Hypnotically created pseudomemories: further investigation into the "memory distortion or response bias" question.

In order to study whether pseudomemories represent actual memory distortions or are a result of response bias, 60 highly hypnotizable subjects and subjects from the general population were divided into 4 experimental groups and were tested for pseudomemory manifestation after receiving a false suggestion. Of the 4 groups of subjects, 3 were offered a monetary reward as a motivation to distinguish false suggestion from actual occurrence. Pseudomemory manifestation was found to be significantly higher among subjects not offered a reward than among subjects who were offered such an reward. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

"Existential" therapists and their group therapy practices.

Existential philosophical thought insists that human behavior is indeterminate and subject only to the individual's will. It is, therefore, skeptical of all dynamic psychologies based as they are on Freudian determinism. Group therapists imbued with this philosophy stop short of its extreme. Their existential position, however, does greatly modify treatment, and yet they preserve both the form and goals of therapy. They place properly selected and prepared patients in a group where their individuality and authenticity are highly valued. Finding most technical procedures irrelevant, the therapists themselves, that is, their evolving personalities are central. The key to patient change is the spontaneous meeting of members and the therapist which the therapist orchestrates. Instead of the usual interpretation, members are encouraged to confront the paradoxes in their lives, their humanness, and especially their finitude. Patients are to be brought up to the threshold of their self-knowledge so they can choose. Choice, therefore, along with action coupled with responsibility are frequent themes. Unless the individual is incompetent, decisions made for him or her by the therapist or by group consensus are thought to be nontherapeutic.     

Comparison of bulimics, obese binge eaters, social phobics, and individuals with panic disorder on comorbidity across DSM-III-R anxiety disorders.

Eighty-two women, presenting as normal-weight bulimics, obese binge eaters, social phobics, and individuals with panic disorder, were compared on anxiety, depression, and substance abuse. All were administered the Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule-Revised and completed the Michigan Alcohol Screening Test, Drug Abuse Screening Test, and Self-Consciousness Scale. A striking proportion of eating disorder subjects were comorbid for one or more anxiety disorders, the most frequent diagnoses being generalized anxiety disorder and social phobia. The results suggest that the place of anxiety in bulimia nervosa goes beyond that discussed within the context of the anxiety reduction model. Conflicting comorbidity findings among this and prior investigations are noted, however, and discussed in terms of the issue of differential diagnosis between eating and anxiety disorders.     

Covariation detection in treated and untreated spider phobics.

Twenty treated and 18 untreated spider phobics were exposed to a series of 72 slides. Three different categories of slides were used: phobia-relevant slides (spiders), alternative fear-relevant slides (weapons), and neutral slides (flowers). Slides were randomly paired with either a shock, a tone, or nothing at all. Despite the absence of a systematic correlation between slides and outcomes, untreated phobics strongly overestimated the covariation between spider slides and shock. Treated phobics did not show a covariation bias, suggesting that such bias can be modulated by behavioral treatment. In addition, untreated subjects were more confident about their contingency estimates than were treated subjects. The present results fit with earlier studies.     

Stability/Instability of Cognitive Strategies Across Tasks Determine Whether Stress Will Affect Judgmental Processes'

Previous research indicates that individuals employ various cognitive heuristics and decision modes in making decisions and judgmental tasks that do not follow an expected value model. It further indicates that several cognitive faculties are affected by stress. The purpose of this study was twofold: first, to examine whether individual differences exist in the use of cognitive heuristics and risk-assessment decision modes; second, to examine whether stress would affect the use of these cognitive strategies. Three versions of a questionnaire measuring the representativeness and availability heuristics, and risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes were administered to three different groups of subjects. Consistent individual differences were only observed in the subscales measuring risk-seeking and risk-aversion modes, but not in the use of the heuristics. In a different group of subjects, exposure to noise and task overload stress increased the use of the representativeness heuristic, but did not alter the use of risk-seeking and risk-aversion decision modes. These results indicate that the existence of individual differences in cognitive strategies may determine, in part, whether stress will modify judgmental processes.     

Declines in Major League Batting Performance as a Function of Game Pressure: A Drive Theory Analysis1

Zajonc's (1965) drive theory explanation argues that greater arousal tends to impair performance on difficult tasks. The hypothesis that arousal generated by “pressure situations” during major league baseball games would hinder batting performance—a difficult task—was tested by examining such performance during the 1989 season. Six “pressure situations” were identified, some occurring during the late innings of close games and others occurring throughout the game when there were two outs. Two measures of batting performance (batting average and slugging average) were employed. Results indicated broad support for the hypothesis. Reasons for this pattern are discussed, as are possible alternative explanations for these findings.     

Recovery of Locomotion in Monkeys With Spinal Cord Lesions

This study reanalyzes kinematically (via film) the pre- and postoperative locomotor behavior of 4 of the 10 monkeys with partial spinal cord lesions (T8) briefly described by Eidelberg, Walden, and Nguyen (1981). The behavior of the remaining 6 monkeys is qualitatively described. The analysis reveals that 5 of the animals initially exhibited unilateral hind limb stepping. Hind and forelimb cycle durations often differed postoperatively; the hind limbs commonly showed increased values, whereas forelimb cycle durations were reduced: ipsilateral interlimb phase values were usually inconsistent. A review of prior studies of primate spinal cord lesions indicates that sparing of the ventrolateral quadrant may not be essential for locomotor recovery (cf. Eidelberg, Walden, & Nguyen, 1981). Furthermore, this review as well as the kinematic analysis indicates that primates with very significant spinal lesions can stilI exhibit locomotor movements. Thus, although the primate's spinal cord seems less able than other mammals' to readily organize locomotor movements (Eidelberg, Walden, & Nguyen, 1981), the total absence of stepping in primates with completely transected cords is unexpected and warrants further research.     

Mood effects on attitude judgments: independent effects of mood before and after message elaboration.

This study investigated the independent effects of induced mood on the encoding of persuasive messages and on the assessment of attitude judgments. In Experiment 1, positive or negative mood was induced either before the encoding of a counterattitudinal message or before the assessment of attitude judgments. When mood was induced before message presentation, Ss in a bad mood were more persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas Ss in a good mood were equally persuaded by strong and by weak arguments. When Ss encoded the message in a neutral mood, however, the advantage of strong over weak arguments was more pronounced when Ss were in a good rather than in a bad mood at the time of attitude assessment. In Experiment 2, Ss exposed to a counterattitudinal message composed of either strong or weak arguments formed either a global evaluation or a detailed representation of the message. Positive, negative, or neutral mood was then induced. Ss in a good mood were most likely and Ss in a negative mood least likely to base their reported attitudes on global evaluations.