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Mikael Leidenhag 《Zygon》2020,55(3):696-709
In this article, I defend my previous argument that natural divine causation suffers under the problem of causal overdetermination and that it cannot serve as a line of demarcation between theistic evolution (TE) and intelligent design (ID). I do this in light of Christoffer Skogholt's critique of my article. I argue that Skogholt underestimates the naturalistic ambitions of some current thinkers in TE and fails, therefore, to adequately respond to my main argument. I also outline how partial causation better serves as a model for the relationship between God's providence and evolution. 相似文献
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In an exploratory study, we investigated degrees of social proximity between mothers and their 9-month-old children. Twenty-four Swedish mother–infant dyads (12 boys and 12 girls) were observed during a brief free play episode. Social proximity was measured through nine items focusing on both communication and social interaction. Overall, we found that mother–daughter dyads displayed significantly higher degrees of social proximity than mother–son dyads. More specifically, mothers with daughters displayed more physical and visual contact, and were also rated as more sensitive than mothers with sons. It was also found that girls were judged as being more compliant than boys. ©1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Mikael Leidenhag 《Zygon》2013,48(4):966-983
In this article, I call into question the relevance of emergence theories as presently used by thinkers in the science–religion discussion. Specifically, I discuss theories of emergence that have been used by both religious naturalists and proponents of panentheism. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) If we take the background theory to be metaphysical realism, then there seems to be no positive connection between the reality of emergent properties and the validity of providing reality with a religious interpretation, though one could perhaps construe an argument for the positive ontological status of emergence as a negative case for a religious worldview. (2) To be considered more plausible, religious naturalism should interpret religious discourse from the perspective of pragmatic realism. (3) Panentheistic models of divine causality are unable to avoid ontological dualism. (4) It is not obvious that emergent phenomena and/or properties are nonreducible in the ontological sense of the terms; indeed, the tension between weak and strong emergence makes it difficult for the emergentist to make ontological judgments. My general conclusion is that the concept of emergence has little metaphysical significance in the dialogue between science and theology. 相似文献
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Mikael Enckell M.D. 《Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review》2013,36(2):149-163
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Mikael Stenmark 《Theology & Science》2013,11(1):23-38
Both within Christianity and Islam we can find influential scholars who maintain that science is not religiously neutral because it contains a naturalist bias. They argue that Christians or Muslims should respond by developing their own kind of science, an “Islamic science,” a “sacred science,” a “theistic science” or a “faith-informed science.” In this article the recent writings of two advocates of such a view, standing in two different religious traditions, namely Mehdi Golshani (Islam) and Alvin Plantinga (Christianity) are compared, analyzed, and evaluated. A distinction between different ways in which religion might enter into the fabric of science is introduced and it is argued that the most crucial issues surround the question of whether or not religion ought to play a part in the validation of theories. 相似文献