Differential effects of aging on processes involved in mental imagery generation]

The purpose of this study was to measure the degree to which the deterioration of mental image generation processes observed in elderly subjects by Dror and Kosslyn (1994) depends on the nature of the processing (referential vs. representational) involved in performing the task at hand. In keeping with the results of research showing that processing resources diminish as normal aging occurs (Craik & Bird, 1982; Rabinowitz, Craik & Ackerman, 1982), we suggest that generation ability based on referential processing is affected to a greater extent in older adults than is the generation ability involving representational processing. Fifteen young adults and 15 elderly persons performed a generation task modeled on that used by Dror and Kosslyn (1994). Observations were based on two contrasting conditions. In the first instance, subjects were required to generate an image representation of numbers when instructed to do so by a graphic stimulus, e.g., "31" (representational generation). In the second case, generation was produced on the basis of a verbal stimulus, e.g., "thirteen" (referential generation). Results (response time and number of accurate answers) show that, compared to young adults, elderly adults have a diminished ability to generate images based on words rather than numbers and do so at a slower pace. Our results suggest, therefore, that the performance of the first type of generation is cognitively more demanding for elderly subjects than that which is founded on figurative stimuli. The deterioration of mental image generation processes observed in elderly subjects by Dror and Kosslyn (1994) is therefore dependent on the nature of processing (referential vs. In conclusion we suggest two complementary assumptions to explain the observed dissociation. The differential effect of age may be the result of a deficienness cy linked to the nature of processing (control vs. automatic). Our second assumption is that, more specifically, referential generation involves more processing resources than does representational generation because it requires an additional transcoding operation. In this instance, the differential effect of aging that we observed would be closely linked to the number of cognitive operations involved in mental image generation.     

Visual perspective taking for avatars in a Simon task

In modern digital applications, users often interact with virtual representations of themselves or others, called avatars. We examined how these avatars and their perspectives influence stimulus–response compatibility in a Simon task. Participants responded to light/dark blue stimuli with left/right key presses in the presence of a task-irrelevant avatar. Changes in stimulus–response compatibility were used to quantify changes in the mental representation of the task and perspective taking toward this avatar. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that perspective taking for an avatar occurred in orthogonal stimulus–response mappings, causing a compatibility effect from the avatar’s point of view. In the following two experiments we introduced a larger variety of angular disparities between the participant and avatar. In Experiment 3, the Simon effect with lateralized stimulus positions remained largely unaffected by the avatar, pointing toward an absence of perspective taking. In Experiment 4, after avatar hand movements were added in order to strengthen the participants’ sense of agency over the avatar, a spatial compatibility effect from the avatar’s perspective was observed again, and hints of the selective use of perspective taking on a trial-by-trial basis were found. Overall, the results indicate that users can incorporate the perspective of an avatar into their mental representation of a situation, even when this perspective is unnecessary to complete a task, but that certain contextual requirements have to be met.     

Beyond the Obvious: Chronic Vividness of Imagery and the Use of Information in Decision Making

The authors investigate two competing hypotheses about how chronic vividness of imagery interacts with the vividness and salience of information in decision making. Results from four studies, covering a variety of decision domains, indicate that chronic imagery vividness rarely amplifies the effects of vivid and salient information. Imagery vividness may, in fact, attenuate the effects of vivid and salient information. This is because, relative to nonvivid imagers, vivid imagers rely less on information that appears obvious and rely more on information that seems less obvious. This tendency is so robust that vividness of imagery may amplify the effects of vivid information only when this information is the only information available in the decision field. The findings seem to reflect vivid imagers' tendency to totally immerse themselves in a decision problem and scrutinize the available information creatively.     

Change of intensity fails to produce an irrelevant sound effect: implications for the representation of unattended sound.

Sequences of changing sounds that are irrelevant to the task at hand disrupt serial recall appreciably even though participants are instructed to ignore the sounds. Three experiments, which compared the effect of changing token identity with that of changing intensity in the 55- to 85-dB (A) range, were conducted. Although serial recall was impaired by changes in token identity, no disruptive effects of a change in intensity were found. This was replicated using speech and nonspeech. Overall, the absence of a changing intensity effect was based on an analysis of the performance of 115 participants in a design whose power was .98. This outcome suggests that the representation of intensity in preattentive processing of auditory stimuli is somewhat different from that of other acoustic features.     

