Distinct neuronal patterns of positive and negative moral processing in psychopathy

Psychopathy is a disorder characterized by severe and frequent moral violations in multiple domains of life. Numerous studies have shown psychopathy-related limbic brain abnormalities during moral processing; however, these studies only examined negatively valenced moral stimuli. Here, we aimed to replicate prior psychopathy research on negative moral judgments and to extend this work by examining psychopathy-related abnormalities in the processing of controversial moral stimuli and positive moral processing. Incarcerated adult males (N = 245) completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging protocol on a mobile imaging system stationed at the prison. Psychopathy was assessed using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised (PCL-R). Participants were then shown words describing three types of moral stimuli: wrong (e.g., stealing), not wrong (e.g., charity), and controversial (e.g., euthanasia). Participants rated each stimulus as either wrong or not wrong. PCL-R total scores were correlated with not wrong behavioral responses to wrong moral stimuli, and were inversely related to hemodynamic activity in the anterior cingulate cortex in the contrast of wrong > not wrong. In the controversial > noncontroversial comparison, psychopathy was inversely associated with activity in the temporal parietal junction and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These results indicate that psychopathy-related abnormalities are observed during the processing of complex, negative, and positive moral stimuli.     

Missed losses loom larger than missed gains: Electrodermal reactivity to decision choices and outcomes in a gambling task

Loss aversion is a defining characteristic of prospect theory, whereby responses are stronger to losses than to equivalently sized gains (Kahneman & Tversky Econometrica, 47, 263–291, 1979). By monitoring electrodermal activity (EDA) during a gambling task, in this study we examined physiological activity during risky decisions, as well as to both obtained (e.g., gains and losses) and counterfactual (e.g., narrowly missed gains and losses) outcomes. During the bet selection phase, EDA increased linearly with bet size, highlighting the role of somatic signals in decision-making under uncertainty in a task without any learning requirement. Outcome-related EDA scaled with the magnitudes of monetary wins and losses, and losses had a stronger impact on EDA than did equivalently sized wins. Narrowly missed wins (i.e., near-wins) and narrowly missed losses (i.e., near-losses) also evoked EDA responses, and the change of EDA as a function of the size of the missed outcome was modestly greater for near-losses than for near-wins, suggesting that near-losses have more impact on subjective value than do near-wins. Across individuals, the slope for choice-related EDA (as a function of bet size) correlated with the slope for outcome-related EDA as a function of both the obtained and counterfactual outcome magnitudes, and these correlations were stronger for loss and near-loss conditions than for win and near-win conditions. Taken together, these asymmetrical EDA patterns to objective wins and losses, as well as to near-wins and near-losses, provide a psychophysiological instantiation of the value function curve in prospect theory, which is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain.     

Optimal data selection: Revision,review, and reevaluation

Since it first appeared, there has been much research and critical discussion on the theory of optimal data selection as an explanation of Wason’s (1966, 1968) selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). In this paper, this literature is reviewed, and the theory of optimal data selection is reevaluated in its light. The information gain model is first located in the current theoretical debate in the psychology of reasoning concerning dual processes in human reasoning. A model comparison exercise is then presented that compares a revised version of the model with its theoretical competitors. Tests of the novel predictions of the model are then reviewed. This section also reviews experiments claimed not to be consistent with optimal data selection. Finally, theoretical criticisms of optimal data selection are discussed. It is argued either that the revised model accounts for them or that they do not stand up under analysis. It is concluded that some version of the optimal data selection model still provides the best account of the selection task. Consequently, the conclusion of Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) original rational analysis (Anderson, 1990), that people’s hypothesis-testing behavior on this task is rational and well adapted to the environment, still stands.     

Approach and Avoidance Tendencies in Spider Fearful Children: The Approach-Avoidance Task

Fear in children is associated with the tendency to avoid situations related to the fear. In this study, the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT) was evaluated as a test of automatic behavioral avoidance tendencies in children. A sample of 195 children aged between 9 and 12 years completed an AAT, a Behavioral Assessment Task (BAT), and two spider fear questionnaires. The results indicate that all children showed an automatic avoidance tendency in response to spider pictures, but not pictures of butterflies or neutral pictures. Girls who reported more fear of spiders on the self-reports and behaved more anxiously during the BAT also showed a greater avoidance tendency in the AAT. These relationships were absent in boys.     

