Why be an Intellectually Humble Philosopher?

In this paper, I sketch an answer to the question “Why be an intellectually humble philosopher?” I argue that, as far as philosophical argumentation is concerned, the historical record of Western Philosophy provides a straightforward answer to this question. That is, the historical record of philosophical argumentation, which is a track record that is marked by an abundance of alternative theories and serious problems for those theories, can teach us important lessons about the limits of philosophical argumentation. These lessons, in turn, show why philosophers should argue with humility.     

Effects of guided imagery with relaxation training on anxiety and quality of life among patients with inflammatory bowel disease

Background: Inflammatory Bowel Disease (IBD) impacts quality of life (QoL). Psychological factors influence the course of the disease and should be targeted for intervention.

Methods: Our study was a prospective, randomised control trial. Fifty-six outpatients were randomly chosen and allocated to a treatment group or a waiting-list control group. Treatment group patients attended three relaxation-training sessions and received an audio disc for home practice. Evaluations performed pre and post-treatment: state anxiety was assessed with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, QoL with the IBD Questionnaire. The Visual Analogue Scale assessed pain, depression, stress and mood. Patients completed a symptom monitoring diary. The control group's symptoms were monitored without study-related treatment.

Results: Thirty-nine subjects completed the study and were included in the data analysis. Following the relaxation-training intervention, the treatment group's (n?=?18) measured results showed a statistically significant improvement as compared to the control group (n?=?21) (time by treatment interaction): anxiety levels decreased (p?<?0.01), QoL and mood improved (p?<?0.05), while levels of pain and stress decreased (p?<?0.01).

Conclusions: Findings indicate IBD patients may benefit from relaxation training in their holistic care. New studies as well as further investigation of the subject are warranted.     

When insecurity dampens desire: Attachment anxiety in men amplifies the decline in sexual desire during the early years of romantic relationships

Sexual desire is typically high during early relationship stages and decreases gradually over time. In the present research, we adopted an attachment-theoretical perspective to investigate why sexual desire for romantic partners erodes more rapidly for some people than others. We employed two samples of developing relationships (dating couples, N = 62; and newlyweds, N = 175) and examined the effects of attachment insecurities on sexual desire in prospective longitudinal designs. Results showed that attachment anxiety moderated the trajectory of men's sexual desire, such that over time, highly anxious men declined in desiring their partner, whereas less anxious men's desire did not drop. Attachment avoidance also predicted lower levels of initial desire in both sexes. These findings suggest that avoidance generally interferes with relationship initiation for both sexes, whereas anxiety in men interferes with the maintenance of desire over time, possibly because of sensitivity to increasing interdependence.     

Transcendental Arguments,Conceivability, and Global Vs. Local Skepticism

Philosophia - In this paper, I argue that, if transcendental arguments are to proceed from premises that are acceptable to the skeptic, the Transcendental Premise, according to which “X is a...     

The “Positive Argument” for Constructive Empiricism and Inference to the Best Explanation

In this paper, I argue that the “positive argument” for Constructive Empiricism (CE), according to which CE “makes better sense of science, and of scientific activity, than realism does” (van Fraassen in The scientific image, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, 73), is an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). But constructive empiricists are critical of IBE, and thus they have to be critical of their own “positive argument” for CE. If my argument is sound, then constructive empiricists are in the awkward position of having to reject their own “positive argument” for CE by their own lights.     

Reassuring sex: Can sexual desire and intimacy reduce relationship‐specific attachment insecurities?

Past research has shown that attachment orientations shape sexual processes within relationships. Yet, little has been done to explore the opposite direction. In the present research, we examined whether sexual desire and emotional intimacy reduce attachment insecurities over time in emerging relationships. In an 8‐month longitudinal study, we followed 62 newly dating couples across three measurement waves. At Time 1, romantic partners discussed sexual aspects of their relationship and judges coded their displays of sexual desire and intimacy. Participants also completed measures of relationship‐specific attachment anxiety and avoidance in each wave. The results indicated that men's displays of desire predicted a decline in their own and their partner's relationship‐specific insecurities. Conversely, women's displays of desire inhibited the decline in their partner's relationship‐specific insecurities, whereas women's displays of intimacy predicted a decline in their partner's relationship‐specific insecurities. These findings suggest that different sex‐related processes underlie attachment formation in men and women.     

Recorded Sounds and Auditory Media

Philosophia - A widespread view among philosophers and scientists is that recorded sounds and assisted hearing differ fundamentally from natural sounds and direct hearing. It is commonly claimed,...     

Arguments from Expert Opinion and Persistent Bias

Accounts of arguments from expert opinion take it for granted that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, and so an argument that proceeds from premises about what an expert judges to a conclusion that the expert is probably right is a strong argument. In Mizrahi (Informal Log 33:57–79, 2013), I consider a potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments, and find it wanting because of empirical evidence suggesting that expert judgments under uncertainty are not significantly more likely to be true than novice judgments or even chance. In this paper, I consider another potential justification for this assumption, namely, that expert judgments are not influenced by the cognitive biases novice judgments are influenced by, and find it wanting, too, because of empirical evidence suggesting that experts are vulnerable to pretty much the same cognitive biases that novices are vulnerable to. If this is correct, then the basic assumption at the core of accounts of arguments from expert opinion, namely, that expert judgments count as (defeasible) evidence for propositions, remains unjustified.     

The Role of Justification in the Ordinary Concept of Scientific Progress

Alexander Bird and Darrell Rowbottom have argued for two competing accounts of the concept of scientific progress. For Bird, progress consists in the accumulation of scientific knowledge. For Rowbottom, progress consists in the accumulation of true scientific beliefs. Both appeal to intuitions elicited by thought experiments in support of their views, and it seems fair to say that the debate has reached an impasse. In an attempt to avoid this stalemate, we conduct a systematic study of the factors that underlie judgments about scientific progress. Our results suggest that (internal) justification plays an important role in intuitive judgments about progress, questioning the intuitive support for the claim that the concept of scientific progress is best explained in terms of the accumulation of only true scientific belief.