Anxiety, Sensory Over-Responsivity, and Gastrointestinal Problems in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders

Children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) experience high rates of anxiety, sensory processing problems, and gastrointestinal (GI) problems; however, the associations among these symptoms in children with ASD have not been previously examined. The current study examined bivariate and multivariate relations among anxiety, sensory over-responsivity, and chronic GI problems in a sample of 2,973 children with ASD enrolled in the Autism Treatment Network (ages 2–17 years, 81.6 % male). Twenty-four percent of the sample experienced at least one type of chronic GI problem (constipation, abdominal pain, bloating, diarrhea, and/or nausea lasting three or more months). Children with each type of GI problem had significantly higher rates of both anxiety and sensory over-responsivity. Sensory over-responsivity and anxiety were highly associated, and each provided unique contributions to the prediction of chronic GI problems in logistic regression analyses. The results indicate that anxiety, sensory over-responsivity and GI problems are possibly interrelated phenomenon for children with ASD, and may have common underlying mechanisms.     

Why We Must Leave Our Organs to Others

Organ procurement presents several ethical concerns (from what constitutes acceptable criteria for death to issues involved in specifically designating to whom an organ can be given), but none is more central than the concern for what are appropriate means for acquiring organs. The following discussion attempts a different perspective on the issue of organ procurement by arguing that, rather than appealing to our charitable consciences or our pocketbooks, relinquishing our organs after death in this day and age is, in fact, obligatory for most people. Each of us is pressed by the growing demand for our organs should we die “rightly,” and that desperate need has risen to such a level that not to release our organs for transplantation would constitute a serious moral wrong.     

Progressive Dying: Meaningful Acts of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide

In this paper I use William James's understanding of “significance” in life to show that for certain patients euthanasia and assisted suicide can be importantly meaningful acts that family, friends, and health care professionals must acknowledge and even, at times, aid in bringing to fruition. Dying with meaning is transformative. It reshapes the lives of others that are left behind, giving to their lives new groundings by engaging them in the meaning of dying for us. For the patient, dying with meaning takes the seemingly formless void in the abyss of death and gives it a significant purpose in the last stages of life itself; it turns potential nothingness into actual significance. To the extent that we outsiders do not help the dying, we condemn terminally ill patients to a meaningless existence until they die.     

The empirical case for role-governed categories

Most theories of categorization posit feature-based representations. Markman and Stilwell (2001) argued that many natural categories name roles in relational systems and therefore they are role-governed categories. There is little extant empirical evidence to support the existence of role-governed categories. Three experiments examine predictions for ways that role-governed categories should differ from feature-based categories. Experiment 1 shows that our knowledge of role-governed categories, in contrast to feature-based categories, is largely about properties extrinsic to category members. Experiment 2 shows that role-governed categories have more prominent ideals than feature-based categories. Experiment 3 demonstrates that novel role-governed categories are licensed by the instantiation of novel relational structures. We then discuss broader implications for the study of categories and concepts.     

Maternal Depressive Symptoms Predict Girls’ but Not Boys’ Emotion Regulation: A Prospective Moment-to-Moment Observation Study

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - We aimed to further the understanding of maternal depressive symptoms on temporal dynamics of child emotion regulation by applying the process...     

Self-evaluation of abilities: accurate self-assessment versus biased self-enhancement

Past research indicates that individuals are keenly aware of the diagnostic implications of their performance. Theories differ, however, in regard to how this awareness influences task choice. According to the self-assessment view, individuals choose tasks that are maximally informative of abilities, regardless of self-esteem implications. According to the self-enhancement view, task choice is often mediated by a concern for self-esteem protection. In the first study, subjects chose among eight forms of a cognitive abilities test that varied in their diagnosticity of success, diagnosticity of failure, and difficulty. In accordance with the self-assessment view, test choice was found to be positively related to diagnosticity of success and, to a lesser extent, diagnosticity of failure. Test choice was also dependent on the interaction of diagnosticity and difficulty in a manner that was more consistent with the self-assessment view. In a second study that provided more precise measurement of perceived diagnosticity and expected success, results indicated that the motives for self-assessment and self-enhancement were each reliably related to task preference. Of the two, self-assessment motivation was a stronger determinant of task preference. Taken together, these results suggest that task choice is governed largely by a concern for accurate self-appraisal. Additional results, however, indicate that current models may require revisions that take into account the less-than-accurate appraisal of diagnosticity.     

Self-schematic representation of the type A and B behavior patterns

Past research has established clear behavioral differences between Type A and B individuals. The purpose of our research was to examine how these behavioral differences are represented in the self-definitions of Type As and Bs. We investigated the existence of Type A and B self-schemata by using two tasks designed to measure the influence of these hypothetical structures on speed of processing and memory interference. During an initial task, Type As and Bs made self-relevant decisions (like me, not like me) in response to trait adjectives previously scaled as Type A, Type B, or neutral in content. Reaction times for the decisions were measured, and results indicated that both Type As and Bs made faster decisions for schema-compatible responses than for schema-incompatible responses. On a second task, Type As and Bs were tested for recognition memory after they attempted to memorize half of the aforementioned trait list. Memory errors were examined and indicated that Type As and Bs made more errors that were compatible with their respective self-schemata. Taken together, these results indicate that a Type A and B distinction forms a reliable organizing framework for the self-definitions of Type As and Bs. The existence of stable cognitive structures that parallel the behavioral differences between Type As and Bs has important implications for both theory and application.