THE CREDIBLE SHRINKING ROOM:

Abstract— Becoming a proficient symbol user is a universal developmental last in the first years of life, but delecting and mentally representing symbolic relations can be quite challenging for young children To test the extent to which symbolic reasoning per se is problematic, we compared the performance of 2-year-olds in symbolic and nonsymbolic versions of a search task. The children had to use their knowledge of the location of a toy hidden in a room to draw an inference about where to find a miniature toy in a scale model of the room (and vice versa) Children in the nonsymbolic condition believed a shrinking machine had caused the room to become the model They were much more successful than children in the symbolic condition, for whom the model served as a symbol of the room The symbol understanding and use.     

THE EFFECTS OF ALIGNABILITY ON MEMORY

Abstract— According to structure-mapping theory, the process of comparison in one of alignment and mapping between representational structures. This process induces a focus on commonalities and alignable differences (i.e., those related to the commonalities). Non-alignable differences (i.e., those not related to the commonalities) are held to be neglected. The theory thus predicts increased focus on the corresponding information, Whether these are commonalities or differences. In this article, we explore the implications of this claim for memory: Specifically, we test the prediction that alignable differences are more likely to be processed and stored than nonalignable differences.
We present a study in which people made similarity comparisons between pairs of pictures and then were probed for recall. The recall probes were figures taken from the pictures and were either alignable or nonalignable differences between the pairs. The alignable differences were better memory probes than the nonalignable differences, suggesting that people were more likely to encode and store the corresponding information than the noncorresponding information.     

INTERRUPTING IRONIC PROCESSES

Abstract— Research on ironic mental control processes makes the under appreciated point that attempts to solve problems sometimes make them worse. Social scientists now know much about what ironic processes look like less about why they occur and too little about how to change them. Features of the exacerbation process itself suggest parsimonious approaches to treatment based on interrupting the "solutions" that keep ironic mental processes going (e.g. compliance-based paradoxical intervention). Extending Wegner's explication of ironic interpersonal (mental) processes we propose that ironic interpersonal (social) processes also maintain many human problems in this area will benefit from attending more to how problems persist between people as well as within them.     

TIME COURSE OF ACTIVATING BRAIN AREAS IN GENERATING VERBAL ASSOCIATIONS

Abstract— Generating a use far a visual word in comparison with reading the word aloud activates frontal attention areas first (170 MS), a left lateral frontal area next (250 ms), and then a left temporoparietal (Wernicke's) area (650 ms). A brief period of practice reduces these activations. If subjects are asked to respond to a word from the same practiced list by giving a novel use, the original activations reappear and are joined by activity similar in location and time to Wernicke's activation but in the right hemisphere. These findings demonstrate the time course of activations of neuroanatomical areas in word processing and indicate a role for the right hemisphere when semantic processing is more difficult, such as in generating a less frequent association in the presence of a highly practiced one.     

Dialektik Und Formalisierung

Dialectics and Formalization. In an appendix to his article Can the concept of dialectic be made clear? (JGPS 27: 131–165) the author critically examined an attempt by D. Wandschneider of reconstructing Hegelian dialectical logic by displaying antinomic structures. The main steps of this reconstruction were formalized within the framework of second order predicate logic. In his reply (JGPS 27: 347–352) Wandschneider argues that formalization is the wrong way of interpreting and judging his reconstruction project on the ground that the understanding of predication is already presupposed by predicate logic and, therefore, cannot be formalized. In the present contribution it is shown that Wandschneider's criticism is based on a fundamentally mistaken conception of formalization and formal logic and that the problems posed by his project remain completely unresolved.     

Referenzsemantik in der Partnermodellierung

How can we explain that an assertion on something perceived can be understood in the same manner by somebody who cannot perceive that scene? This problem bases the interest in computational linguistics in how listener modeling could possibly be harmonized with reference semantics. Mental images substituting real perception appear as a way out. The architecture of the listener model has to be adapted to the creation and use of such pictorial data structures. Furthermore, the relation between the latter and a verbal (i. e., propositional) representation must be understood. The resulting architecture of a listener model with reference semantics can be employed to solve communicational problems from three general classes in a better way, as is demonstrated by an example implementation.     

Correspondence

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

Adjusting Social Inferences in Familiar and Unfamiliar Domains: The Generality of Response to Situational Pragmatics

Two experiments investigated the influence of situational pragmatics on the selective use of specific instances and generalized knowledge structures to make social inferences. In Experiment 1, social inferences were made in an unfamiliar domain similar in structure to a typical situation of social greetings and address, but devoid of useful cues to social schemas. Participants were told that either one or another of the features of the situation was more pragmatically important for deriving inferences about appropriate social behaviour; consistent with predictions from a computational model of analogical mapping (ACME), they made reliable inferences based on analogies to specific instances, with the situational importance of relations guiding the selection of the optimal analogue. In Experiment 2, social inferences were examined in the more familiar domain of predicting social behavior between low and high status persons and between members of an ingroup and an outgroup in Japan. The availability of specific examples was varied, as was the perceived importance of status and group membership. The situation was isomorphic to that in the first experiment, except for the availability of generalized knowledge structures to guide inferences. Participants made relatively veridical inferences that were sensitive to variations in the pragmatic importance of dimensions. Provision of specific analogues had little impact on inferences, suggesting that participants were relying instead on more general and cross-culturally applicable knowledge about adjusting social relations according to situational pragmatics.