The adaptive significance of destructiveness in primitive personalities

Destructiveness in primitive personalities is not restricted to a segment of the person as it is in the case of neurotics, but is global and pervasive. This destructiveness is meaningfully configured in a manner which cannot fully be accounted for by constitutional factors or be comprehended from the individual, intrapsychic, conflictual viewpoint of classical psychoanalysis. It follows an interpersonally meaningful pattern and therefore has adaptive significance in the contemporary life of the individual. The adaptive model I propose does not violate essential canons of psychoanalytic theory, for it can simultaneously be conceptualized in terms of intrapsychic structure and dynamics. This model holds out the possibility for a therapeutic approach to primitive personality organization which differs in some but by no means all respects from classical analysis.     

BEHAVIORAL MOMENTUM IN THE TREATMENT OF NONCOMPLIANCE

Behavioral momentum refers to the tendency for behavior to persist following a change in environmental conditions. The greater the rate of reinforcement, the greater the behavioral momentum. The intervention for noncompliance consisted of issuing a sequence of commands with which the subject was very likely to comply (i.e., high-probability commands) immediately prior to issuing a low-probability command. In each of five experiments, the high-probability command sequence resulted in a “momentum” of compliant responding that persisted when a low-probability request was issued. Results showed the antecedent high-probability command sequence increased compliance and decreased compliance latency and task duration. “Momentum-like” effects were shown to be distinct from experimenter attention and to depend on the contiguity between the high-probability command sequence and the low-probability command.     

UNIVERSALISM IN LAY CONCEPTIONS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A CROSS-CULTURAL EXAMINATION

In two studies of Japanese and Australian university students, we examined the resource allocation rules of equity and equality. In both cultures, subjects were universalistic rather than relativistic in their judgments of fairness and alterability of these rules in the work place. They judged the equity rule to be unalterable by legislation or consensus. However, in both studies, the Japanese perceived equity to be less fair and equality to be less unfair than their Australian counterparts. In addition, study 2 indicated that cross-cultural differences in judgments of fairness were influenced by consideration of need. The age of the worker was a more important determinant of fairness judgments for Japanese than for Australians; the debt of a worker was a more important déterminant for Australians than for Japanese. The results are discussed with regard to the role of culture in conceptions of distributive justice.     

Hindsight bias: An interaction of automatic and motivational factors?

If subjects are asked to recollect a former response after having been informed about the correct response, their recollection tends to approach the correct response. This effect has been termedhindsight bias. We studied hindsight bias in an experiment requiring numerical responses to almanac-type questions for physical quantities. We varied (1) the time at which the correct information was provided, (2) the encoding of the original responses by asking/not asking subjects to give a reason for the respective response, and (3) the motivation to recall correctly. We found that hindsight is less biased if reasons are given and if the correct information is provided at an earlier time. Motivation had only interactive effects: (1) With high motivation to recall correctly, the time the correct information was provided had no influence. (2) With reasons given, the variation of motivation showed no effect. These results rule out purely motivational and purely automatic explanations.     

Type A behavior and emotional responses to uncertainty: A test of the self-appraisal model

The self-appraisal model of Type A behavior holds that Type A's desire an accurate appraisal of abilities, and respond to uncertainty about abilities with exaggerated attempts to generate diagnostic information. The model also predicts that the major emotional response to uncertainty for Type A's is anxiety. In this study, Type A's and B's were induced to succeed or fail on a task where they were either very certain or very uncertain of their subsequent ability levels. Task failure produced greater depression, anger, and frustration for all subjects. Consistent with the self-appraisal model's prediction, uncertainty (regardless of success or failure) led to greater anxiety for Type A's than for Type B's. In fact, greater uncertainty produced lower anxiety for Type B's, indicating that Type A's and B's differ dramatically in their emotional responses to uncertainty about abilities.