to bottom-up saliency, order errors were affected by T1 mask. The discrepancy between LVF and RVF advantage in the AB could be resolved in terms of two mechanisms of attentional gating: top-down attentional gating, which is biased towards LVF, and bottom-up attentional gating, which is biased towards RVF.     

Show Me the Argument: Empirically Testing the Armchair Philosophy Picture

Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is what we would expect from the vantage point of the armchair philosophy picture. The results also show, however, that the percentages of articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. This trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in philosophy.     

The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?

According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of science as a graveyard of theories’ picture. Using JSTOR Data for Research and Springer Exemplar, I present new lines of evidence that are at odds with this pessimistic picture of the history of science. When rigorously tested against the historical record of science, I submit, the pessimistic picture of the history of science as a graveyard of dead theories and abandoned posits may turn out to be no more than a philosophers’ myth.     

Why be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher?

In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in turn, show why philosophers should argue with humility.     

Decreasing household television time: a pilot study of a combined behavioral and environmental intervention

Excessive TV viewing is associated with weight gain across the lifespan; thus developing strategies to decrease household viewing time may be an effective obesity prevention approach. This pilot study (n = 6 families) examined the feasibility and short‐term impact of a 2‐pronged environmental plus behavioral approach designed to reduce TV time in the entire family. The environmental manipulation involved placing TV Allowances (programmed to turn off power after family members had watched 75% of their baseline hours) on all TVs in the home. A kit with behavioral strategies for reducing TV time was also sent to the home each week and family members self‐monitored viewing time. Viewing was objectively assessed with the TV Allowances at baseline and at 8 weeks. A significant decrease in objectively measured TV viewing hours was observed, t(5) = 3.1, p = 0.03, 29.8 ± 10.3 versus 14.9 ± 6.0 h (equivalent of decreasing from 7.5 to 3.7 h per day). Fifty percent of families reduced their viewing time by ≥50%. The acceptability of the intervention was high, with 100% of families reporting they would recommend the TV Allowances to others. Further research is needed to test the long‐term efficacy of the program and its impact on weight. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.