Age-related Changes in Memory and Fluid Reasoning in a Sample of Healthy Old People

ABSTRACT

Participants in the Healthy Old People in Edinburgh (HOPE) study (N = 398) were assessed on Raven's Progressive Matrices and Logical Memory on up to three occasions. Covariates included education, social class, disease and medication status, blood pressure and study outcome. Raven's score declined linearly with age, whereas decline in Logical Memory was accelerating. There was significant variation in individuals' rates of decline for Ravens but not Logical Memory. Slope–intercept covariances were not significant. Those who later developed dementia already exhibited lower scores, more so for Logical Memory than Raven's. Death and study attrition were related to performance, again greater for Logical Memory. Conclusions: The HOPE approach of progressive screening is a feasible and practical method for studying healthy cognitive ageing. As predicted for an initially healthy sample, rates of decline were relatively homogeneous. The hypothesis of differential decline was not supported, nor was a strict interpretation of the hypothesis that cognitive ageing is entirely pathology driven.     

Holism and eclecticism in the theory of concepts

Abstract

Howard (1992) defines concepts as the information that a person has about a category, and argues for an eclectic theory of concepts on the basis of this definition. We argue that this definition is unacceptable and hence that eclecticism does not follow. First, the definition is circular as it stands. Secondly, when it is modified to avoid circularity, it implies conceptual holism, according to which concepts are not useful explanatory constructs in psychology. Thirdly, we argue that Howard's argument relies essentially on this unacceptable definition: alternative accounts of concepts, namely categorisational or representational views, do not support it. Having countered the argument for eclecticism, we then argue against it directly on methodological grounds.     

The Interplay of News Frames on Cognitive Complexity

This research considers how distinct news frames work in combination to influence information processing. It extends framing research grounded in prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and attribution theory (Iyengar, 1991) to study conditional framing effects on associative memory. Using a 2 × 3 experimental design embedded within a probability survey (N= 379), tests examined the effects of two different frame dimensions—loss‐gain and individual‐societal—on the complexity of individuals' thoughts concerning the issue of urban growth. Findings indicate that news frames interact to generate more or less complex cognitive responses, with societal‐gain frame combinations generating the most detailed cognitions about the causes, components, and consequences of urban growth. Directions for research on media framing are discussed.     

Investigating the Relation between Imagery and Perception: Evidence from Face Priming

The relation between imagery and perception was investigated in face priming. Two experiments are reported in which subjects either saw or imagined the faces of celebrities. They were later given a speeded perceptual test (familiarity judgement to pictures of celebrities) or a speeded imagery test (in which they were told the names of celebrities and asked to make a decision about their appearance). Seeing faces primed the perceptual test, and imaging faces primed the imagery test; however, there was no priming between seeing and imaging faces. These results show that perception and imagery can be dissociated in normal subjects. In two further experiments, we examined the effects of imaging faces on a subsequent face-naming task and on a task requiring familiarity judgements to partial faces. Both these tasks were facilitated by prior imaging of faces. These results are discussed in relation to those of McDermott & Roediger (1994), who found that imagery promoted object priming in a perceptual test involving naming partial line drawings. The implications for models of face recognition are also discussed.     

II—Richard Cross

ABSTRACT Scotus's belief that any created substance can depend on the divine essence and/or divine persons as a subject requires him to abandon the plausible Aristotelian principle that there is no merely relational change. I argue that Scotus's various counterexamples to the principle can be rebutted. For reasons related to those that arise in Scotus's failed attempt to refute the principle, the principle also entails that properties cannot be universals.     

Generate and test: An alternative route to knowledge elicitation in an implicit learning task

Three experiments are reported, which examine generation of knowledge in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) invariant learning task. In this task, participants are exposed to 30 four-digit numbers containing an invariant "3". Following this participants then demonstrate a preference for novel numbers containing this invariant over numbers without it. Despite above-chance performance on this pseudo-memory test, participants appear unable to verbalize anything pertinent to the invariant. Here we introduce a novel version of this task, relying on generation of items rather than a preference test. We argue that this new task engages different processing resources, resulting in different patterns of performance. In Experiment 1, invariant learning was demonstrated using a novel fragment completion test. Experiment 2 found that suppressing articulation inhibited learning, implying that this test task accesses phonological knowledge. It is suggested that using the fragment completion test engages different processing resources during test from those in a preference test. Experiment 3 reinforces this position by demonstrating that knowledge appears to transfer across surface features, a result that seems to contradict recent findings by Stadler, Warren, and Lesch (2000). A resolution is offered, drawing on episodic accounts of implicit learning.     

The effects of preoperative preparation on postoperative outcomes: the moderating role of control appraisals.

OBJECTIVE: To test the proposal that external health locus of control and self-efficacy would moderate the effects of a psychological preparation for surgery on outcomes for surgical heart patients. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Psychological distress, pain, serum cortisol, and tumor necrosis factor alpha. DESIGN: A total of 80 coronary artery bypass graft patients were given standard care plus a psychological preparation or standard care alone using a single-blind methodology with random assignment. Data on psychological and biological functioning were collected at admission (baseline) and discharge. RESULTS: As predicted, external health locus of control and self-efficacy moderated the effect of the preparation on all outcomes. Results indicated that for high external health locus of control, the preparation was related to lower distress for people with high self-efficacy compared with those with low self-efficacy. When external health locus of control was low, the preparation was related to lower distress for those with lower self-efficacy. CONCLUSION: These findings caution against the use of preparations and education for surgical patients without accounting for control appraisals.     

A specific calculating ability

We report two experiments that investigate the calculating strategy used by a low IQ savant to identify prime numbers. Hermelin and O'Connor (1990) had suggested previously that this subject may use a procedure first described by Eratosthenes to detect a prime number, namely, dividing a target number by all primes up to the square root of the target number and testing for a remainder. In the first experiment, we compare the reaction times of the savant to decide whether a number is prime with those of a control subject proficient in mathematical calculation. In addition, we measured the savant's speed of information processing using an inspection time task. We found that the reaction times of the savant, although generally faster, followed the same pattern of the control subject who reported using the Eratosthenes procedure. The savant's inspection time indicated that his speed of processing was far superior to that expected from someone of his IQ. In the second experiment, we measured the time it takes mathematics students to divide by different prime numbers and we also tested them on the prime identification task. We used their division times to simulate their performance on the prime number identification task under the assumption that they used the Eratosthenes procedure. We also simulated the reaction times that would result from a simple memory-based procedure for identifying primes. We found that the Eratosthenes simulation, in contrast to the memory simulation, provided a good fit to both the students' and the savant's reaction times. We conclude that the savant is using a complex computational algorithm to identify primes and suggest two explanations of how the apparent contradiction between his low general intelligence and his superior numerical ability might be resolved.