Two-digit comparison: decomposed, holistic, or hybrid?

We investigate whether two-digit numbers are decomposed for purposes of numerical comparison (e.g., choosing the larger one). Earlier theorists concluded that numbers are processed holistically (Brysbaert, 1995; Dehaene, Dupoux, & Mehler, 1990), or that holistic and decomposed processes operate in parallel (Nuerk, Weger, & Willmes, 2001). In the present experiment, we presented pairs of two-digit numbers with a decade distance of either zero (e.g., 54-57) or one (54-61). If a holistic process contributes to two-digit comparison, there should be an overall distance effect for number pairs with a decade distance of one. On the other hand, if numbers are decomposed and a holistic comparison does not contribute, this overall distance effect should be absent for these number pairs. Evidence is found that, at least in the present task settings, numbers are not compared holistically. The results are interpreted in terms of a recently proposed theory of numerical cognition (Verguts & Fias, 2004; Verguts, Fias, & Stevens, in press).     

Blocking is sensitive to causal structure in 4-year-old and 8-year-old children

In a contingency learning task, 4-year-old and 8-year-old children had to predict the outcome displayed on the back of a card on the basis of cues presented on the front. The task was embedded in either a causal or a merely predictive scenario. Within this task, either a forward blocking or a backward blocking procedure was implemented. Blocking occurred in the causal but not in the predictive scenario. Moreover, blocking was affected by the scenario to the same extent in both age groups. The pattern of results was similar for forward and backward blocking. These results suggest that even young children are sensitive to the causal structure of a contingency learning task and that the occurrence of blocking in such a task defies an explanation in terms of associative learning theory.     

Stimulus-feature specific negative priming

We report the results of two experiments that showed that the time needed to respond to a feature of a stimulus increases when that particular feature of that particular stimulus previously had to be ignored. The data of Experiment 2 argue against the hypothesis that the observed stimulus-feature specific negative priming was due to a response conflict instigated by automatic episodic retrieval of prime responses. Experiment 2 also showed that the effects were not caused by difficulties in switching between prime and probe tasks and provided additional evidence for the fact that priming effects were stimulus-feature specific. The present results suggest that the selective inhibition or episodic encoding mechanisms that are assumed to underlie negative priming can operate in a more specific and powerful manner than has been previously assumed.     

Social–Cognitive Processes in Preschool Boys With and Without Oppositional Defiant Disorder

The social–cognitive characteristics of 88 preschool boys with Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) and 80 nondisruptive boys were assessed 3 times over a 2-year period. Three questions were addressed: (1) Do social–cognitive processes (encoding, attribution, problem solving, and response evaluation) distinguish clinic-referred preschool boys from peers without behavior problems? (2) What is the relation between preschoolers' social–cognitive processes and observed problem behavior? (3) Are the social–cognitive processes of clinic boys with ODD influenced by comorbidity with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)? Boys were presented hypothetical, peer-oriented social dilemmas to resolve. At all 3 assessments, clinic boys were twice as likely as were comparison group boys to generate aggressive solutions. Relative to comparison boys, clinic boys' encoding of social information was less accurate. The groups did not differ in their attributions or response evaluations. Verbal IQ and language skills were modestly correlated with problem solving and encoding. Within the clinic group, social–cognitive processes were not affected by ADHD comorbidity and they showed little relation to later diagnostic status or severity of behavior problems.     

Index to Volume 29

Other Index

Index to Volume 29     

The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem

This paper concerns one of the undecided disputes of modern moral philosophy: the possibility of moral dilemmas. Whereas proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas often appeal to moral experience, many opponents refer to ethical theory and deontic logic. My aim in this paper is to clarify some of the tension between moral experience and ethical theory with respect to moral dilemmas. In Part One I try to show that a number of logical arguments against the possibility of moral dilemmas, though apparently very different, turn out to be basically the same, as they are all based on the following concept of ought: if A ought to be done, doing B is impermissible and doing A itself is permissible. In Part Two I present an overview of several definitions of moral dilemmas that have been given by proponents of moral dilemmas: definitions that define moral dilemmas in terms of oughts and definitions that define them in terms of reasons. I conclude that, while reason is to weak, ought is too strong a concept to define moral dilemmas with. In this way, the arguments from Part One create a logical problem for proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas to define moral dilemmas.     

Relations of self-esteem concerns, group identification, and self-stereotyping to in-group favoritism

In 2 studies, the author examined the effect of collective self-esteem (CSE; J. Crocker & R. Luhtanen, 1993) on people's willingness to display in-group favoritism. To test that self-esteem hypothesis, he measured public CSE, rather than private CSE, because the former parallels a threat to social identity, a state believed to motivate in-group favoritism. Furthermore, the author explored whether group identification and self-stereotyping moderated the effect of public CSE on in-group favoritism. The participants were 92 British and Dutch university employees. As expected, participants high in public CSE displayed more in-group favoritism than did those low in public CSE. Moreover, group identification and self-stereotyping appeared to moderate the effect of CSE.     

The test of self‐conscious affect: internal structure,differential scales and relationships with long‐term affects

Item analyses and confirmatory factor analyses on the Test of Self‐Conscious Affect (TOSCA), in a student (N = 723) and an adult (N = 891) sample, supported the theorized four factor structure of proneness to reparation, negative self‐evaluation, externalizing blame and unconcern. However, two‐fifth of the items did not empirically differentiate between two or more factors. Differential TOSCA scales, including only differentiating TOSCA items, were constructed and related to measures of long‐term affect, depression, anxiety, and anger. Both the pattern and size of correlations of the original and the differential TOSCA scales were almost identical. Results of this study support the interpretation of TOSCA guilt as a measure of a tendency to reparation associated with guilt and TOSCA shame as a measure of a tendency to global negative self‐evaluation. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Perceptions of group homogeneity as a function of social comparison: The mediating role of group identity

Recent research has shown that creating an intergroup context of comparison may influence the outgroup homogeneity effect or even turn it into an ingroup homogeneity effect. In the present study, the aim was to replicate these findings by using overall judgment of similarity instead of the more commonly used dimensional ratings. Further, and more importantly, it was argued that this effect could be explained by an increase in the salience of participants’ group identity. The results showed that context of comparison revealed an effect on both level of group identification and perceptions of relative ingroup and outgroup homogeneity. In line with predictions, participants’ level of group identification seemed to account for the effect of the comparison context on the homogeneity ratings.