Generate and test: An alternative route to knowledge elicitation in an implicit learning task

Three experiments are reported, which examine generation of knowledge in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) invariant learning task. In this task, participants are exposed to 30 four-digit numbers containing an invariant "3". Following this participants then demonstrate a preference for novel numbers containing this invariant over numbers without it. Despite above-chance performance on this pseudo-memory test, participants appear unable to verbalize anything pertinent to the invariant. Here we introduce a novel version of this task, relying on generation of items rather than a preference test. We argue that this new task engages different processing resources, resulting in different patterns of performance. In Experiment 1, invariant learning was demonstrated using a novel fragment completion test. Experiment 2 found that suppressing articulation inhibited learning, implying that this test task accesses phonological knowledge. It is suggested that using the fragment completion test engages different processing resources during test from those in a preference test. Experiment 3 reinforces this position by demonstrating that knowledge appears to transfer across surface features, a result that seems to contradict recent findings by Stadler, Warren, and Lesch (2000). A resolution is offered, drawing on episodic accounts of implicit learning.     

A Community of Psychotherapists

Services for chronic mental patients in this era of deinstitutionalization present a major challenge to clinicians and planners alike. The complexity of these patients' clinical and other programmatic needs requires that an array of viable comprehensive services be made available to them. Following certain established principles of service planning will help facilitate patients' longitudinal, psychological, financial, and geographical access to care.     

Double Effect and the End-Not-Means Principle: A Response to Bennett

Proponents of double-effect reasoning — relying in part on a distinction between intention and foresight — assert that it is worse intentionally to cause harm than to cause harm with foresight but without intention. They hold, for example, that terror bombing is worse than tactical bombing in so far as terror bombing is the intentional harming of non-combatants while tactical bombing is not. In articulating the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction, advocates of double effect employ the Kantian end-not-means principle.
Jonathan Bennett has recently argued that this principle cannot ground the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction. He holds that the principle demands that one benefit others while double effect deals with acts that do not benefit others. Thus, he maintains, the intended/foreseen distinction does not have ethical import and double effect is not tenable. I argue for a reading of the end-not-means principle that grounds the ethical relevance of both the intended/foreseen distinction and double effect.     

Non-parametric inference for ordered alternatives in a randomized block design

This paper treats the problem of testing an ordered hypothesis based on the ranks of the data. The statistical procedures for the randomized block design with more than one observation per cell are derived. Multiple comparisons and estimation procedures are also included.