Attenuation of change blindness in children with autism spectrum disorders

Change blindness refers to the difficulty most people find in detecting a difference between two pictures when these are presented successively, with a brief interruption between. Attention at the site of the change is required for detection. A number of studies have investigated change blindness in adults and children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Some have produced evidence that people with ASD find changes to social stimuli harder to detect and changes to non‐social stimuli easier to detect, relative to comparison participants. However, other studies have produced entirely contradictory findings. There is a need for consistency in methodology to aid understanding of change blindness and attentional processes in ASD. Here, we replicate a change blindness study previously carried out with typically developing (TD) children and adults and with adults with ASD. Results reveal attenuated change blindness for non‐social stimuli in children with ASD relative to TD norms. Our results are interpreted, alongside others' findings, as potentially indicative of a complex relationship between different influences on attention over time.     

The effects of amount of processing on recall and recognition

Johnson-Laird, Gibbs and de Mowbray (1978) and Ross (1981) have argued that amount of processing, as indexed by the overall number of decisions a subject makes, provides a good predictor of incidental memory performance. Conversely, McClelland, Rawles and Sinclair (1981) have provided evidence that it is normally the number of positive decisions rather than the overall number of decisions per se that determines level of recall. The present study replicated and extended the findings of McClelland and his colleagues. In free recall (Experiment 1 and 3), cued recall (Experiment 3) and recognition in the presence or absence of context cues (Experiments 2 and 3), an account based on number of positive decisions provided by far the better explanation. Experiment 3 also revealed that the experimental manipulations had a somewhat greater effect on recall than recognition. This is explained in terms of Tulving and Pearlstone's (1966) distinction between availability and accessibility. It is suggested that words associated with negative decisions are not only less accessible in memory, there are also fewer of them available for recall and recognition.