Wordshape errors in language production

Errors in natural speech that crucially involve the shape of the target word, i.e. interact in some way with the number of consonants and vowels in the word and their relative positioning, are examined in detail. It is shown that context highly constrains the rate of such errors. The data implicate a distinction between a segment level that encodes fine phonemic distinctions and a wordshape level with a course encoding. Implications for the representation of language and cognitive processing in language production are explored.     

The relationship between underpredicted pain and escape

Escape and avoidance that are disproportional to the danger of the pertinent stimulus are important clinical problems that are often related to inaccurate (catastrophic) expectations. One possible source of such expectations is a prior, underestimated aversive experience. In the present experiment the hypotheses that underestimated pain leads to escape and that it leads to avoidance were tested. In order to control for the effect of the intensity of the pain stimulus, a control group that received 20 pain stimuli of high intensity was formed. Subjects in the experimental condition received 17 pain stimuli of low intensity and 3 of (unexpectedly) high intensity (experimentally induced underprediction). Underprediction of the high intensity stimulus was significantly related to escape, but not to avoidance. The results suggest that the way in which avoidance was operationalized accounts for this. The strong support of the hypothesized relationship between underpredicted pain and escape is an important finding, however.     

Towards a theory of algorithm-determined cognitive test construction

A rationale for, and data from, a trial of a theory of item generation by algorithms whose origins are cognitive models of task performance are presented. Since Spearman (1904), intelligence has been operationally defined and assessed in human subjects by administering identical test items whose content and order have been fixed only after empirical iterations. In our approach, intelligence is ostensively defined by theoretically determined algorithms used for item construction and presentation. Knowledge of what cognitive factors limit human performance makes it possible to vary within tightly specified parameters those features of the tasks that contribute to difficulty, which we call radicals, to let those components of the tasks that do not contribute to difficulty vary randomly, and to counterbalance aspects of answer production that might induce biases of response. Empirical data are based on the generation of five different short tests demanding only functional literacy as a prerequisite for their execution. Four parallel forms of each test were administered to young male Army recruits whose scores were collated with their Army Entrance Test results, which were not previously known to us. Results show that the parallel, algorithm-generated item sets are statistically invariant, which item generation theory demands; and that the individual tests differentially predict Army Entrance Test scores. We conclude that IQ test performances are parsimoniously explained by individual differences in encoding, comparison and reconstructive memory processes.     

Numerical abstraction by human infants

Across several experiments, 6- to 8-month-old human infants were found to detect numerical correspondences between sets of entities presented in different sensory modalities and bearing no natural relation to one another. At the basis of this ability, we argue, is a sensitivity to numerosity, an abstract property of collections of objects and events. Our findings provide evidence that the emergence of the earliest numerical abilities does not depend upon the development of language or complex actions, or upon cultural experience with number.     

Event representation in Pavlovian conditioning: image and action

In a typical Pavlovian conditioning experiment, a relatively insignificant event, the conditioned stimulus (CS), is paired with a biologically more meaningful event, the unconditioned stimulus (US). As a consequence of those pairings, the CS is thought to acquire response characteristics of the US. In this article I describe experiments with rats that suggest that under some circumstances, the CS acquires control of perceptual processing of the US, in the absence of that US itself. I present three kinds of evidence for this surrogate processing, which I liken to imagery or hallucination: (1) CSs come to control specific, sensory-evaluative responses normally evoked only by the USs; (2) CSs can substitute for USs in the establishment of new learning about those USs themselves; (3) CSs can substitute for USs in the modulation of conditioning to other events, either overshadowing (interfering) or potentiating learning, in the same manner as the USs themselves. Finally, I compare these data with evidence for conditioned sensation and imagery in humans, and suggest that imagery may be a very basic process, evolutionarily derived from perceptual and conditioning processes adapted to deal with remote or absent objects.     

Literalism as a marker of hypnotic "trance": disconfirming evidence

The responses given by highly hypnotizable, hypnotic subjects and those of unhypnotizable subjects who simulated hypnosis to questions of the type, "Do you mind telling me your name?" and "Do you mind standing up?" were contrasted. The purpose was to examine Erickson's (1980) assertion that literalism (answering "yes" or "no" verbally or nonverbally without any cognitive elaboration) is a marker of hypnotic "trance." Simulators exhibited a greater rate of literalism than hypnotic "virtuosos" (i.e., extreme scorers on both group and individual hypnotizability measures). Hypnotized subjects and nonhypnotized subjects approached in the campus library responded comparably. Because less than a third of hypnotic virtuosos responded literally, our results strongly refuted Erickson's assertion that literalism is a cognitive feature of hypnosis.     

Selective processing of threat cues in posttraumatic stress disorder

Vietnam combat veterans with (n = 15) and without (n = 15) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) performed a modified Stroop task in which they named the colors of neutral words (e.g., INPUT), positive words (e.g., LOVE), obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) words (e.g., GERMS), and PTSD words (e.g., BODYBAGS). In contrast to normal controls, PTSD patients took significantly longer to color-name PTSD words than to color-name neutral, OCD, and positive words. Because Stroop interference reflects involuntary semantic activation, it may provide a quantitative measure of intrusive cognitive activity--the hallmark symptom of PTSD.     

Children's understanding of private keys in referential communication

A private key is a referential utterance used to inform selectively. The ambiguity of the utterance conceals meaning from nonselected audience members. The purpose of this study was to examine three aspects of children's understanding of the use of private keys. Experiment 1 concerned children's sensitivity to information in the context of utterance (i.e., the common ground). Experiment 2 examined appreciation of audience design and the speaker's intent. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 explored some reasons for children's problems in understanding private keys. The results show that even first graders are sensitive to common ground information and the speaker's intent. However, audience design is troublesome even for second graders in some situations, probably because they fail to assess the knowledge of the audience members. Private keys are important theoretically because they represent an aspect of referential communication involving the uses of ambiguous utterances that have been ignored by developmental researchers.