Noncompliance with Persuasive Appeals for a Prosocial,Altruistic Act: Blood Donating1

Effects of persuasive messages, responsibility denial (RD), and attitude-accessing on blood-giving attitudes, intentions, moral obligations, and behavior were examined. In Study 1, participants (n= 84) who heard a message emphasizing moral reasons for donating indicated a more favorable postmessage attitude and stronger moral obligation to donate than participants exposed to a message aimed at reducing fear, a combined moral and fear- reduction message, or no message. Combined message participants showed greatest intent to donate, yet only 14% of all participants attended a campus drive. In Study 2, low (n= 52) and high (n= 60) RD individuals heard the message arguments and were asked to access their attitudes. Low compared to high RD individuals stated a stronger sense of moral obligation, particularly when they accessed their thoughts relevant to blood donating, and behavioral intention, especially in the combined message condition. Few participants attended a blood drive (12.5%), yet most were low RD individuals from the nonaccessed attitude condition (83%). Results suggest that few individuals will engage in the altruistic act of blood donating, despite the experimental use of persuasive messages and accessing issue-relevant attitudes.     

An "Epidemic" Model of Adolescent Cigarette Smoking

The prevalence of regular smoking increases rapidly during adolescence. We applied modeling methods from the study of epidemic infectious disease to smoking behavior. Our "epidemic" models dealt with the process of transition among four states: nonsmoker (susceptible), trier (exposed), regular smoker (infected), and ex-smoker (recovered). The best fitting model was one in which the transition from nonsmoker to trier was a social contagion process where nonsmokers contacted either triers or regular smokers. All other transitions were treated as constant rate processes in which a constant proportion of eligible individuals made the transition in a given year. The recursive equation model embodying these assumptions was able to predict accurately the proportion of adolescents in each state in Grades 6–11. Our results support a "stage" model of smoking, suggesting that different psychological and physiological processes are involved in the initiation of smoking than in developing a habit of regular smoking. A possible sex difference was found in the non-contact transition between trier and smoker states, with the transition being more probable in females than in males.     

Reaction time to threat stimuli in panic disorder and social phobia

Two studies assessed response time among clinically anxious subjects and normal controls when presented with threat, positive and neutral stimuli under perceptual (lexical decision) and semantic (category decision) task conditions. In Study 1, panic disorder subjects' (n = 14) performance was compared to that of matched normal controls (n = 14) while in Study 2 social phobic subjects (n = 24) were compared to matched normal controls (n = 24). Relative to matched normal controls, panic disorder subjects but not social phobics tended to show greater slowing in performance on the more cognitively complex (category) task. A second finding, consistent across both studies was that, compared to the normal control groups, both panic and social phobic groups showed significantly slowed responses to threat words in both the perceptual and semantic tasks. Such findings are directly counter to the predictions of a mood congruence hypothesis. This apparent contradiction is resolved by a review of the literature which indicates that mood-related facilitation effects are obtained only in tasks which tap awareness of threat information rather than speed of response. It is suggested that while anxiety may produce enhanced awareness of threat, it may inhibit responsiveness to it. The results of these studies are seen as consistent with ethological theories of inhibited motoric responses under certain threat conditions. Furthermore, the findings suggest that caution is indicated in interpreting slowed reaction time to threat stimuli in tasks such as the Stroop color naming task as purely the result of attentional processes.     

USING STIMULUS EQUIVALENCE PROCEDURES TO TEACH NAME-FACE MATCHING TO ADULTS WITH BRAIN INJURIES

On pretests, 3 men with brain injuries matched dictated names of three therapists to written names, but did not match dictated or written names to photos, produce correct names in response to photos, locate offices given written names, or name therapists on sight. Match-to-sample training established conditional relations between dictated names and photos. Posttests showed the emergence of untrained conditional relations involving photos and written names, indicating development of three classes of equivalent stimuli (each containing a dictated name, photo, and written name). For 1 participant, conditional relations involving photos of office nameplates were also examined, but did not emerge pre- or posttraining. Two participants produced names orally when given photos and sorted written names and faces together after training; the 3rd participant was unavailable for these posttests. After training, 1 participant located and named all three therapists in their offices.     

The concept of sin in pastoral counseling

The concept of sin seems to have virtually disappeared from the pastoral counseling literature, and this likely reflects the possibility that it has virtually disappeared from the practice of pastoral counseling. This article presents a case for returning the concept of sin to pastoral counseling and does so by discussing the psychospiritual importance of addressing sin, defining sin in a pastorally useful way, discussing four capital sins in light of a contemporary understanding of sin, and drawing some pastoral implications.     

The ω-rule

We prove that all proofs in -logic (a first order logic with -rule added) in which -rule is used finitely many times can be turned into proofs in which the -rule is used at most one time. Next, we prove that the word finitely above cannot be changed by the word infinitely.