Forgive them for I have sinned: The relationship between guilt and forgiveness of others' transgressions

We propose that guilt leads to forgiveness of others' transgressions. In Study 1, people prone to experience guilt (but not shame) were also prone to forgive others for past misdeeds. In Study 2, we manipulated harm‐ and inequity‐based guilt; both increased forgiveness of others' transgressions. Further, the effect of guilt on forgiveness was mediated by identification with the transgressor. In Study 3, we replicated the guilt–forgiveness relationship and examined three other plausible mediators: capability for similar wrongdoing, empathic understanding, and general identification; only identification with the transgressor satisfied the criteria for mediation. In Study 4, we induced guilt by asking participants to harm a friend or stranger. Guilt induced by harming a friend led to greater forgiveness of third‐party transgressors, and again, identification with the transgressor mediated the effect. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding how the prosocial effects of guilt extend beyond the boundaries of a single interpersonal relationship.     

Statistical properties of the rWG(J) index of agreement

L. R. James, R. G. Demaree, and G. Wolf (1984) introduced rWG(J) to estimate interrater agreement for a group. This index is calculated by comparing an observed group variance with an expected random variance. As researchers have gained experience using this index, several questions have arisen. What are the consequences of replacing values beyond the unit interval by 0? What is the dependence of rWG(J) on the group size? The authors' simulations show that a positive bias is caused by the truncation, but for large population values of rWG(J) it is negligible. Also, in this case, the group size has no effect on the expected value of rWG(J). For inference on rWG(J), researchers can exploit the availability of computers to simulate data from the hypothesized distribution and then compare the simulation results for rWG(J) with the actual values. In addition, it is shown how the bootstrap method can be used for comparing the indices of 2 groups.     

Understanding and Treating Chronic Shame: A Relational/Neurobiological Approach by Patricia A. DeYoung,Routledge, New York, 2015, 190pp.

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Capuchins (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>) fail to show an asymmetric dominance effect

The asymmetric dominance effect (ADE) occurs when the introduction of a partially dominated decoy option increases the choice share of its dominating alternative. The ADE is a violation of regularity and the constant-ratio rule, which are two derivations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom, a core tenant of rational choice. The ADE is one of the most widely reported human choice phenomena, leading researchers to probe its origins by studying a variety of non-human species. We examined the ADE in brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), a species that displays many other decision biases. In Experiment 1, we used a touchscreen method to elicit choice-based preferences for food rewards in asymmetrically dominated choice sets. In Experiments 2 and 3, we distinguished between different types of judgments and used a free selection task to elicit consumption-based preferences for juice rewards. However, we found no evidence for the ADE through violations of regularity or the constant-ratio rule, despite the similarity of our stimuli to other human and non-human experiments. While these results appear to conflict with existing literature on the ADE in non-human species, we point out methodological differences—notably, the distinction between value-based and perception-based stimuli—that have led to a collection of phenomena that are difficult to understand under a unitary theoretical framework. In particular, we highlight key differences between the human and non-human research and provide a series of steps that researchers could take to better understand the ADE.     

The integration of social influence and reward: Computational approaches and neural evidence

Decades of research have established that decision-making is dramatically impacted by both the rewards an individual receives and the behavior of others. How do these distinct influences exert their influence on an individual’s actions, and can the resulting behavior be effectively captured in a computational model? To address this question, we employed a novel spatial foraging game in which groups of three participants sought to find the most rewarding location in an unfamiliar two-dimensional space. As the game transitioned from one block to the next, the availability of information regarding other group members was varied systematically, revealing the relative impacts of feedback from the environment and information from other group members on individual decision-making. Both reward-based and socially-based sources of information exerted a significant influence on behavior, and a computational model incorporating these effects was able to recapitulate several key trends in the behavioral data. In addition, our findings suggest how these sources were processed and combined during decision-making. Analysis of reaction time, location of gaze, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data indicated that these distinct sources of information were integrated simultaneously for each decision, rather than exerting their influence in a separate, all-or-none fashion across separate subsets of trials. These findings add to our understanding of how the separate influences of reward from the environment and information derived from other social agents are combined to produce decisions.     

Investigating the effectiveness of brief cognitive reappraisal training to reduce fear in adolescents

As adolescent anxiety is common and costly, identifying effective strategies to reduce symptoms is a priority. This study tested whether adolescents could learn to use cognitive reappraisal strategies to attenuate fear during extinction learning. Fifty-seven participants (12–15 years) viewed images of two neutral faces, one which was paired with a fearful expression and shrieking scream (conditioned threat stimulus) and the other that was never paired with the aversive outcome (conditioned safety stimulus) during fear acquisition. Before extinction, participants either received cognitive appraisal training, which explored alternative, benign meanings associated with the scream or a control activity. Self-reported fear ratings in the cognitive reappraisal group were significantly lower to both the conditioned threat and safety stimuli after extinction than the control group. These findings did not characterise fear-potentiated startle data. Potential reasons for the lack of consistency between measures are considered.     

Reconsidering “Considering Gestational Life”: Reply to Commentaries by Levine and Williams

The two commentaries of “Considering Gestational Life” are both wonderful in their generative reflections and from such uniquely different perspectives. Each has generated an array of new questions about the nature and impact of gestation that are yet to be substantially explored. This discussion attempts to further their inquiries by focusing on how “gestational thinking” leads us into exploring Negative Capability; the improvisational nature of analytic process; objectivity versus subjectivity; reconsidering the impact of gestational trauma; the epistimophilic instinct; gender bias; clarifying “objectless intersubjectivity”; the role of silence, isolation, interiority, and privacy in analytic listening; what patients seek in treatment; and clarification of the meaning of “merger” and “unity.”