The Happiness-Energy Paradox: Energy Use is Unrelated to Subjective Well-Being

Applied Research in Quality of Life - Earth’s per capita energy use continues to grow, despite technological advances and widespread calls for reduction in energy consumption. The negative...     

SEXIST DISCRIMINATION AS DISTANCING BEHAVIOR

This study, the second in a series of investigations of sexist discrimination in face-to-face situations, involved the observations of women and men characters on 10 primetime TV shows found to be most popular with a sample of eighth graders. Distancing behavior—the operational measure of face-to-face discrimination—was found, as predicted, to be manifested more frequently by men TV characters toward women than toward men. Distancing behavior by women TV characters, on the other hand, was not related to the gender of the person with whom they were interacting. Observations were made independently by 53 trained college students, most of whom watched four preassigned TV programs, focusing on either a woman or a man character during a 10–12 minute segment. It was also found that women TV characters appeared less often in the programs than men and that, when they did appear, they were more likely to be shown interacting with men than with other women. Implications for behavioral modeling are discussed.     

Reasonably Traditional: Self–Contradiction and Self–Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition–Based Rationality

Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self–referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self–referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism.