Framing how we think about disagreement

Disagreement is a hot topic right now in epistemology, where there is spirited debate between epistemologists who argue that we should be moved by the fact that we disagree and those who argue that we need not. Both sides to this debate often use what is commonly called “the method of cases,” designing hypothetical cases involving peer disagreement and using what we think about those cases as evidence that specific normative theories are true or false, and as reasons for believing as such. With so much weight being given in the epistemology of disagreement to what people think about cases of peer disagreement, our goal in this paper is to examine what kinds of things might shape how people think about these kinds of cases. We will show that two different kinds of framing effect shape how people think about cases of peer disagreement, and examine both what this means for how the method of cases is used in the epistemology of disagreement and what this might tell us about the role that motivated cognition is playing in debates about which normative positions about peer disagreement are right and wrong.     

Identity, the Identity Statuses, and Identity Status Development: A Contemporary Statement

The Utrecht Study of Adolescent Development (Meeus et al., this issue) provides new data pertinent to issues of identity formation addressed in earlier reviews of the literature, specifically, (a) the direction and timing of identity status development, (b) the relative stability of the identity statuses, and (c) gender differences in identity formation. Despite numerous differences from earlier studies in the samples studied, the instruments used, and the methodologies employed, the findings of the Utrecht study are generally quite consistent with theoretical expectations and previous research outcomes. Because of the size and scope of the Utrecht study, data on possible age differences in the frequency of specific patterns of intraindividual identity status change could be analyzed. This aspect of identity formation had not been previously investigated. Equivocal results were obtained. Possible explanations for the partial failure to confirm this aspect of developmental theory are discussed.     

Toward an Interdisciplinary Science of Culture

The Psychological Record - Cultural events are of interest to scientists working in many scientific domains. Given this, an interdisciplinary science of culture may provide a more thorough...     

Sellars on thoughts and beliefs

In this paper, I examine Wilfrid Sellars’ famous Myth of Jones. I argue the myth provides an ontologically austere account of thoughts and beliefs that makes sense of the full range of our folk psychological abilities. Sellars’ account draws on both Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ryle provides Sellars with the resources to make thoughts metaphysically respectable and Wittgenstein the resources to make beliefs rationally criticisable. By combining these insights into a single account, Sellars is able to see reasons as causes and, hence, to respect the full range of our folk psychological generalisations. This is achieved by modelling folk psychological practice on theoretical reasoning. But despite frequent misinterpretation, Sellars does not claim that thoughts and beliefs are theoretical concepts. Thus, folk psychological explanation is not theoretical, and hence, it is not replaceable by scientific theory. Hence, scientific concepts will not eliminate folk psychological concepts. Thus, Sellars avoids eliminativism.     

Anxiety attenuates awareness of emotional faces during rapid serial visual presentation

Anxiety limits normative perception and impacts the interaction between key neurophysiological systems, possibly by decreasing recruitment of goal-oriented processes and increasing recruitment of stimulus-driven processes. Previous studies examining the impact of anxiety on emotion processing commonly lack a sample with levels of anxiety comparable to a clinical population. Many also fail to control for co-occurring symptoms like depression. The current study used rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) with two emotional targets, comparing healthy controls to a group of individuals with symptom levels comparable to anxiety disorder patients. The results showed a modulatory effect of anxiety; the high anxiety (HA) group showed an enhanced impairment in detecting the second of two emotional targets relative to the low anxiety (LA) control group. Though there were no group-specific effects on the attentional blink or repetition blindness, there was a significant interaction of group with first and second target valence. Notably, HA individuals showed deficits (where LA individuals showed benefits) when the same emotion was presented twice. Further, when the first target was neutral, second target detection was especially impaired in HA individuals. Correlational analyses confirmed perceptual limitations were related to anxiety, but not depression, positive affect, or negative affect. The current results, along with past findings, suggest that clinical anxiety leads to deficits in overall cognitive control, increased difficulty inhibiting attention to distractors, and impairments in rapid, intuitive emotion processing.