On the function of weak phantasmata in perception: Phenomenological,psychological and neurological clues for the transcendental function of imagination in perception

Weak phantasmata have a decisive and specifically transcendental function in our everyday perception. This paper provides several different arguments for this claim based on evidence from both empirical psychology and phenomenology.I would like to express my gratitude to Bill McKenna for his help with the English text and his critical remarks. This paper was presented in the Cork Roundtable for Philosophy in March 2003, at University College, Cork, and I would like to thank Julia Jansen, Tony O’Connor and the other participants for their constructive critique.     

Social dominance orientation,prejudice, and discrimination: A new computer-based method for studying discriminatory behaviors

A number of studies have shown that the scale of social dominance orientation (SDO), used to measure the degree of preference for inequality among social groups, is a predictive measure of social and political attitudes toward stigmatized outgroups. However, the relationship between SDO and discrimination has received little attention. The main goal of this study was to assess the validity of a new computer-based method used to measure discriminatory behaviors in a laboratory setting. An additional goal was to test the mediating role of prejudice in the relation between SDO and discrimination. The results provide a first validation of this new method and demonstrate that the effect of SDO on discrimination is mediated by prejudice.     

In search of the enactive: Introduction to special issue on enactive experience

Abstact In the decade and a half since the appearance of Varela, Thompson and Rosch's workThe Embodied Mind,enactivism has helped to put experience and consciousness, conceived of in a distinctive way, at the forefront of cognitive science. There are at least two major strands within the enactive perspective: a broad view of what it is to be an agent with a mind; and a more focused account of the nature of perception and perceptual experience. The relation between these two strands is discussed, with an overview of the papers presented in this volume.     

A matter of facts

We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally, to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level.     

Statistical analysis for finger tapping with a periodic external stimulus

In this paper we outline an experiment in which seven subjects attempted to tap in synchrony with a pacing stimulus with the interstimulus interval that varied in a cycle (T,T+dT,T, T-dT) repeating every fourth interval, where T represents an unexpected step change of an interstimulus interval. Conditions included three levels of T= (400, 500, and 600 msec.) with four levels of dT= 1, 3, 5, and 7% of T). The statistical analysis indicated that small changes in T lead to rapid matching of the interresponse intervals to the new interstimulus intervals even when the variation in the input is not apparent to subjects.     

Associative interference in recognition memory: A dual-process account

Associative interference from overlapping word pairs (A-B, A-D) reduces recall but has inconsistent effects on recognition. A dual-process account suggests that interference conditions reduce recollection but increase familiarity. This is predicted to increase recognition false alarms but have variable effects on recognition hits, depending on the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity. In three experiments that varied materials (sentences or random nouns) and test type (associative or pair recognition), interference conditions always increased recognition false alarms, but sometimes increased and sometimes decreased recognition hits. However, remember hits always decreased and know hits always increased with interference, patterns predicted of the recollection and familiarity processes, respectively. According to the dual-process view, a manipulation that affects the component processes in opposite ways can produce inconsistent patterns of recognition performance as the relative contribution of recollection and familiarity changes across tasks.     

Retrieving text inferences: Controlled and automatic influences

Bridging inferences contribute to text coherence by identifying the connections among ideas, whereas elaborative inferences simply specify sensible extrapolations from text. Bridging inferences have been indistinguishable from explicit text ideas on numerous measures, suggesting similar longterm memory (LTM) representations for the two, whereas elaborative inferences are inferior. To evaluate the LTM representations of text ideas, we used the extended process-dissociation procedure (Buchner, Erdfelder, & Vaterrodt-Plunnecke, 1995; Jacoby, 1991) to partition the controlled, recollective contributions to text retrieval from the automatic, familiarity-based contributions. The automatic contribution to the recognition of implied concepts was consistently negligible, an outcome consistent with the absence of perceptual processing of those concepts during the original reading. In addition, the controlled basis of recognition was consistently higher for explicit than for implicit concepts, which suggests a more robust conceptual representation for explicit text ideas (Yonelinas, 2002). These results were interpreted to reflect the asymmetric representation of explicit ideas and inferences (elaborative and even bridging inferences) in the surface, propositional textbase, and situational levels of text representation.