Superstition predicts perception of illusory control

Superstitions are common, yet we have little understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that bring them about. This study used a laboratory‐based analogue for superstitious beliefs that involved people monitoring the relationship between undertaking an action (pressing a button) and an outcome occurring (a light illuminating). The task was arranged such that there was no objective contingency between pressing the button and the light illuminating – the light was just as likely to illuminate whether the button was pressed or not. Nevertheless, most people rated the causal relationship between the button press and the light illuminating to be moderately positive, demonstrating an illusion of causality. This study found that the magnitude of this illusion was predicted by people's level of endorsement of common superstitious beliefs (measured using a novel Superstitious Beliefs Questionnaire), but was not associated with mood variables or their self‐rated locus of control. This observation is consistent with a more general individual difference or bias to overweight conjunctive events over disjunctive events during causal reasoning in those with a propensity for superstitious beliefs.     

Simplified Estimation and Testing in Unbalanced Repeated Measures Designs

In this paper we propose a simple estimator for unbalanced repeated measures design models where each unit is observed at least once in each cell of the experimental design. The estimator does not require a model of the error covariance structure. Thus, circularity of the error covariance matrix and estimation of correlation parameters and variances are not necessary. Together with a weak assumption about the reason for the varying number of observations, the proposed estimator and its variance estimator are unbiased. As an alternative to confidence intervals based on the normality assumption, a bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap technique is considered. We also propose the naive percentile bootstrap for Wald-type tests where the standard Wald test may break down when the number of observations is small relative to the number of parameters to be estimated. In a simulation study we illustrate the properties of the estimator and the bootstrap techniques to calculate confidence intervals and conduct hypothesis tests in small and large samples under normality and non-normality of the errors. The results imply that the simple estimator is only slightly less efficient than an estimator that correctly assumes a block structure of the error correlation matrix, a special case of which is an equi-correlation matrix. Application of the estimator and the bootstrap technique is illustrated using data from a task switch experiment based on an experimental within design with 32 cells and 33 participants.

     

Meeting Scotus: On Scholasticism and Its Ghosts

Recalling the story of the ghost of Duns Scotus that haunts Merton Library, we investigate in this article whether Christian theology contains room for belief in ghosts. We conclude that there is no good reason why ghosts should not exist within a proper dogmatic account of death and resurrection, but that there is no theological need to affirm that ghosts do exist either. Thus we suggest that this matter is dogmatically indifferent. That same dogmatic account, however, demands that we take seriously the continuing lively voices of those, like Scotus, who have gone before as we pursue our own theological vocations.     

Relative informativeness of quantifiers used in syllogistic reasoning

Three experiments tested a possible resolution of the probability heuristics model (PHM) of syllogistic reasoning proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999), with their experimental results apparently showing that the generalized quantifier few was not as informative as suggested theoretically. Modifying the interpretation of few to take into account the distinction between positive and negative quantifiers (Moxey & Sanford, 1993) indicated two orderings over the quantifiers all, most, few, some, none, and some...not that are more consistent with the results. Experiments 1-3 tested these orderings empirically by having participants rank whether a quantifier applied to a particular probabilistic state of affairs. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that participants agreed on when a quantifier applied and that the empirically derived informativeness orderings were consistent with the proposed modifications of the order. Experiment 3 showed that this finding was robust even when response competition was eliminated.     

Long-term effects of covert face recognition

Covert face recognition has previously been thought to produce only very short-lasting effects. In this study we demonstrate that manipulating subjects' attentional load affects explicit, but not implicit memory for faces, and that implicit effects can persist over much longer intervals than is normally reported. Subjects performed letter-string tasks of high vs. low perceptual load (Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfomance. 21, 451-468.), while ignoring task-irrelevant celebrity faces. Memory for the faces was then assessed using (a) a surprise recognition test for the celebrities' names, and (b) repetition priming in a face familiarity task. The load manipulation strongly influenced explicit recognition memory, but had no effect on repetition priming from the same items. Moreover, faces from the high load condition produced the same amount of priming whether they were explicitly remembered or not. This result resolves a long-standing anomaly in the face recognition literature, and is discussed in relation to covert processing in prosopagnosia.     

“Non-Natural” Qualities in G.E. Moore: Inherent or Contingent?

G.E. Moore's theory of the nature of the quality referred to by the word good asserts that this quality is non-natural. If it is, further, supposed that this non-natural quality belongs necessarily and exclusively to those events, human acts, entities, etc., which possess certain strictly determined natural qualities, and those qualities only, then it becomes difficult to explain the relation and the supposed interdependence allegedly existing between the two so disparate categories of qualities. This paper purports to show that, in fact, any mutual dependence of natural and non-natural qualities, including the causal one, is unconceivable. To deny this would allow no less but the possibility of deriving an ought from an is. A final consequence of this is that a non-natural quality, denoted by the predicate good, does, in fact, attach to a strictly delineated and limited morally relevant behaviour (and whatever else we may consider morally relevant), and to it only. But it is attached there in randomly; it is contingent, not inherent; it is there without regard to, and not as a consequence of, the natural qualities of what is the subject of moral judgment ... whether we like it or not.     

Can longitudinal changes in processing speed explain longitudinal age changes in fluid intelligence?

The processing-speed theory of cognitive aging contends tha age-related declines in intellectual function reflect the consequences of age-related slowing of processing speed. Cross-sectional data support this assumption. The association between 4-year changes in processing speed and 4-year changes in fluid intelligence was examined with a sample of 417 older adults. Changes in processing speed correlated .53 with changes in fluid intelligence. The difference in the explanatory power of processing speed regarding age-related differences and age-related changes is discussed with reference to other longitudinal studies and methodological considerations.     

Meet The Simpsons: top-down effects in face learning

We examined whether prior knowledge of a person affects the visual processes involved in learning a face. In two experiments, subjects were taught to associate human faces with characters they knew (from the TV show The Simpsons) or characters they did not (novel names). In each experiment, knowledge of the character predicted performance in a recognition memory test, relying only on old/new confidence ratings. In experiment 1, we established the technique and showed that there is a face-learning advantage for known people, even when face items are counterbalanced for familiarity across the experiment. In experiment 2 we replicated the effect in a setting which discouraged subjects from attending more to known than unknown people, and eliminated any visual association between face stimuli and a character from The Simpsons. We conclude that prior knowledge about a person can enhance learning of a new face.     

Optimal data selection: Revision,review, and reevaluation

Since it first appeared, there has been much research and critical discussion on the theory of optimal data selection as an explanation of Wason’s (1966, 1968) selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). In this paper, this literature is reviewed, and the theory of optimal data selection is reevaluated in its light. The information gain model is first located in the current theoretical debate in the psychology of reasoning concerning dual processes in human reasoning. A model comparison exercise is then presented that compares a revised version of the model with its theoretical competitors. Tests of the novel predictions of the model are then reviewed. This section also reviews experiments claimed not to be consistent with optimal data selection. Finally, theoretical criticisms of optimal data selection are discussed. It is argued either that the revised model accounts for them or that they do not stand up under analysis. It is concluded that some version of the optimal data selection model still provides the best account of the selection task. Consequently, the conclusion of Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) original rational analysis (Anderson, 1990), that people’s hypothesis-testing behavior on this task is rational and well adapted to the environment, still stands.