What must a psychological theory of reasoning explain? Comment on Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas (2008)

In this comment, it is argued that the modification of mental models theory of conditional inference proposed by P. Barrouillet, C. Gauffroy, and J.-F. Lecas to deal with truth value gaps merely patches up a problem in the theory, rather than accomplishing the fundamental and systematic revision that is necessary. It is argued that P. Barrouillet et al.'s modified mental model theory fails to meet the criteria of good theory of reasoning by invoking an algorithmic-level distinction to resolve a failing in the computational-level theory of the task.     

Location-specific versus hemisphere-specific adaptation of processing selectivity

Current theories of cognitive control assume that processing selectivity is adjusted according to the utility of processing task-irrelevant stimulus features. Consistently, interference evoked by flanker stimuli is reduced when the proportion of incompatible trials—in which flankers are associated with an incorrect response—is increased. Consistent with the idea that the cerebral hemispheres select processing strategies independently of each other, Corballis and Gratton (2003) demonstrated that flanker interference for stimuli presented in either the left or right visual hemifield is affected by the ratio of compatible and incompatible target-flanker pairings presented in the same—but not in the other—hemifield. Presenting stimuli at four different locations, we demonstrated independent effects of the ratio of compatible and incompatible trials for stimulus locations in different hemifields as well as for stimulus locations within the same hemifield. Independent selectivity adjustment regarding the left and right visual hemifields thus appears to be a special case of a larger class of location-specific adaptation effects and might not be informative regarding hemisphere-specific processing.     

Paradoxes of happiness

To get happiness forget about it; then, with any luck, happiness will come as a by-product in pursuing meaningful activities and relationships. This adage is known as the paradox of happiness, but actually it contains a number of different paradoxes concerning aims, success, freedom, and attitudes. These paradoxes enhance our understanding of the complexity of happiness and its interaction with other values in good lives, that is, lives which are happy as well as morally decent, meaningful, and fulfilling. Yet, each paradox conveys a one-sided truth that needs to be balanced with others. Happiness, understood as subjective well-being, involves positively evaluating our lives and living with a sense of well-being. As such, it should not be confused with either pleasure or normative conceptions of “true” happiness.     

Dissociable learning processes,associative theory,and testimonial reviews: A comment on Smith and Church (2018)

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Smith and Church (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25, 1565–1584 2018) present a “testimonial” review of dissociable learning processes...     

Visual object affordances: object orientation

Five experiments systematically investigated whether orientation is a visual object property that affords action. The primary aim was to establish the existence of a pure physical affordance (PPA) of object orientation, independent of any semantic object-action associations or visually salient areas towards which visual attention might be biased. Taken together, the data from these experiments suggest that firstly PPAs of object orientation do exist, and secondly, the behavioural effects that reveal them are larger and more robust when the object appears to be graspable, and is oriented in depth (rather than just frontally) such that its leading edge appears to point outwards in space towards a particular hand of the viewer.     

The Burden of Proof and Its Role in Argumentation

The notion of “the burden of proof” plays an important role in real-world argumentation contexts, in particular in law. It has also been given a central role in normative accounts of argumentation, and has been used to explain a range of classic argumentation fallacies. We argue that in law the goal is to make practical decisions whereas in critical discussion the goal is frequently simply to increase or decrease degree of belief in a proposition. In the latter case, it is not necessarily important whether that degree of belief exceeds a particular threshold (e.g., ‘reasonable doubt’). We explore the consequences of this distinction for the role that the “burden of proof” has played in argumentation and in theories of fallacy.     

Eye movements as direct tests of the GO model for the missing-letter effect

When asked to detect target letters while reading a text, participants miss more letters in frequently occurring function words than in less frequent content words. To account for this pattern of results, known as the missing-letter effect, Greenberg, Healy, Koriat, and Kreiner proposed the guidance-organization (GO) model, which integrates the two leading models of the missing-letter effect while incorporating innovative assumptions based on the literature on eye movements during reading. The GO model was evaluated by monitoring the eye movements of participants while they searched for a target letter in a continuous text display. Results revealed the usual missing-letter effect, and many empirical benchmark effects in eye movement literature were observed. However, contrary to the predictions of the GO model, response latencies were longer for function words than for content words. Alternative models are discussed that can accommodate both error and response latency data for the missing-letter effect.     

Successfully challenging fundamentalist beliefs results in increased death awareness

Terror management theory argues that human understanding of mortality creates an existential anxiety that must be kept under constant control. Defenses—such as beliefs that provide permanence, predictability, and meaning—are erected whose function is in part to keep thoughts about death as far removed from consciousness as possible. The current study investigated the defensive function of Christian fundamentalist belief in managing death-awareness. The general hypothesis of the study is that challenges to such beliefs undermine one’s ability to control cognitions related to mortality. More specifically, it was hypothesized that successful challenges to this form of religious belief would make death-related cognitions more accessible to consciousness. Self-identified Christians, both fundamentalists and non-fundamentalists, encountered material that challenged the fundamentalist belief that the Christian Bible is free of inconsistencies and contradictions. Consistent with expectations, under these conditions higher levels of accessibility of death-related cognition were found among fundamentalist Christians, but not their non-fundamentalist counterparts.