Movin’ on up: higher-level requirements and inferential justification

Does inferential justification require the subject to be aware that her premises support her conclusion? Externalists tend to answer “no” and internalists tend to answer “yes”. In fact, internalists often hold the strong higher-level requirement that an argument justifies its conclusion only if the subject justifiably believes that her premises support her conclusion. I argue for a middle ground. Against most externalists, I argue that inferential justification requires that one be aware that her premises support her conclusion. Against many internalists, I argue that this higher-level awareness needn’t be doxastic or justified. I also argue that the required higher-level awareness needn’t be caused in some appropriate way, e.g. by a reliable or properly functioning faculty. I suspect that this weaker higher-level requirement is overlooked because, at first glance, it seems absurd to allow nondoxastic, unjustified, and unreliably-caused higher-level awareness to contribute to inferential justification. One of the central goals of this paper is to explain how such weak awareness can make an essential contribution to inferential justification.     

Positive and extensive intergroup contact in the past buffers against the disproportionate impact of negative contact in the present

Negative (vs positive) intergroup contact may have a disproportionately large impact on intergroup relations because of valence‐salience effects, whereby negative contact causes higher category salience (Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin, 2010). One correlational and three experimental studies in three conflict areas (Northern Ireland, Arizona's border area, and Cyprus; Ns = 405, 83, 76, and 91) tested the moderation of these valence‐salience effects by individuals' histories of outgroup contact. Consistent with a perceived fit principle valence‐salience effects of face‐to‐face, television‐mediated, and imagined contact held among individuals with negative or limited histories of outgroup contact; these effects were significantly reduced or nonsignificant among individuals with positive or extensive past outgroup contact. These moderation effects suggest that positive and diverse intergroup contact in the past buffers against the harmful effects of negative contact experiences in the present, thus limiting the potential for negative spiralling of intergroup relations. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism

We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of this relation fail. Since evidential support is one component of inferential justification, the upshot of this failure is that their accounts of inferential justification also fail. In Sect. 2, I clarify the evidential support relation. In Sects. 3–5, I subject reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of evidential support to various counterexamples. In Sect. 6, I show that the most promising ways to address these counterexamples aren’t very promising.     

“Where You Lead,I Will Follow”: Partisan Cueing on High-Salience Issues in a Turbulent Multiparty System

The ability of parties to not only reflect, but actually shape, citizens' preferences on policy issues has been long debated, as it corresponds to a fundamental prediction of classic party identification theory. While most research draws on data from the United States or studies of low-salience issues, we exploit the unique opportunity presented by the 2013 Italian election, with the four major parties of a clear multiparty setting holding distinct positions on crucial issues of the campaign. Based on an experimental design, we test the impact of party cues on citizens' preferences on high-salience issues. The results are surprising: Despite a party system in flux (with relevant new parties) and a weakening of traditional party identities, we find large, significant partisan-cueing effects in all the three experimental issues, and for voters of all the major Italian parties—both old and new, governmental and opposition, ideologically clear or ambiguous.     

Young Children's ability to Discriminate between Antisocial and Prosocial Teases

The present study was designed to (a) examine 5- to 8-year-old children's ability to discriminate between antisocial and prosocial teases and (b) determine whether their age and experiences within the home are associated with their ability to recognize these two types of teases. Results revealed that the 5- to 8-year-old children were able to discriminate between antisocial and prosocial teases. Although the children's parents or legal guardians indicated that the children had more frequent experience with prosocial than antisocial teases in the home, (a) the children were better able to correctly identify the intent of antisocial teasers than prosocial teasers and (b) the parents or legal guardians (correctly) indicated that their child would be better able to recognize an antisocial tease than a prosocial tease. Despite the finding that the children's comprehension of antisocial teasing tended to exceed their comprehension of prosocial teasing, the findings indicate that being relatively young (i.e., 5–6 years old vs. 7–8 years old) and having relatively frequent experience with antisocial teasing in the home may be associated with some children's difficulty in recognizing the intent behind antisocial teases.     

Development of a Communication Aid to Facilitate Risk Communication in Consultations with Unaffected Women from High Risk Breast Cancer Families: A Pilot Study

The literature on risk perception in women from high-risk breast cancer families reveals persistent over-estimation of risk, even after counseling. In this study, a communication aid was designed to facilitate discussion of risk between clinical geneticists and genetic counselors and women from this high-risk population. Method: Stage 1. The aid was developed by an expert panel of clinical geneticists, genetic counselors, psychologists, an epidemiologist, an oncologist, linguists and a consumer. It was guided by the international literature on risk communication and a large multi-centre Australian study of risk communication. The 13 page full-color communication aid used varying formats of words, numbers, graphs and pie-charts to address (a) the woman’s subjective risk; (b) the population risk of breast cancer; c) the risk of inherited breast cancer; (d) the cumulative risk for women with BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations; (e) family risk factors; (f) the woman’s suitability for genetic testing; (h) screening and management recommendations, and (i) a re-assessment of the woman’s subjective risk. Stage 2: A before–after pilot study of 38 women who were unaffected with breast cancer and were attending four Australian familial cancer clinics was undertaken. Baseline and follow-up questionnaires were completed by 27 women. Outcomes were compared to those observed in 107 similar women undergoing genetic counseling without the communication aid in 2001. Results: The risk communication aid appears to be beneficial; breast cancer genetics knowledge improved in some areas and importantly, risk perceptions improved in the cohort receiving the communication aid. Psychological measures showed no difference in anxiety or depression between the group receiving the communication aid and the comparison cohort. Women and clinicians were very positive about the usefulness of the communication aid as an adjunct to the genetic counseling consultation.