Context-dependent variation in social stereotyping 2: The relationship between frame of reference,self-categorization and accentuation

This paper examines the hypothesis that patterns of stereotypic accentuation reflect the degree to which judged stimuli share the same social category membership as the stereotyper, Following self-categorization theory, the degree of this shared identity is operationalized in terms of the meta-contrast ratio as a function of the positions of (a) stereotyper and (b) stereotyped target relative to (c) the stereotyper's frame of reference. Three experiments are reported which sought to manipulate shared category membership either by extension of subjects' frame of reference or by extremitization of target and subject with respect to that frame. As predicted, greater shared identity was associated with stronger assimilation of the target to subjects' own position and with change in stereotype content. Findings are discussed in relation to theories of personality, social judgement and social cognition. Like the accentuation processes which underpin them, it is proposed that stereotypes are sensitive to comparative context and that they reflect veridically the social self-categorical properties of stimuli.     

Ingroup bias and the ‘black sheep’ effect: Assessing the impact of social identification and perceived variability on group judgements

Two studies compared the relative strength of motivational assumptions drawn from SIT (e.g. Tajfel, 1978) and memory-based assumptions drawn from the differential familiarity hypothesis (Linville, Fischer and Salovey, 1989) in explaining ingroup bias and the black sheep effect (Marques, 1986, 1990). In Study 1, 15 subjects estimated member distributions and gave overall ratings of an ingroup and two outgroups. In Study 2, 42 subjects performed similar tasks for ingroup or outgroup, and evaluated likeable and unlikeable group members. Results showed, first, that overall group ratings account better for ingroup bias than do central tendencies of group distributions. In addition, likeable and unlikeable ingroup members were, respectively, upgraded and downgraded relative to their outgroup counterparts. Finally, whole ingroup ratings as well as judgements of likeable and unlikeable ingroup members proved more independent from variability and central tendency of underlying distributions than did similar outgroup judgements. Results are discussed in light of motivational and knowledge-based determinants of group judgements.     

Truthlikeness without truth: A methodological approach

In this paper, an attempt is made to solve various problems posed to current theories of verisimilitude: (1) the (Miller's) problem of linguistic variance; (2) the problem of which are the best scientific methods for getting the most verisimilar theories; and (3) the question of the ontological commitment in scientific theories. As a result of my solution ot these problems, and with the help of other considerations of epistemological character, I conclude that the notion of Tarskian truth is dispensable in a rational (and realist) interpretation of the scientific enterprise. As a logical result, however, falsificationism will be vindicated.

... and in brief, a speaker must always aim at verisimilitude, and send the truth packing.

Plato,Phaedrus, 272 EI want to express my gratitude to Professors García-Bermejo, Niiniluoto, and Zofío for interesting comments and critiques of several of the ideas in this paper, and to Miss Karen Firnich for correcting my English. I am also thankful to an anonymous referee who indicated several dark points on a previous version of my article.     

Backward induction and beliefs about oneself

According to decision theory, the rational initial action in a sequential decision-problem may be found by ‘backward induction’ or “folding back’. But the reasoning which underwrites this claim appeals to the agent's beliefs about what she will later believe, about what she will later believe she will still later believe, and so forth. There are limits to the ‘depth’ of people's beliefs. Do these limits pose a threat to the standard theory of rational sequential choice? It is argued, first, that the traditional solutions of certain games depend on knowledge which exceeds depth limits, and that these solutions therefore cannot be shown rational in the usual sense. Then, for that related reason even ‘folding back’ solutions of one-person problems cannot be! A revision of our notion of rational choice is proposed, analogous to the reliabilist account of knowledge of Goldman and others, by which this paradox is resolved.     

Misremembering a familiar object: Mnemonic illusion,not drawing bias

It was reported by Jones (1990) that the design of British coins is systematically misremembered. Although the Queen's head in fact faces right, most people draw it facing left. It is possible, however, that the origin of this phenomenon does not reside in memory but instead in a leftward drawing bias. Two experiments of the three reported here tested this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, British participants attempted to recall the direction of the Queen's head but responded verbally instead of pictorially. The results were similar to those of Jones and thus contradict the hypothesis that misremembering of the Queen's head is caused by a leftward drawing bias. In Experiment 2, Canadian participants attempted to draw a Canadian coin. Leftward misremembering was not observed in this case. Thus the hypothesized importance of a leftward drawing bias was again not supported. Instead, the results provided support for the schema explanation of the Queen's Head memory illusion proposed by Jones. The results of Experiment 3, which compared memory for British coins and stamps, further bolstered this conclusion.     

A developmental evaluation of the role of word shape in word recognition

Fourth- and seventh-grade children and college-age adults proofread passages typed either in lowercase or in all capital letters. Words were misspelled by deleting one of four letters, s, c, k, or p, that have similar features in lowercase and uppercase. Proofreading errors decreased with age and increasing reading ability, but all of the subjects were sensitive to changes in word shape--they missed more words with deletions of s or c than k or p in the lowercase passage but not in the all-capitals passage. These findings indicate that word shape is an important variable in recognizing familiar words, even for young readers.     

The role of syllabic and orthographic properties of letter cues in solving word fragments

The present research examined the role of phonological and orthographic properties of cues in mediating the retrieval of words from the mental lexicon. The task required subjects to resolve fragmented words when provided with semantically related cues (e.g., spiteful:---DIC----). Phonological properties of the letter cues were manipulated such that the letters either corresponded to the syllables (e.g., DIC in vindictive) or nonsyllables (NDI) in the word. Orthographic properties of the letter cues were manipulated by selecting letter groups that either co-occurred frequently in the language or did not. In two experiments, results revealed little or no effect of the phonological variable (syllables) but a reliable effect of the orthographic variable (letter-cue frequency). Letter cues with a low frequency of co-occurrence in the language led to better completion of the fragmented words. We interpret these findings as support for models of lexical representation that are based on orthographic properties (e.g., Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989) rather than those based on phonological constraints.     

Output and retrieval interference in the missing-number task

Three experiments are reported that represent a reexamination of the missing-number method (Buschke, 1963b) of estimating short-term memory span. The missing-number task involved presenting a random sequence of all but one of the numbers of a known reference set and asking subjects to identify the missing number. Experiment 1 introduced a modified missing-number task that included two missing items and two choices made by the subject. With a large decline in performance for the second choice relative to the first, it is possible that only the second choice was subject to output or retrieval interference. An alternative explanation is that subjects output the number with the weakest memory representation as their first response. By postcuing subjects to report their two choices in a forward or backward sequence, Experiment 2 provided evidence against the importance of output interference and support either for the importance of retrieval interference or for the "weakest-first" hypothesis. However, with a paradigm that replaced only correctly identified missing numbers, a prediction that subjects would select the number with the weakest memory representation as their first response was not confirmed in Experiment 3. Instead, retrieval interference was implicated to explain the first-choice superiority found in Experiments 1 and 3. The results were interpreted in terms of the TODAM model of Murdock (1982, 1987, in press).