Decision-making under uncertainty: biases and Bayesians

Animals (including humans) often face circumstances in which the best choice of action is not certain. Environmental cues may be ambiguous, and choices may be risky. This paper reviews the theoretical side of decision-making under uncertainty, particularly with regard to unknown risk (ambiguity). We use simple models to show that, irrespective of pay-offs, whether it is optimal to bias probability estimates depends upon how those estimates have been generated. In particular, if estimates have been calculated in a Bayesian framework with a sensible prior, it is best to use unbiased estimates. We review the extent of evidence for and against viewing animals (including humans) as Bayesian decision-makers. We pay particular attention to the Ellsberg Paradox, a classic result from experimental economics, in which human subjects appear to deviate from optimal decision-making by demonstrating an apparent aversion to ambiguity in a choice between two options with equal expected rewards. The paradox initially seems to be an example where decision-making estimates are biased relative to the Bayesian optimum. We discuss the extent to which the Bayesian paradigm might be applied to the evolution of decision-makers and how the Ellsberg Paradox may, with a deeper understanding, be resolved.     

Conflict adaptation in time: Foreperiods as contextual cues for attentional adjustment

Interference evoked by distractor stimulus information, such as flankers in the Eriksen task, is reduced when the proportion of conflicting stimuli is increased. This modulation is sensitive to contextual cues such as stimulus location or color, suggesting attentional adjustment to conflict contingencies on the basis of context information. In the present study, we explored whether conflict adjustment is modulated by temporal variation of conflict likelihood. To this end, we associated low and high proportions of conflict stimuli with foreperiods of different lengths. Flanker interference was higher with foreperiods associated with low conflict proportions, suggesting that participants use the foreperiod as a contextual cue for attentional adjustment. We conjecture that participants initially adopt the strategy useful for conflict contingencies associated with short foreperiods, and then readjust during the trial, in the absence of any additional exogenous cue, when the imperative stimulus has not occurred during a certain time interval.     

Order or disorder? Impaired Hebb learning in dyslexia

The present study offers an integrative account proposing that dyslexia and its various associated cognitive impairments reflect an underlying deficit in the long-term learning of serial-order information, here operationalized as Hebb repetition learning. In nondyslexic individuals, improved immediate serial recall is typically observed when one particular sequence of items is repeated across an experimental session, a phenomenon known as the Hebb repetition effect. Starting from the critical observation that individuals with dyslexia seem to be selectively impaired in cognitive tasks that involve processing of serial order, the present study is the first to test and confirm the hypothesis that the Hebb repetition effect is affected in dyslexia, even for nonverbal modalities. We present a theoretical framework in which the Hebb repetition effect is assumed to be a laboratory analogue of naturalistic word learning, on the basis of which we argue that dyslexia is characterized by an impairment of serial-order learning that affects language learning and processing.     

A Bayesian approach to the argument from ignorance.

In this paper, we re-examine a classic informal reasoning fallacy, the so-called argumentam ad ignorantiam. We argue that the structure of some versions of this argument parallels examples of inductive reasoning that are widely viewed as unproblematic. Viewed probabilistically, these versions of the argument from ignorance constitute a legitimate form of reasoning; the textbook examples are inductive arguments that are not unsound but simply weak, due to the nature of the premises and conclusions involved. In an experiment, we demonstrated some of the variables affecting the strength of the argument, and conclude with some general considerations towards an empirical theory of argument strength.     

Testing a positional model of the Hebb effect

In two experiments, we investigated the hypothesis that a strengthening of position-item associations underlies the improvement seen in performance on an immediate serial recall task, for a list that is surreptitiously repeated every third trial. Having established a strong effect of repetition, performance was tested on transfer lists in which half the items held the same position as in the repeated list (S-items) and the remainder moved (D-items). In Experiment 1, S-items showed a small advantage in order errors over control and D-items. A second experiment tested whether a design feature in Experiment 1 underlay this advantage. When the experimental design was better controlled, no improvement was shown for either S- or D-items over controls. These data were shown to be inconsistent with the results of computer simulations of a positional model. An alternative model is outlined.     

Representational Translation With Concrete Models in Organic Chemistry

In representation-rich domains such as organic chemistry, students must be facile and accurate when translating between different 2D representations, such as diagrams. We hypothesized that translating between organic chemistry diagrams would be more accurate when concrete models were used because difficult mental processes could be augmented by external actions on the models. In three studies, the task was to translate between different diagrams of molecules with or without a model. The model groups outperformed control groups, and students who received and used models outperformed those who received but did not use models. Uses of the model suggested that participants were performing external actions to support or replace difficult mental spatial processes. Spatial ability was a much weaker predictor of performance than model use. Results suggest that concrete molecular models can be an effective learning tool but some students need direct instruction to be able to take advantage of models.