Self-Explanations: How Students Study and Use Examples in Learning to Solve Problems

The present paper analyzes the self-generated explanations (from talk-aloud protocols) that “Good” and “Poor” students produce while studying worked-out examples of mechanics problems, and their subsequent reliance on examples during problem solving. We find that “Good” students learn with understanding: They generate many explanations which refine and expand the conditions for the action parts of the example solutions, and relate these actions to principles in the text. These self-explanations are guided by accurate monitoring of their own understanding and misunderstanding. Such learning results in example-independent knowledge and in a better understanding of the principles presented in the text. “Poor” students do not generate sufficient self-explanations, monitor their learning inaccurately, and subsequently rely heavily on examples. We then discuss the role of self-explanations in facilitating problem solving, as well as the adequacy of current AI models of explanation-based learning to account for these psychological findings.     

Are the salutogenic effects of social supports modified by income? A test of an "added value hypothesis".

Older adults (54 men, 113 women; M age = 69.5 years) were examined to test the hypothesis that social supports would be more salutogenic (health promoting) for persons with lower incomes than for persons with higher incomes. Interactions of income and social supports (mean of 3 emotional scales of the Interpersonal Support Evaluation List) at study entry predicted changes 15-18 months later in a cardiovascular composite (linear combination of high-density lipoproteins-mean arterial pressure; p < .05), and natural killer cell activity (p < .05). For both outcomes, emotional supports were salutogenic for persons with lower incomes (< or =$29,000/year), but not for persons with higher incomes (>$29,000/year). In contrast, interactions of the Tangible Support Scale with income did not occur. Persons with lower incomes may derive benefits from social supports that go beyond tangible assistance.     

Cue type affects preparatory influences on task inhibition

The present study investigates the influence of preparation on inhibitory effects in cued task switching. In three experiments, we assessed n − 2 repetition costs as marker of inhibition of the just executed and now irrelevant task by comparing performance in task sequences such as ABA (i.e., n − 2 repetitions, with A, B and C standing for different tasks) to task sequences such as CBA (i.e., n − 2 switches). Specifically, we varied the cue–target interval (CTI) to examine cue-based preparation effects. In addition, we manipulated cue type (i.e., abstract, verbal, and direct cues) across the three experiments. We obtained significant reductions of n − 2 repetition costs with prolonged CTI when using abstract cues (i.e., coloured frames) and task names (i.e., digit), but not when using the task-specific stimulus–response mapping as cue for the upcoming task. These data suggest that cue-based preparation is not a uniform process but depends on the information provided by the cue.     

Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief

In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences worrying and I come up with two candidate principles. I then argue that one principle should be rejected because it is inconsistent with permissivism. The principle we should accept implies that it is sometimes rational to maintain our beliefs, even upon learning that they were caused by irrelevant influences.     

Brain hyper‐connectivity and operation‐specific deficits during arithmetic problem solving in children with developmental dyscalculia

Developmental dyscalculia (DD) is marked by specific deficits in processing numerical and mathematical information despite normal intelligence (IQ) and reading ability. We examined how brain circuits used by young children with DD to solve simple addition and subtraction problems differ from those used by typically developing (TD) children who were matched on age, IQ, reading ability, and working memory. Children with DD were slower and less accurate during problem solving than TD children, and were especially impaired on their ability to solve subtraction problems. Children with DD showed significantly greater activity in multiple parietal, occipito‐temporal and prefrontal cortex regions while solving addition and subtraction problems. Despite poorer performance during subtraction, children with DD showed greater activity in multiple intra‐parietal sulcus (IPS) and superior parietal lobule subdivisions in the dorsal posterior parietal cortex as well as fusiform gyrus in the ventral occipito‐temporal cortex. Critically, effective connectivity analyses revealed hyper‐connectivity, rather than reduced connectivity, between the IPS and multiple brain systems including the lateral fronto‐parietal and default mode networks in children with DD during both addition and subtraction. These findings suggest the IPS and its functional circuits are a major locus of dysfunction during both addition and subtraction problem solving in DD, and that inappropriate task modulation and hyper‐connectivity, rather than under‐engagement and under‐connectivity, are the neural mechanisms underlying problem solving difficulties in children with DD. We discuss our findings in the broader context of multiple levels of analysis and performance issues inherent in neuroimaging studies of typical and atypical development.     

Working through the Problems of Study Abroad Using the Methodologies of Religious Studies

After illustrating the joys of teaching religious studies abroad with an anecdote from my trip to China, I warn of some of its inherent pedagogical and ethical challenges. I argue that teaching some of the “new directions” in religious studies scholarship might address these challenges. These include a turning away from the abstract (texts, beliefs, theologies) and towards the concrete (bodies, places, rituals); moving away from teaching religions as unchanging, ancient verities and instead emphasizing the impact that colonialism, modernization, and secularism have had; moving from searching for authenticity to questioning it; and emphasizing methodological self‐consciousness. Keeping these new directions in mind will help ensure the study abroad experience is educationally successful. This essay serves as an introduction to a series of six additional essays comprising a special section of the journal (see Teaching Theology and Religion 18:1, January 2015).     

Internalism without Luminosity1

Internalists face the following challenge: what is it about an agent's internal states that explains why only these states can play whatever role the internalist thinks these states are playing?  Internalists have frequently appealed to a special kind of epistemic access that we have to these states. But such claims have been challenged on both empirical and philosophical grounds.  I will argue that internalists needn't appeal to any kind of privileged access claims.  Rather, internalist conditions are important because of the way in which we expect them to act as causal mediators between states of the world, on the one hand, and our beliefs and actions on the other.