Mental competence and the question of beneficent intervention

The authors examine recent arguments purporting to show that mental incompetence (lack of decision-making capacity) is not a necessary condition for intervention in a person's best interests without consent. It is concluded that these arguments fail to show that competent wishes could justifiably be overturned. Nonetheless, it remains an open question whether accounts of decision-making capacity based solely on the notions of understanding and appreciation can adequately deal with various complexities. Different possible ways of resolving these complexities are outlined, all of which need further exploration.     

The learning of goal-directed locomotion: A perception-action perspective

This study was designed to better understand the process underlying the learning of goal-directed locomotion. Subjects walked on a treadmill in a virtual reality setting and were asked to cross pairs of oscillating doors. The subjects' behaviour was examined at the beginning of the learning process (pretest), after 350 trials (intermediate test), and after 700 trials (posttest). The data were analysed at three different levels, each representing a specific aspect of the global response: performance outcome, displacement kinematics, and current arrival condition. While some aspects of performance outcome suggested the presence of a ceiling effect in the intermediate test, both displacement kinematics and current arrival condition clearly highlighted continuous transformations of the control mechanism involved. The learning process is best described as (1) the establishing of a relationship between specific information and a movement parameter and (2) the optimization of this relationship. The optimization process is characterized by the further exploration of the available behavioural repertoire and by the refinement of the dialogue between information and movement.     

The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: MT. 5:8 in Augustine's Trinitarian Theology of 400

The essay is an analysis of Augustine's solution to what I identify as the Homoian subordinationist understanding of the Son's visibility. This solution lies in Augustine's (re-)interpretation of Old Testament theophanies, and his doctrine of the vision through Christ of the Trinity at the end-time which Augustine supports by an exegesis of Mt. 5:8. Historically, the issue for Augustine is the connection made between doctrines of the Son's inherent "visibility" before the Incarnation and arguments made both against modalism and in support of subordinationism on the basis of that visibility. For Augustine's own Trinitarian theology, any consideration of a sight or vision of God in, e.g., Old Testament theophanies or the Incarnation necessarily raises questions about "sight" as both sensible and noetic knowledge, the structure of our way(s) of knowing, and the role of faith as the means for purifying the knowing capacity in humanity. The question of the vision of God which Augustine addresses in those early books of de Trinitate which are written around the year four hundred is connected to Augustine's epistemological concerns addressed in a variety of writings written before or contemporary to books I-IV of de Trinitate .