Cognitive phenomenology and conscious thought

How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as conscious thought. So one must either accept that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology, or deny the existence of conscious thought. Once it is clear that conscious thought requires cognitive phenomenology, there is a pressing question about the exact relationship between a thought’s cognitive phenomenological properties and its content. I conclude with a discussion of the nature of this relationship.     

A response to Martina and Wimmer’s review of The Given

In this paper I respond to Martina and Wimmer’s review of The Given, focusing on their criticisms of the awareness of awareness thesis.     

The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion

My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.

Against Propositionalism

‘Propositionalism’ is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations—all intentional attitudes—are relations to propositions or something proposition‐like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate ‘F’. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they are, and that propositionalism must be abandoned.     

Counseling Families From Diverse Cultures: A Nondeficit Approach

This article focuses on the rationale, essential principles, and constructs of counseling families from diverse cultures and the implications for professional counselors and other mental health service providers. Specific recommendations for incorporating cultural sensitivity, knowledge of cultures, and culturally relevant counseling skills are made.     

Government, the Press, and the People's Right To Know

Even the most ardent defenders of a legal right to freedom of the press are likely to regard this right as having limitations; but how precisely the right should be limited is a matter of considerable disagreement. This issue is at least partly moral in character: it concerns the moral acceptability of laws which regulate or protect the activities of members of the press. I propose here to address this moral issue, and to do so within the broader framework of considering whether establishing a legal right to freedom of the press—regardless of how it might be limited—is justifiable on moral grounds. In pursuing this investigation, I will devote special attention to familiar claims about the relation between press rights on the one hand, and "the people's right to know" on the other.     

The influence of caloric information on cafeteria food choices

We evaluated the effect of posting caloric information on food purchases at a cafeteria. Purchases of more than 14,300 entrees, vegetables, and salads by 6,970 customers were unobtrusively monitored via the cash register inventory control system during 15 evening observations. A quasi-multiple-baseline design across food groups was used to test the additive effect of labeling the three lowest caloric choices for vegetables, salads, and entrees. A linear logit analysis confirmed that labeling increased the probability of low calorie selections for vegetables and salads, but not for entrees. Observations of meals purchased by a subsample of 413 customers indicated labeling did not change the total caloric content of meals. The number of customers and total sales per evening were unaffected by the labeling intervention. The results suggest that manipulating environmental cues may be an effective method for changing food purchases in a cafeteria, but labeling individual items may not be the best way to decrease total calories purchased.