Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection

Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that agents (or, agent-involving events) cause actions to occur or not occur: Maddy’s decision to get a beer causes her to get up off her comfortable couch to get a beer, though she almost chose not to get up. Libertarian free will notoriously faces the luck objection, according to which agential states do not determine whether an action occurs or not, so it is beyond the control of the agent, hence lucky, whether an action occurs or not: Maddy’s reasons for getting beer in equipoise with her reasons to remain in her comfortable seat do not determine that she will get up or stay seated, so it seems beyond her control, hence lucky, that she gets up. In this paper I consider a sub-set of the luck objection called the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection, according to which indeterministic physical processes cause actions to occur or not, and agent’s lack control over these indeterministic physical processes, so agent’s lack control over, hence it is lucky, whether action occurs or not. After motivating the physical indeterminism luck objection, I consider responses from three recent event-causal libertarian models, and conclude that they fail to overcome the problem, though one promising avenue is opened up.

This paper is divided into six parts. In Section One, I minimally define libertarian free will as accepting agential indeterminism, which is the conjunction of indeterminism and agential causation, where agential indeterminism occurs when an agent’s reasons, efforts or character indeterministically cause actions. In Sections Two and Three I outline the physical indeterminism luck objection to libertarian free will, which states that sub-agential physical processes in the brain indeterministically cause actions to occur, and agents lack control over these indeterministic physical causes, so agent’s lack control over whether their actions occur. If agent’s lack control over whether actions occur, the occurrence of these actions is lucky, where this luck jeopardizes free will and moral responsibility. In Sections Four through Six I consider three recent libertarian responses to this objection—Mark Balaguer in Section Four, Chris Franklin in Section Five, and Robert Kane in Section Six. I conclude that none of these models satisfactorily overcomes the physical indeterminism luck objection, though one interpretation of Kane yields a promising avenue of reply.

     

The Oneness Beliefs Scale: Connecting Spirituality with Pro‐Environmental Behavior

The inherent unity of all phenomena, or oneness, is a central concept of mysticism, but there have heretofore been no measures of oneness beliefs. We developed the Oneness Beliefs Scale, with spiritual and physical oneness subscales. The spiritual oneness subscale fills a need in the field for a short, reliable measure of spirituality not characterized by the language of traditional Western religiousness. The physical oneness subscale allows researchers to juxtapose spiritual beliefs with a nonspiritual, materialist counterpart. We found that spiritual oneness beliefs were more strongly related to mystic experiences and spirituality than to traditional religiousness. Physical oneness was not strongly associated with either religiousness or spirituality. Both spiritual and physical oneness were positively associated with pro‐environmental attitudes but not with depression, anxiety, or negative affect. Spiritual oneness was a better predictor of pro‐environmental attitudes than was religiousness. Spiritual oneness also predicted donating to a pro‐environmental group, making this to our knowledge the first empirical study to show a positive association between a religion or spirituality measure and observed, rather than self‐reported, pro‐environmental behavior.     

Bidirectional Associations Between Parenting Behavior and Child Callous-Unemotional Traits: Does Parental Depression Moderate this Link?

The current study longitudinally examined bidirectional associations between callous-unemotional (CU) traits and parenting dimensions. This study extended the literature by examining whether parental depression moderated these relations in a pre-adolescent sample. Proposed relations were examined using a longitudinal sample of 120 aggressive children (59.6 % male) who were in the 4th grade (M?=?10.56 years, SD?=?0.56) at baseline and were followed annually over 4 years. A series of generalized estimating equation (GEE) models were used to examine proposed relations. At the first order level, corporal punishment (p?p?=?0.03) however, the inverse relations were not found. Importantly, parental depression moderated the link between corporal punishment and CU traits. Specifically, at high levels of depression, corporal punishment was predictive of increases in CU traits, but was unrelated to CU traits at low levels of depression. These findings aid in our understanding of the link between corporal punishment and CU traits by highlighting conditions under which certain parenting behaviors have an impact on CU traits, which in turn, may have important intervention implications. Further clinical implications, limitations and future directions are discussed.     

