Effect of age on dual-task performance in children and adults

Age effects on dual-task costs were examined in healthy adults (Exp. 1) and in typically developing children (Exp. 2). In both experiments, individual differences in performance on the single-task components were titrated so that any age differences in dual-task costs could not be attributed to differences in single-task performance. Dual-task costs were found, but there were no age-related differences in these costs in older relative to younger adults, in 7-year-old relative to 9-year-old children, or across all four age groups. The results from these experiments suggest that previously reported age differences in dual-task costs, in both healthy ageing and child development, may be due to a failure to adequately equate single-task difficulty.     

Psychometric properties of reverse-scored items on the CES-D in a sample of ethnically diverse older adults

Reverse-scored items on assessment scales increase cognitive processing demands and may therefore lead to measurement problems for older adult respondents. In this study, the objective was to examine possible psychometric inadequacies of reverse-scored items on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) when used to assess ethnically diverse older adults. Using baseline data from a gerontologic clinical trial (n = 460), we tested the hypotheses that the reversed items on the CES-D (a) are less reliable than nonreversed items, (b) disproportionately lead to intraindividually atypical responses that are psychometrically problematic, and (c) evidence improved measurement properties when an imputation procedure based on the scale mean is used to replace atypical responses. In general, the results supported the hypotheses. Relative to nonreversed CES-D items, the 4 reversed items were less internally consistent, were associated with lower item-scale correlations, and were more often answered atypically at an intraindividual level. Further, the atypical responses were negatively correlated with responses to psychometrically sound nonreversed items that had similar content. The use of imputation to replace atypical responses enhanced the predictive validity of the set of reverse-scored items. Among older adult respondents, reverse-scored items are associated with measurement difficulties. It is recommended that appropriate correction procedures such as item readministration or statistical imputation be applied to reduce the difficulties.     

Retraining automatic action tendencies changes alcoholic patients' approach bias for alcohol and improves treatment outcome

This study tested the effects of a new cognitive-bias modification (CBM) intervention that targeted an approach bias for alcohol in 214 alcoholic inpatients. Patients were assigned to one of two experimental conditions, in which they were explicitly or implicitly trained to make avoidance movements (pushing a joystick) in response to alcohol pictures, or to one of two control conditions, in which they received no training or sham training. Four brief sessions of experimental CBM preceded regular inpatient treatment. In the experimental conditions only, patients' approach bias changed into an avoidance bias for alcohol. This effect generalized to untrained pictures in the task used in the CBM and to an Implicit Association Test, in which alcohol and soft-drink words were categorized with approach and avoidance words. Patients in the experimental conditions showed better treatment outcomes a year later. These findings indicate that a short intervention can change alcoholics' automatic approach bias for alcohol and may improve treatment outcome.     

Harm,risk, and doping analogies: A counter-response to Kious

Brent Kious has objected to our previous criticism of his views on doping, maintaining that we, by and large, misrepresented his position. In this response, we strengthen our original misgivings, arguing that (1) his views on risk of harm in sport are either uncontroversially true (not inconsistent with the views of many doping opponents) or demonstrably false (attribute to doping opponents an overly simplistic view), (2) his use of analogies (still) indicates an oversimplification of many issues surrounding the question of doping in sports, and (3) his doping analogies are insufficiently precise to support his conclusions.     

Philosophy on steroids: a reply

Brent Kious has recently attacked several arguments generally adduced to support anti-doping in sports, which are widely supported by the sports medicine fraternity, international sports federations, and international governments. We show that his attack does not succeed for a variety of reasons. First, it uses an overly inclusive definition of doping at odds with the WADA definition, which has global, if somewhat contentious, currency. Second, it seriously misconstrues the position it attacks, rendering the attack without force against a more balanced construal of an anti-doping position. Third, it makes unwarranted appeals to matters Kious considers morally ‘clear’, while simultaneously attacking a position many others take to be equally morally ‘clear’, namely that of anti-doping. Such an inconsistency, attacking and appealing to the moral status quo as befits one’s argument, is not acceptable without further qualification. Fourth, his position suffers from a general methodological flaw of over-reliance upon argumentation by analogy. Moreover, it is argued that the analogies, being poorly selected and developed, fail to justify his conclusion that the anti-doping lobby lacks philosophical and moral authority for its stance. These issues are symptomatic of a more fundamental problem: any attempt at providing a blanket solution to the question of whether doping is morally acceptable or not is bound to run up against problems when applied to highly specific contexts. Thus, rather than reaching any particular conclusion for or against doping products or processes in this article, we conclude that an increased context-sensitivity will result in a more evenhanded appraisal of arguments on the matter.     

Gaze direction differentially affects avoidance tendencies to happy and angry faces in socially anxious individuals

Increasing evidence indicates that eye gaze direction affects the processing of emotional faces in anxious individuals. However, the effects of eye gaze direction on the behavioral responses elicited by emotional faces, such as avoidance behavior, remain largely unexplored. We administered an Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT) in high (HSA) and low socially anxious (LSA) individuals. All participants responded to photographs of angry, happy and neutral faces (presented with direct and averted gaze), by either pushing a joystick away from them (avoidance) or pulling it towards them (approach). Compared to LSA, HSA were faster in avoiding than approaching angry faces. Most crucially, this avoidance tendency was only present when the perceived anger was directed towards the subject (direct gaze) and not when the gaze of the face-stimulus was averted. In contrast, HSA individuals tended to avoid happy faces irrespectively of gaze direction. Neutral faces elicited no approach-avoidance tendencies. Thus avoidance of angry faces in social anxiety as measured by AA-tasks reflects avoidance of subject-directed anger and not of negative stimuli in general. In addition, although both anger and joy are considered to reflect approach-related emotions, gaze direction did not affect HSA's avoidance of happy faces, suggesting differential mechanisms affecting responses to happy and angry faces in social anxiety.