Enhanced perceived responsibility decreases metamemory but not memory accuracy in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)

Mixed findings have been obtained in prior research with respect to the presence and severity of memory and metamemory deficits in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). We tested the hypothesis that experimentally induced increments of subjective responsibility would lead to a disproportionately strong decline of memory confidence and enhanced response latencies in OCD while leaving memory accuracy unaffected. Twenty-eight OCD patients and 28 healthy controls were presented a computerized memory test framed with two different scenarios. In the neutral scenario, the participant was requested to imagine purchasing 15 items from a do-it-yourself store. In the recognition phase, the 15 needed items were presented along with 15 distractor items. The participant was asked to decide whether items were on his or her shopping list or not, graded by subjective confidence. In the responsibility scenario, the general experimental setup was analogous except that the participant now had to envision that he or she was a helper in a region recently struck by an earthquake, dispatched to provide 15 urgently needed goods from a nearby town. In line with prior work by our group, samples did not differ in either condition on memory accuracy in a subsequent recognition task. As hypothesized, OCD participants were less certain in their responses for the high responsibility condition than controls. Whereas patients and controls did not differ in their subjective estimates for memorized items, patients expressed stronger doubt that their earthquake mission was successful. The findings indicate that low memory confidence in OCD may only be elicited in situations where perceived responsibility is high and that patients may share higher performance standards ("good is not good enough") than controls when perceived responsibility is inflated.     

Inferring the size of a goal object from an actor's grasping movement in 6‐ and 9‐month‐old infants

The present study applied a preferential looking paradigm to test whether 6‐ and 9‐month old infants are able to infer the size of a goal object from an actor's grasping movement. The target object was a cup with the handle rotated either towards or away from the actor. In two experiments, infants saw the video of an actor's grasping movement towards an occluded target object. The aperture size of the actor's hand was varied as between‐subjects factor. Subsequently, two final states of the grasping movement were presented simultaneously with the occluder being removed. In Experiment 1, the expected final state showed the actor's hand holding a cup in a way that would be expected after the performed grasping movement. In the unexpected final state, the actor's hand held the cup at the side which would be unexpected after the performed grasping movement. Results show that 6‐ as well as 9‐month‐olds looked longer at the unexpected than at the expected final state. Experiment 2 excluded an alternative explanation of these findings, namely that the discrimination of the final states was due to geometrical familiarity or novelty of the final states. These findings provide evidence that infants are able to infer the size of a goal object from the aperture size of the actor's hand during the grasp.     

Interhemispheric dissociation of expressive and receptive language functions in patients with complex-partial seizures: An amobarbital study

Bilateral intracarotid amobarbital procedures (IAP) were performed in 144 patients with medically intractable complex-partial seizures. As a result of language testing, 29 patients (20.1%) were found to have bilateral language representation to different degrees. In four (2.8%) of these patients--all right-handers with early onset of epilepsy and/or evidence of early brain damage--there was strong evidence of an interhemispheric dissociation of expressive and receptive language functions. Two of these patients had circumscribed temporal foci (one left, one right), and receptive language functions were represented in the hemisphere contralateral to the focus. One patient with a right frontal focus showed left-hemisphere dominance for expressive functions, while the fourth patient exhibited left-hemisphere dominance for receptive functions associated with a right temporo-parietal focus. It is argued that in these four cases the circumscribed functional and/or structural impairments have led to a shift of the anatomically associated language functions to the opposite hemisphere (rather than to neighboring regions of the same hemisphere). These findings substantiate the hypothesis that in special circumstances the anterior (expressive) language area can be located in one hemisphere and the posterior (receptive) area in the other.     

The use of nitrous oxide as a contrast medium during fractionated gas encephalography in halane-nitrous-oxide anesthesia]

40 children were employed as test cases in fractionated gas encephalography using Halan-nitrous oxide anesthesia, and the level of cerebrospinal pressure, the r?ntgenoparent quality of the extracerebral spaces and the duration of postencephalographical symptoms were examined using air and nitrous oxide as contrast media. In the course of the examination the cerebrospinal pressure showed a tendency to rise when air was introduced, to fall when nitrous oxide was introduced. After instillation of N2O however the filling of the subarachnoid space was over so quickly that it could not be included in the assessment. Sufficient r?ntgenograms were obtained for all diagnostic demands through 'hybrid filling', (introduction of nitrous oxide into the ventricles, introduction of air into the subarachnoid spaces). With the aid of the results obtained from this examination attempts will be made to derive differentiated indications for filling with nitrous oxide.     

Positivismus und Realismus

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Emotion as Position-Taking

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something.