Thoughts on representation in therapy of Holocaust survivors1

This paper presents the problems of representation and lack of representation in treating Holocaust survivors, through clinical vignettes and various theoreticians. The years of Nazi persecution and murder brought about a destruction of symbolization and turning inner and external reality into the Thing itself, the concrete, or, in Lacan’s words, ‘The Thing’. The paper presents two ideas related to praxis as well as theory in treating Holocaust survivors: the first is related to the therapist’s treatment of the Holocaust nightmare expressing the traumatic events just as they happened 63 years previously; the second deals with the attempt at subjectification, in contrast to the objectification forced by the Nazis on their victims.     

Development of a Communication Aid to Facilitate Risk Communication in Consultations with Unaffected Women from High Risk Breast Cancer Families: A Pilot Study

The literature on risk perception in women from high-risk breast cancer families reveals persistent over-estimation of risk, even after counseling. In this study, a communication aid was designed to facilitate discussion of risk between clinical geneticists and genetic counselors and women from this high-risk population. Method: Stage 1. The aid was developed by an expert panel of clinical geneticists, genetic counselors, psychologists, an epidemiologist, an oncologist, linguists and a consumer. It was guided by the international literature on risk communication and a large multi-centre Australian study of risk communication. The 13 page full-color communication aid used varying formats of words, numbers, graphs and pie-charts to address (a) the woman’s subjective risk; (b) the population risk of breast cancer; c) the risk of inherited breast cancer; (d) the cumulative risk for women with BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations; (e) family risk factors; (f) the woman’s suitability for genetic testing; (h) screening and management recommendations, and (i) a re-assessment of the woman’s subjective risk. Stage 2: A before–after pilot study of 38 women who were unaffected with breast cancer and were attending four Australian familial cancer clinics was undertaken. Baseline and follow-up questionnaires were completed by 27 women. Outcomes were compared to those observed in 107 similar women undergoing genetic counseling without the communication aid in 2001. Results: The risk communication aid appears to be beneficial; breast cancer genetics knowledge improved in some areas and importantly, risk perceptions improved in the cohort receiving the communication aid. Psychological measures showed no difference in anxiety or depression between the group receiving the communication aid and the comparison cohort. Women and clinicians were very positive about the usefulness of the communication aid as an adjunct to the genetic counseling consultation.     

Visual and oculomotor selection: links, causes and implications for spatial attention

Natural scenes contain far more information than can be processed simultaneously. Thus, our visually guided behavior depends crucially on the capacity to attend to relevant stimuli. Past studies have provided compelling evidence of functional overlap of the neural mechanisms that control spatial attention and saccadic eye movements. Recent neurophysiological work demonstrates that the neural circuits involved in the preparation of saccades also play a causal role in directing covert spatial attention. At the same time, other studies have identified separable neural populations that contribute uniquely to visual and oculomotor selection. Taken together, all of the recent work suggests how visual and oculomotor signals are integrated to simultaneously select the visual attributes of targets and the saccades needed to fixate them.     

Quantifier comprehension in corticobasal degeneration

In this study, we investigated patients with focal neurodegenerative diseases to examine a formal linguistic distinction between classes of generalized quantifiers, like "some X" and "less than half of X." Our model of quantifier comprehension proposes that number knowledge is required to understand both first-order and higher-order quantifiers. The present results demonstrate that corticobasal degeneration (CBD) patients, who have number knowledge impairments but little evidence for a deficit understanding other aspects of language, are impaired in their comprehension of quantifiers relative to healthy seniors, Alzheimer's disease (AD) and frontotemporal dementia (FTD) patients [F(3,77)=4.98; p<.005]. Moreover, our model attempts to honor a distinction in complexity between classes of quantifiers such that working memory is required to comprehend higher-order quantifiers. Our results support this distinction by demonstrating that FTD and AD patients, who have working memory limitations, have greater difficulty understanding higher-order quantifiers relative to first-order quantifiers [F(1,77)=124.29; p<.001]. An important implication of these findings is that the meaning of generalized quantifiers appears to involve two dissociable components, number knowledge and working memory, which are supported by distinct brain regions.