Short-term visual memory and pattern masking

The results of two experiments involving the matching of unfamiliar, nameless shapes (Gibson forms) indicated that a visual representation of a brief (30-100 ms) stimulus survives in a Short-Term Visual Memory (STVM) for 6 s or more after the onset of a pattern mask. On the basis of these results a possible alternative to Sperling's (1967) model for short-term memory for visual stimuli was presented. In this model it is assumed that recognition processes occupy several hundred milliseconds and continue after the arrival of the mask using the information available in STVM.     

“Backward masking” of simple detection latencies

Simple detection latencies were determined with stimuli that comprised two successive flashes. The second flash either equaled or exceeded the first in luminance, duration, or both. When a low-luminance flash preceded either a low-or a high-luminance flash, the flashes summated, yielding latencies that were shorter than the latency for the first flash alone. In the limit, when the second flash was intense and followed the first by a short time, the latency for the paired flashes behaved as if it was determined by the second flash alone. This limit was analogous to the retroactive interference in studies of the neurophysiological concomitants of backward masking. However, the S in masking studies detects the first flash despite interference by the second, whereas the present S detected the onset of the stimulus light. The need for an analysis of the S’s response under masking is thus indicated.     

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN REACTION TO FAILURE1

Les Occidentaux admettent qu'on critique leur performance; ils réagissent en général à la critique en essayant de faire mieux. En Extrême-Orient, il n'est pas convenable de dire à quelqu'un qu'il a échoué en quelque chose; le faisant, on a toute chance de le voir renoncer ou faire plus mal encore. Cette différence de comportement dans les deux civilisations s'explique par des différences d'organisation cognitive. Les AA. ont comparé, dans trois groupes d'étudiants de culture différente (Américains; Extrême-orientaux suivant les cours d'universités américaines; Thais de Thaïlande), les individus qui ont réussi et ceux qui ont échoué dans leurs études. Les sujets américains réagissent à l'échec en réduisant les relations entre toutes les variables étudiées, ce qui constitue un mode de défense en profondeur par le biais d'une organisation plus souple. Les sujets des deux autres groupes réagissent à l'échec par une réduction des contacts personnels et une rigidité accrue de l'organisation personnelle interne. Ces résultats ont une grande importance pratique relativement aux effets sociaux du développement économique en Extrême-Orient.     

Dissociations between procedural and episodic memory: effects of time and aging

The issue of multiple memory systems is explored. Young and older adults (mean ages = 20 and 71, respectively) named pictures and were tested immediately, 1, 7, or 21 days later. Episodic memory (recognition) for pictures was significantly lower in older relative to young adults and declined systematically across all retention intervals in both age groups. In contrast, procedural memory (repetition priming in picture naming) revealed no reliable age differences. In both age groups, priming declined within the first 24 hr, but unlike recognition, there was no further decrement from 1 to 21 days. There were also within-subject dissociations: The magnitude of priming was equivalent for remembered and forgotten items, and the relation between recognition and priming across intervals was nonmonotic, revealing a reversed association. The findings were interpreted within a multiple-memory-systems framework.     

Hand preference and performance on unimanual and bimanual tasks in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Patterns of manual preference and the extent to which preference provided a benefit in performance (movement time) were evaluated in 7 young adult capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Directions of preference were inconsistent within individual animals across home-cage activities, unimanual, and bimanual experimental tasks. Preferences were more strongly expressed in the experimental tasks than in the home cage. A left bias in the population for prehension, predicted by recent theories, was not evident in any setting. Movement time was moderately negatively correlated with degree of preference within experimental tasks. The benefit to performance conferred by lateral preference was not dependent on whether the right or left hand was preferred. Lateralization of prehension appears to be a flexible process in these monkeys, which can result in quickly realized benefits in some conditions.     

TEMPORAL CONTROL ON INTERVAL SCHEDULES: WHAT DETERMINES THE POSTREINFORCEMENT PAUSE?

On fixed-interval or response-initiated delay schedules of reinforcement, the average pause following food presentation is proportional to the interfood interval. Moreover, when a number of intervals of different durations occur in a programmed cyclic series, postreinforcement pauses track the changes in interval value. What controls the duration of postreinforcement pauses under these conditions? Staddon, Wynne, and Higa (1991), in their linear waiting model, propose control by the preceding interfood interval. Another possibility is that delay to reinforcement, signaled by a key peck and/or stimulus change, determines the subsequent pause. The experiments reported here examined the role of these two possible time markers by studying the performance of pigeons under a chained cyclic fixed-interval procedure. The data support the linear waiting model, but suggest that more than the immediately preceding interfood interval plays a role in temporal control.     

When do children overestimate their knowledge of unfamiliar targets?

We report four investigations in which 5 to 7 year olds judged whether or not they knew familiar- and unfamiliar-named targets. Under some conditions judgments were made in relation to performance on a relevant task, e.g., children judged whether they knew the picture they had picked from a set was the target. Under other conditions, children judged their state of knowledge not in relation to performance, e.g., they answered "Do you know who (target) is?" Under both types of condition, children nearly always made correct "know" judgments when targets were familiar. Correct "don't know" judgments about unfamiliar targets were relatively common when judgments were not made in relation to performance on a task (average scores 80-90% correct), but were less frequent when knowledge was judged in relation to performance on a task (average scores 40-70% correct). Knowledge judged in relation to performance was overestimated even when children did not choose the picture they thought might be the target before making their judgment, when the pictures were face-down, and when children predicted performance on a task not yet present. It seems that although children can make relatively accurate judgments of their own knowledge states, they tend to overestimate their competence when assessing their knowledge in relation to performance on a task. We discuss why this might be.