Influence of Expertise on the Intentional Transfer of Motor Skill

Intentional transfer of expert knowledge is an important issue in cognitive science and motor skills. How subjects deliberately transfer expertise in karate when learning a closely related motor skill (tai chi) was examined in this study. Subjects (N = 20) learned a videotaped sequence of self-defense movements, evaluated their learning, and then performed the sequence. Self-regulation of learning is believed to be central to effective transfer. The measures of self-regulation were accuracy of self-evaluation, video use, and approach to learning. Results showed that unlike novices, experts used self-regulation, learning strategies, and the video player in more complex ways in self-regulation. Experts, as compared with novices, demonstrated their greater knowledge through the higher quality of their performance and their better comprehension of movement meaning; but both groups recalled an equal number of moments, suggesting that both experts and novices transferred general knowledge about learning.     

Knowledge level learning and the power law: A soar model of skill acquisition in scheduling

Zusammenfassung. Das hier vorgestellte Modell lernt graduell, Planungsaufgaben aus der Klasse der Maschinenbelegungsprobleme (job-shop-scheduling problems) zu lösen. Mit Hilfe des Chunking-Mechanismus von Soar wird episodisches Wissen über die Belegungsreihenfolge von Aufträgen auf Maschinen memoriert. Bei der Entwicklung des Modells wurden zahlreiche qualitative (z. B. Transfereffekte) und quantitative Befunde (z. B. Bearbeitungszeiten) aus einer früheren empirischen Untersuchung berücksichtigt. In einer Validierungsstudie wurden dieselben Aufgaben von 14 Probanden und dem Modell bearbeitet. Die Passung von Simulationsdaten und empirischen Ergebnissen fiel insgesamt gut aus. Allerdings löst das Modell die Aufgaben schneller und zeigt auch einen etwas besseren Lernverlauf als die Probanden. Das Modell liefert eine Erklärung für das Rauschen, das typischerweise bei Bearbeitungszeiten zu beobachten ist: es handelt sich um erworbenes Wissen, das mehr oder weniger gut und auch unterschiedlich häufig auf neue Situationen übertragen wird. Der Lernverlauf der Probanden entspricht nur für aggregierte Daten einer Potenzfunktion (power law). Der vorgestellte Mechanismus zeigt, wie ein symbolisches Modell der Informationsverarbeitung graduelle Verhaltensänderungen generiert und wie der offensichtliche Erwerb allgemeiner Prozeduren ohne explizites Lernen von deklarativen Regeln erfolgen kann. Es wird nahegelegt, daß es sich hier um die Modellierung einer Form impliziten Lernens handelt. Summary. The model presented here gradually learns how to perform a job-shop scheduling task. It uses Soar's chunking mechanism to acquire episodic memories about the order to schedule jobs. The model was based on many qualitative (e.g., transfer effects) and quantitative (e.g., solution time) regularities found in previously collected data. The model was tested with new data where scheduling tasks were given to the model and to 14 subjects. The model generally fit these data with the restrictions that the model performs the task (in simulated time) faster than the subjects, and its performance improves somewhat more quickly than the subjects' performance. The model provides an explanation of the noise typically found in problem solving times - it is the result of learning actual pieces of knowledge that transfer more or less to new situations but rarely by an average amount. Only when the data are averaged (i.e., over subjects) does the smooth power law appear. This mechanism demonstrates how symbolic models can exhibit a gradual change in behavior and how the apparent acquisition of general procedures can be performed without resorting to explicit declarative rule generation. We suggest that this may represent a type of implicit learning.     

The puzzle of language evolution

Linguistics must again concentrate on the evolutionary nature of language, so that language models are more realistic with respect to human natural languages and have a greater explanatory force. Multi-agent systems are proposed as a possible route to develop such evolutionary models and an example is given of a concrete experiment in the origins and evolution of word-meaning based on a multi-agent approach.     

Faulty Judgment,Expert Opinion,and Decision-Making Capacity

An assessment of decision-making capacity is the accepted procedure for determining when a person is not competent. An inferential gap exists between the criteria for capacity specific abilities and the legal requirements to understand relevant information and appreciate the consequences of a decision. This gap extends to causal influences on a person'scapacity to decide. Using a published case of depression, we illustrate that assessors' uses of diagnostic information is frequently not up to the task of bridging this inferential gap in a justifiable way. We then describe cases of faulty judgement which challenge the understanding of diagnostic causal influences. These cases help to clarify the nature of the expertise required for capacity assessments. In practice, the requirements of decision-making capacity are often abandoned to other considerations due to a lack of requisite expertise. The legal policy supporting decision-making capacity as a means to protective intervention is justified only if the requisite expertise is developed. We propose the requisite expertise to be developed in the long term as a distinct multidisciplinary endeavour.